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Verifiable computation (VC) protocols enable clients to outsource computa-
tions to untrusted servers in the cloud without compromising the integrity of the
computation. Although cryptographic approaches for verifiable computation were
mostly of theoretical interest in the past, there has been great progress in the area
during the past few years. In particular, efficient constructions for Zero-Knowledge
Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) were proposed
and adopted in practice. These techniques enable an untrusted server to prove the
correctness of computations in zero-knowledge using a succinct proof that can be
verified efficiently by the client.
This thesis aims at addressing some challenges in such VC protocols, and
developing practical protocols for cryptocurrency applications. The challenges we
address include the proof computation overhead at the prover’s side, and the level
of expertise expected from the programmers to write secure and efficient programs
for VC. More specifically, current protocols require the programmer to carefully
express the computation as an arithmetic circuit, in a way that minimizes the proof
computation overhead and prevents malicious behavior by the prover, which is a
non-trivial task.
To address the above challenges, we present a framework that aims to reduce
the proof computation overhead, and offer more programmability to non-specialist
developers, while automating the task of circuit minimization through a combination
of techniques. The framework includes new circuit-friendly algorithms for frequent
operations, which achieve constant to asymptotic savings over algorithms used in
previous compilers. In addition, we explore and optimize cryptographic primitives
that have efficient arithmetic circuit representations.
Furthermore, we explore different settings where VC can be used in practice.
We present the design of Hawk, a system for privacy-preserving smart contracts.
Hawk enables custom decentralized applications in the smart contract setting to run
verifiably on top of a public blockchain system, while not revealing the participants’
inputs to the network. To achieve practical performance, Hawk relies on a special
party per contract (a manager) that is only trusted for posterior privacy, but not
for correctness. Finally, we explore how VC techniques and smart contracts could
enable practical crimes in the future, which highlights the importance of working
on countermeasures.
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Outsourcing computations to cloud services, while beneficial, raises security
concerns. A remote service could manipulate the computation result, or provide
approximate solutions to save resources. Therefore, in integrity-sensitive scenarios,
a client will need to verify that the outsourced computation has been performed
correctly. For outsourcing to be meaningful in practical settings, the cost for verify-
ing the solution should be less than the cost of executing the computation natively.
Several approaches have been proposed for solving this problem, including trusted
hardware, replication and cryptography-based approaches. While the former two
approaches rely on certain assumptions, the cryptography-based approaches were
not considered practical until recently.
Fortunately, there has been a significant progress in the area during the past
few years, which enabled efficient implementations for zk-SNARKs (Zero-Knowledge
Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge) , which allows the prover to
argue for the correctness of the computation using a succinct proof that is efficient to
verify [3–5]. It also enables the prover to have secret inputs to the computation. This
progress has lead to developing several applications [2, 6–9], not only as academic
research, but also in industry (ZCash cryptocurrency [10]).
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One bottleneck in the currently used zk-SNARK constructions is the proof
computation time. Such zk-SNARK constructions require representing the out-
sourced computation as an arithmetic circuit. As the size of the circuit (typically
measured as a number of multiplications) increases, the proof computation becomes
more expensive. Additionally, developing such circuits efficiently and securely is
also a challenge. Most of the applications
In this thesis, we aim at addressing these challenges, by building tools and
devising circuit optimizations. Additionally, motivated by the emerging cryptocur-
rency domain, we design and evaluate practical protocols, primarily for cryptocur-
rency applications, that rely primarily on verifiable computation.
1.1 Overview of Contributions
Our contributions can be categorized into two main categories: The first is
developing low and high-level tools that enable programmers to efficiently develop
programs for zk-SNARKs, while devising techniques for optimizing arithmetic cir-
cuit representation. The second is developing efficient verifiable computation-based
protocols for cryptocurrency applications, investigating both its good and dark sides.
1.1.1 Developed Tools
In order to enable programmers and protocol designers to write efficient pro-
grams for verifiable computation, we developed the following tools:
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1. xJsnark (Chapter 3): xJsnark is a high-level tool for developing efficient zk-
SNARK circuits. Using previous compilers for verifiable computation like
Buffet [11] or Pinocchio/Geppetto [12], programmers are assumed to have
some additional experience in order to develop efficient applications on top.
In addition, programmers may need to carefully add extra casting statements,
specify additional prover inputs, or add extra constraints to the code in order
to develop secure and efficient programs. xJsnark attempts to solve these
problems through both the front end features, and the back end algorithms.
In this work, we showed that xJsnark supports building optimized circuits for
existing applications like ZeroCash [7].
In particular, the back end of xJsnark provides new efficient, circuit-friendly
algorithms for frequent operations such as memory accesses and short and long
integer arithmetic; where “circuit-friendliness” in our context means that the
algorithm may be expressed as a compact arithmetic circuit that minimizes
the number of multiplication gates. Our new algorithms can improve the
performance by constant to asymptotic factors in comparison with known
approaches. The front end of xJsnark is currently developed as a Java language
extension using the Jetbrains MPS framework [13]. The front end supports
numerous features designed to help a non-specialist user. For example, we
provide parametrized types, including bitwidth-parametrized integers, and Fp
fields elements at the language level, allowing the user to express short and
long integers very conveniently, and providing hints to the compiler for how
3
to optimize integer operations.
2. Low-level Tools:
To build the protocols developed in Chapters 4 and 5, we developed low level
circuit construction libraries (prior to building xJsnark). We provide more
details on the lower-level tools that we developed in Appendix A.
(a) jsnark [14]: This is a low-level circuit library written in Java, which en-
ables the development of efficient arithmetic circuits for zk-SNARKs, on
top of libsnark [5, 15], a library that implements an improved version of
Pinocchio [4]. jsnark has been used for building several applications, or
benchmarking [2, 8, 16,17].
(b) C∅C∅ [16]: This is a library for building composable zero-knowledge
proofs, that are compatible with the Universal Composability frame-
work [18]. To realize such proofs efficiently, this work also explores se-
lected known cryptographic primitives such as encryption and key ex-
change, and expresses them as efficient arithmetic circuits (Details are
in Appendices A and B). This was part of a joint work with Zhichao
Zhao, Andrew Miller, Yi Qian, Hubert Chan, Charalampos Papaman-
thou, Rafael Pass, abhi shelat and Elaine Shi.
1.1.2 Protocols and Applications
In this direction, we explore how verifiable computation can be used to build
practical protocols for cryptocurrency applications. Motivated by the emerging
4
smart contract technology, we make the following two contributions:
1. HAWK [2]: A decentralized system for privacy-preserving smart contracts. Ex-
isting smart contract systems, like Ethereum [19] lack transactional privacy,
as for transparency purposes, miners have access to the plaintext values of
the inputs. HAWK utilizes the new breakthroughs in verifiable computation
techniques to solve this problem, and enables applications like decentralized
private auctions and crowdfunding to run on a public blockchain system. A
HAWK contract relies on a special party called the manager, that is only
trusted for the privacy of the inputs, which are only revealed after all parties
commit to them. The manager is not trusted for the correctness of the com-
putation. Even if the manager deviates from the protocol or colludes with one
of the participants, this will not affect the outcome of the execution. Chap-
ter 4 illustrates the design and implementation of HAWK. This work appeared
previously in IEEE S&P 2016 as a joint work with Andrew Miller, Elaine Shi,
Zikai Wen and Charalampos Papamanthou.
2. How smart contracts can be used for crime [8]: The introduction of new tech-
nologies usually enables new forms of crimes. For example, technologies like
the internet, social networks and Bitcoin lead previously to new types of crimes
or facilitated the existing ones. Therefore, from a proactive perspective, we in-
vestigate how smart contracts and progress in verifiable computation schemes
could facilitate serious crimes in the future. One of the crimes we investigated
was cryptographic key theft which relied mainly on a practical verifiable com-
5
putation protocol that could allow criminals to use a smart contract system
to fairly exchange such information. We discuss this work in Chapter 5. This
work has appeared in CCS 2016, and is a joint work with Ari Juels and Elaine
Shi.
Additional future directions and open problems are discussed in Chapter 6.
6
Chapter 2: Background and Preliminaries
In this chapter, we provide background about verifiable computation and smart
contracts.
2.1 Verifiable Computation
A verifiable computation (VC) scheme involves two parties, a prover P and a
verifier V , where P proves the correctness of executing a program F on an input x
from V , and (optionally) a secret input u from P . P sends V both the output ~y and
a proof ~π to verify the result. Specifically, a VC scheme typically consists of three
algorithms [20]:
• (PKF , V KF) ← KeyGen(F , 1λ) A randomized algorithm that given an out-
sourced program F and a security parameter λ, it outputs a public proving
key PKF and a verification key V KF . The verification key might be public
or private depending on the setting.
• (y, π) ← Prove(F , PKF , x, u). The prove algorithm for a program F takes
the public proving key PKF , the public input ~x, the prover’s secret input
u, and outputs ~y ← F(x, u), and the proof π proving the correctness of the
computation.
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• {0, 1} ← Verify(V KF , x, y, π). Given the verification key V KF , the proof ~π,
and the statement (x, y), the Verify algorithm outputs 1 if y = F(x, u).
In many practical verifiable computation settings, it is desirable to reduce the
size of the proofs and the effort of the verifier with respect to the computation being
verified. Thankfully, recent research progress have shown how to construct practical
VC schemes using a cryptographic primitive called: zero-knowledge Succinct Non-
interactive ARgument of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs). Most notably, existing imple-
mentations for zk-SNARKs have enabled to have constant size proofs and minimal
verification time under certain assumptions [3, 4].
For simplicity, we mainly focus on what is called preprocessing zk-SNARKs,
in which the whole program is represented as a single circuit or a single system of
constraints, and a one-time trusted setup per each different circuit is needed in the
beginning. However, the techniques we describe for circuit optimizations can also be
extended in a straightforward way to systems that support recursive composition of
zk-SNARKs [12,21]. The formal security definitions for (zk-)SNARKs can be found
in Section 2.3.
2.1.1 Program Representation and Cost model
In the preprocessing zk-SNARKs we are considering, the program to be verified
is expressed as a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP) [3,20], where computations
are represented as a set of quadratic equations over a finite field (typically a 254-bit
prime field p), or in other words, a circuit of additions and multiplications gates mod
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p. We denote each quadratic equation or a multiplication operation as a constraint.
To translate a program into set of constraints, the main operations can be
translated as follows:
Arithmetic Operations (mod p). Translation of addition and multiplication
(mod p) is straightforward. Note that additions and multiplication by constants are
almost free operations, while each multiplication gate costs one constraint.
Bitwise Operations. Access to the individual bits of a wire in the circuit is an
expensive operation. For example, for an n-bit wire w, it would require n + 1
constraints to verify that each bit wire bi achieves the following constraint: bi(1 −
bi) = 0, and that all bits achieve the constraint (
∑
2ibi) × 1 = w . We denote this
gate as split gate, following the naming of Pinocchio, while the reverse operation as
pack gate following the naming convention of libsnark. Note that the pack operation
can be just implemented as a weighted linear combination of the bits. For any two
bits bi, and bj, the operations: AND, OR, and XOR each costs one constraints,
while the negation of a certain bit can be implemented as a linear combination of
the bit.
Arithmetic Operations (mod p′ 6= p). The problem of representing arithmetic
operations is more challenging when the modulus is not equal to p. For example,
when the operations are done over p′ = 2n, to obtain a correct result, a remainder
operation needs to be applied on the result, which leads to a number of constraints
that are at least equal to the bitwidth of the result, as it requires at least one split
gate. However, as we see in Chapter 3, the compiler can apply some heuristics
for efficient translations of such operations. Previous compilers such as [11, 12, 20]
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assume that the programmer is responsible for taking such decisions.
Conditional Statements and Control Flow. In many programs, various kinds
of checks are needed to control the program flow and computation results. This for
example includes equality checks, comparison checks and results of Boolean state-
ments. Checking the equality of two n-bit wires requires two constraints (assuming
n < 254), while the unsigned integer comparison costs about n+ 2 constraints.
Based on the conditional results, the flow of the program may could be decided,
but since all the computation is modeled as a circuit, all the possible execution paths
are encoded in advance in the circuit, but only the valid execution path should have
an impact on the result. Efficient methods for realizing such encoding exist. For
example, the Fairplay compiler [22] provides an efficient approach for encoding the
assignment operations in different execution paths. This approach is inherited by
Buffet [11], since it is built based on the Fairplay compiler front end. Geppetto [12]
on the other hand applies an orthogonal optimization to reduce the effect of the
paths that were not taken on the proof time.
Assertions (mod p). This refers to gates that verify a constraint given input
wires. In its general form, an assertion gate accepts three inputs a, b and c, and
verifies that a× b = c.
Memory/Array Access. Typically, it’s straightforward to represent the array ac-
cess operations, when the indices are known during compilation time. The problem
is challenging when the access index is not known in advance. A solution using the
Pinocchio compiler [20] will perform a linear scan over an n element array, costing
3n constraints.The Pepper compiler [23] provides a Merkle tree approach using an
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Ajtai hash function, costing about 4000 log n constraints. Due to the large mul-
tiplicative constant in the Merkle tree approach, a method for verifying memory
access using permutation networks were proposed in [24], and subsequently used in
TinyRAM [25], and Buffet [11].
It should be noted that what makes the problem of optimized program repre-
sentation for preprocessing zk-SNARKs interesting is that its cost model is different
from the cost models of usual programs. In Chapter 3, we will show how this can
be used to develop new techniques.
2.1.2 Existing Development Tools
The currently used utilities for developing verifiable programs span two differ-
ent categories:
High-level language compilers. This includes many works such as Pinocchio [20],
TinyRam [25], Pantry [23], Buffet [11], and Geppetto [12]. Pinocchio’s compiler
translates a subset of the C programming language to an arithmetic file that pro-
vides a circuit representation of the computation to be verified. Plus its support for
large-scale computations via Multi-QAPs, Geppetto’s compiler provides additional
features over Pinocchio’s compiler, e.g. enabling programmers to define long integer
types, specify bounding constraints in the code and access to bit values. Geppetto’s
compiler also employs energy-saving circuits, by which the prover’s cost gets mini-
mized in branches that are not taken during execution. Pantry and Buffet support
a larger subset of the C language. Pantry was the first to extend verifiability to
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computations with state, such as map-reduce jobs. Buffet provides more efficient
control flow, and random memory accesses, combining the permutation network ap-
proach with compiler optimizations. TinyRam compiles high-level C programs to
TinyRam assembly instructions, and uses a universal circuit that does not require
a set up each time, but this results in higher cost per program step.
Although the above tools include many theoretical and engineering optimiza-
tions, it is not straightforward to develop programs efficiently, especially for cryp-
tographic operations.
Low-level circuit construction tools. Although such tools require more pro-
gramming effort, they were used in many applications that require optimized per-
formance [2, 7, 8]. This for example includes libsnark’s gadget libraries [15]. In
libsnark’s C++ libraries, a programmer represents the verifiable program as gad-
gets connected together. Each gadget defines a set of constraints, and how to set the
value of its output variables. jsnark provides a simpler Java interface to libsnark so
that it can make development easier and likely to produce more efficient circuits, and
it uses the same libsnark cryptographic back end eventually. Other works include
snarklib [26] , and bellman [27].
2.2 Smart Contracts
In this section, we cover some basics about smart contracts which are needed
in Chapters 4 and 5.
New cryptocurrencies [19,28] rely on the novel blockchain technology where the
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network reaches consensus not only about data, but also computations performed
on this data. In Bitcoin for example, miners verify transactions and store valid ones
in a global ledger. As long as the majority of the network is honest, the consistency
of the ledger is maintained. However, Bitcoin supports a limited scripting language
which limits the types of functions that can run on top of the blockchain. Although
there were previous attempts at building smart contracts on top of the Bitcoin
blockchain [29–33], building new custom applications is still not straightforward.
Fortunately, new decentralized cryptocurrency systems such as the recently
launched Ethereum [19] enable a richer form of smart contracts that allow more
general computations. Smart contracts in such systems act as autonomously exe-
cuting trusted parties, who control the flow of money based on a predefined set of
rules that cannot be changed by anyone in the network (assuming honest majority).
This motivated many decentralized applications to be built, like prediction markets,
crowdfunding applications and others [34–37].
Figure 2.1 shows the high-level architecture of a smart contract system instan-
tiated over a decentralized cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. When the
underlying consensus protocol employed the cryptocurrency is secure, a majority
of the miners (as measured by computational resources) are assumed to correctly
execute the contract’s programmable logic.
Cost model To protect decentralized smart contract systems against denial of
service and infinite loop attacks, smart contracts in Ethereum has the notion of
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Figure 2.1: Schematic of a decentralized cryptocurrency system with smart
contracts. A smart contract’s state is stored on a public blockchain system. A
smart contract program is executed by a network of miners who reach consensus
on the outcome of the execution, and update the contract’s state on the blockchain
accordingly. Users can send money or data to a contract; or receive money or data
from a contract.
consumes while executing a contract functionality. Users of smart contracts have to
pay for gas consumed by contracts execution.
In the contracts developed in this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), the gas is not ex-
plicitly expressed in the notation. However, one of our objectives is to minimize the
computation that needs to be performed by the miners, while maintaining privacy.
Therefore, we rely on zk-SNARKs as a main tool, as it enables succinct proofs and
efficient verification compared to other available zero knowledge proof constructions.
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2.2.1 Limitations of smart contracts
Smart contracts enable many beneficial use cases, including financial instru-
ments, decentralized auctions and crowdfunding, .. etc. As in the case of Bitcoin,
no entity can manipulate the execution of a contact, and hence smart contracts
remove the need for trusted intermediaries or reputation-based systems. In compar-
ison with Bitcoin, smart contracts enable fair exchange between distrustful parties
based on a programmable logic. This feature can enable protection against cheating
or aborting adversaries in complex protocols.
However, from another perspective, existing smart contract systems have a
couple of drawbacks which we address or explore in Chapters 4 and 5.
First, they lack transactional privacy. In order to perform computations in
an efficient trustworthy manner on top of a blockchain, the contract logic has to
have access to all the input values of the computation. Additionally, the result of
contract execution is also public. This may not fit many applications where privacy
is essential. Therefore, in this thesis (Chapter 4), we show how we can develop
privacy-preserving smart contracts that aim to solve this problem.
Second, as Bitcoin stimulated a lot of criminal activity due to its pseudonymity,
we expect that smart contracts could also stimulate further criminal activity, pri-
marily due to their richer functionality. For example, they can enable complex fair
exchange between mutually distrustful criminal parties, eliminating the need for
reputation systems or third-party intermediaries that could be manipulated or infil-
trated by law enforcement [38,39]. In Chapter 5, we illustrate how smart contracts
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could be used for criminal activities, to advise the community against their risks.
2.3 Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section, we review the formal definitions for zero knowledge proofs and
zk-SNARKs [16].
Notation. In the following, f(λ) ≈ g(λ) means that there exists a negligible
function ν(λ) such that |f(λ)− g(λ)| < ν(λ).
2.3.1 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK) for an NP language L
consists of the following algorithms:
• crs ← K(1λ,L), also written as crs ← KeyGennizk(1λ,L): Takes in a secu-
rity parameter λ, a description of the language L, and generates a common
reference string crs.
• π ← P(crs, stmt, w): Takes in crs, a statement stmt, a witness w such that
(stmt, w) ∈ L, and produces a proof π.
• b ← V(crs, stmt, π): Takes in a crs, a statement stmt, and a proof π, and
outputs 0 or 1, denoting accept or reject.
• (ĉrs, τ, ek) ← K̂(1λ,L): Generates a simulated common reference string ĉrs,
trapdoor τ , and extraction key ek
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• π ← P̂(ĉrs, τ, stmt): Uses trapdoor τ to produce a proof π without needing a
witness
Perfect completeness. A NIZK system is said to be perfectly complete, if an
honest prover with a valid witness can always convince an honest verifier. More
formally, for any (stmt, w) ∈ R, we have that
Pr
 crs← K(1λ,L), π ← P(crs, stmt, w) :
V(crs, stmt, π) = 1
 = 1
Computational zero-knowledge. Informally, a NIZK system is computationally
zero-knowledge if the proof does not reveal any information about the witness to
any polynomial-time adversary. More formally, a NIZK system is said to compu-
tationally zero-knowledge, if there exists a polynomial-time simulator S = (K̂, P̂),
such that for all non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A,
Pr
[




(ĉrs, τ, ek)← K̂(1λ,L) : AP̂1(ĉrs,τ,·,·)(ĉrs) = 1
]
In the above, P̂1(ĉrs, τ, stmt, w) verifies that (stmt, w) ∈ L, and if so, outputs
P̂(ĉrs, τ, stmt) which simulates a proof without knowing a witness. Otherwise, if
(stmt, w) /∈ L, the experiment aborts. This notion is adaptive zero knowledge in the
sense that the simulator must specify the reference string before seeing the theorem
statements.
Computational soundness. A NIZK scheme for the language L is said to be
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computationally sound, if for all polynomial-time adversaries A,
Pr
 crs← K(1λ,L), (stmt, π)← A(crs) :
(V(crs, stmt, π) = 1) ∧ (stmt /∈ L)
 ≈ 0
Simulation extractability. Simulation extractability is a strong notion which
requires that even after seeing many simulated proofs (even for false theorems),
whenever the adversary makes a new proof, a simulator is able to extract a witness.
Simulation extractability implies simulation soundness and non-malleability (i.e., it
is not feasible for an adversary to take a verifying proof and “maul” it into a verifying
proof for another statement) since if the simulator can extract a valid witness from
an adversary’s proof, the statement must belong to the language. More formally, a
NIZK system is said to be simulation extractable if it satisfies computational zero-
knowledge and additionally, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm E , such that
for any polynomial-time adversary A, it holds that
Pr

(ĉrs, τ, ek)← K̂(1λ,L);
(stmt, π)← AP̂(ĉrs,τ,·)(ĉrs, ek);
w ← E(ĉrs, ek, stmt, π) : stmt /∈ Q and
(stmt, w) /∈ L and V (ĉrs, stmt, π) = 1

≈ 0
where in the above, Q is the list of oracle queries made by A to P̂(ĉrs, τ, ·). Here
the K̂ is identical to the zero-knowledge simulation setup algorithm.
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2.3.2 zk-SNARKs
A zk-SNARK is a NIZK that is succinct, perfectly complete, computationally
zero-knowledge, and has a knowledge extractor:
Succinctness. A SNARK is said to be succinct if an honestly generated proof
has poly(λ) bits and that the verification algorithm V(crs, stmt, π) runs in O(|stmt| ·
poly(λ)).
Adaptive knowledge extraction. Knowledge extraction requires that if a proof
generated by an adversary is accepted by the verifier, then the adversary “knows” a
witness for the given instance; i.e., there exists an algorithm E which recovers a wit-
ness. Furthermore, the extraction property holds adaptively even if the prover picks
the statement after seeing the reference string. Formally, a SNARK for language L
satisfies the knowledge extraction property iff:
For all polynomial-sized adversary A, there exists a polynomial-size extractor




(stmt, π)← A(crs, z)
a← EA(crs, z)
:
V(crs, stmt, π) = 1
(stmt, a) /∈ RL
 ≈ 0
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Chapter 3: xJsnark: A Framework for Efficient Verifiable Computa-
tion
3.1 Overview
Existing zk-SNARK constructions model computation as arithmetic circuits
(or alternatively, as a set of arithmetic constraints) over a finite field. As mentioned
previously, there are two methods for a programmer to express the computation that
needs to be verified, either through compilation from a high-level language [4,11,12],
or by manual circuit construction frameworks [5,14]. The former provides program-
mers convenience; while the latter enables lower-level control and optimizations,
resulting in possibly much better performance than circuits auto-generated by a
compiler, but requires effort and knowledge from the programmer.
In this work, our goal is to bridge this gap. We design and implement xJsnark,
a programming framework for developing (zk-)SNARK applications. xJsnark takes
a language-compiler co-design approach: It introduces user- and compiler-friendly
language features that allow the user to conveniently write programs in a Java-like
language and subsequently enable the back end to extract additional information
needed for converting the user-supplied program to a compact, optimized circuit.
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As we show later, xJsnark reduces programmer effort in comparison with ex-
isting SNARK compilers such as Buffet [11] and Geppetto [12]; and meanwhile im-
proves the performance of the compiled SNARK implementation by 1.2× to more
than 3× for different cryptographic and memory access applications. We will also
illustrate how the framework reduces the effort in developing large circuits as in the
case of ZeroCash [7], while producing optimized output.
3.1.1 Problem Statement
An important goal of xJsnark is “program-to-circuit” conversion, i.e., to com-
pile a user-supplied program described in a Java-like source language into a compact
circuit representation that is recognized by existing SNARK schemes. At the mo-
ment, xJsnark emits circuits in a libsnark-compatible format [15], such that the
resulting SNARK can be executed using the libsnark back end. Thus our contribu-
tion is not the back end SNARK implementation, but rather, the program-to-circuit
conversion stage, and the co-design of the source language and compile-time opti-
mizations to minimize the compiled circuit.
This problem of program-to-circuit conversion is commonly encountered in
designing programming frameworks for cryptography: besides (zk-)SNARKs, it has
also been investigated in the context of secure multi-party computation [22,40–42] —
in particular, known cryptographic building blocks for securing the integrity and/or
confidentiality of computation customarily express computation as circuits.
SNARK-specific program-to-circuit conversion. Several factors make the
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program-to-circuit conversion problem unique in the SNARK context, and our al-
gorithmic techniques described later would repeatedly make use of these optimiza-
tions to achieve constant to asymptotic performance improvements over existing
approaches.
First, an important observation that fundamentally differentiates circuit gen-
eration in the SNARK context than, say, in the multi-party computation con-
text [22, 40–43], is the following: a SNARK circuit need not necessarily compute
a function in the forward direction, it suffices to generate a circuit that verifies
the correct of the computation result — and the latter is often much cheaper than
the former. For example, the statement y = x/a can be verified much more ef-
ficiently by checking that y × a = x rather than computing the division in the
forward direction. This observation has also been pointed out by several earlier
works [4, 6, 11, 12, 16, 24, 25] — but in this work we will apply it in new ways in
the design of several circuit-friendly algorithms that achieve constant to asymptotic
performance improvements over existing approaches.
Second, known SNARK constructions rely on arithmetic circuits over a finite
field. Moreover, known SNARK implementations have a unique performance profile
where multiplication of two variables are expensive; whereas addition gates or mul-
tiplication with predetermined constants come almost for free (See Section 2.1.1).
Therefore, the optimization metrics are very different from conventional compilers
in our case. We focus on how to emit arithmetic circuits that express a user-supplied
program while minimizing the number of expensive multiplication gates.
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3.1.2 Technical Highlights
To emit compact circuits for user-supplied programs, we introduce new algo-
rithmic techniques in all stages of the compilation. Our new algorithms improve the
circuit size by constant to asymptotic factors for frequent building blocks relative to
the state-of-the-art, while not requiring as much experience from the programmer
compared to earlier compilers.
New circuit-friendly building blocks. First, at the building block level, we de-
sign new efficient, circuit-friendly algorithms for frequent operations such as memory
accesses and short and long integer arithmetic; where “circuit-friendliness” in our
context means that the algorithm may be expressed as a compact arithmetic circuit
that minimizes the number of multiplication gates (more specifically, multiplica-
tion of two variables and not with a predetermined constant). Our new algorithms
can improve the performance by constant to asymptotic factors in comparison with
known approaches. More specifically, we make the following algorithmic contribu-
tions:
• Efficient read-only memory. We present an algorithm (Section 3.4) for verify-
ing a batch of k read-only memory accesses in total cost proportional to k
√
n
where n is the size of the memory array to be accessed, where cost is expressed
in terms of the number of arithmetic multiplications of two variables — note
that the number of addition gates and “multiply by constant” gates are still
linear in n, but as mentioned earlier these gates come almost for “free”. (Note
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that earlier work on Boolean circuits obtained similar bounds for the multi-
plicative complexity of a Boolean function [44]. In contrast, in this work we
consider the case of arithmetic circuits, while relying on the observation that
multiplications by constants are for free, and on external witnesses to provide
efficient checks). We will show that for a broad range of choices over k and
n, our read-only memory access algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art by
factors ranging between 3-10×, and overall we illustrate how it can improve
the AES implementation by more than 2×.
• Smart memory. Our xJsnark framework supports a smart memory algorithm
that adapts the memory implementation to obtain high efficiency. Depending
on the concrete value of k and n, and whether the memory access is read-only,
our back end automatically selects the most efficient memory access algorithm
among the following: 1) the näıve linear sweep algorithm which may be efficient
for sufficiently small values of k; 2) a permutation network [11,24,25], and 3)
our new read-only memory algorithm mentioned above.
• Long integer arithmetic. We introduce several new circuit-friendly algorithms
for efficient long integer arithmetic. xJsnark internally expresses long integers
as an array of short integers whose bitwidth can fit in the SNARK’s native
arithmetic field. Henceforth let m denote the length of this array.
1. Multiplication. Known works employ either a näıve multiplication algo-
rithm that incurs Θ(m2) circuit size (e.g., Cinderella [9]); or adopt Karat-
suba [45] that incurs Θ(m1.58) circuit size (e.g., ObliVM [40], GraphSC [43])
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— where circuit size counts only multiplication gates. We propose a
SNARK-friendly long-integer multiplication algorithm that incurs only
O(m) multiplication (by non-constant) gates.
2. Modular arithmetic. Modular arithmetic is a frequently encountered op-
eration for implementing a wide class of cryptographic algorithms (e.g.,
RSA circuits) in SNARKs. To support modular arithmetic, a recurring
operation is to verify the modular congruence of two variables, i.e., verify
that a ≡ b ∗ q + r where q is the modulus.
Using our long integer multiplication technique as a building block, we
devise an improved algorithm for checking the modular congruence of
long integers, leading to an improvement of 3× for this operation, and
improving the overall performance by more than 1.5× relative to the
state-of-the-art [9] that was built on top of Geppetto [12]. This is while
minimizing the programmer’s effort/experience requirements.
Global optimizations for integer arithmetic. Besides optimizing individual
building blocks, our compiler also makes (somewhat) global optimization decisions
for frequent operations such as integer arithmetic. One challenge in supporting
bitwidth-parametrized integers is to figure out when to perform bitwidth realign-
ment. More specifically, imagine that the program contains operations on uint32
variables, i.e., unsigned integers of 32 bits. Since the SNARK’s native field is much
larger than 32 bits, we need not perform a mod 232 operation for each arithmetic











































y1 = f1 (x1, x2, x3) 
y2 = f2 (x1, x2, x3)
y3 = f3 (x4, x5, x6) 
y4 = f4 (x4, x5, x6) 
y5 = f5 (x4, x5, x7) 
..
To Libsnark
Figure 3.1: xJsnark Overview
the lazy strategy) is simply let the bitwidth grow but keep track of the maximum
bitwidth of internal variables — then we only perform realignment whenever an
overflow is just about to happen. As we show later, this näıve lazy strategy is not
the optimal. Instead, our compiler is able to perform more globally aware decisions
as to when to perform bitwidth realignment.
Circuit minimization. Third, we implement a customized version of the state-
of-the-art circuit minimization techniques — more specifically, multi-variate poly-
nomial minimization techniques — to minimize the generated circuit. Such circuit
minimization techniques may have exponential time, and therefore we devise algo-
rithms to cluster the arithmetic constraints to be verified into bounded-size groups,
and we apply multi-variate polynomial minimization to each group.
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3.1.3 Implementation, Evaluation, and Open Source
Besides our new algorithmic techniques and various more globally aware opti-
mizations, one important contribution we make is to integrate all these techniques
into a unified, user-friendly programming framework. We hope that the xJsnark user
can benefit from our effort and be able to develop efficient SNARK implementations
without needing much specialized knowledge on the topic. To this end, we released
our xJsnark framework as an open source project [46].
Implementation. We present an overview of our xJsnark framework in Figure 3.1.
xJsnark’s front-end is developed atop Java using Jetbrains MPS, an open-source
project [13] for implementing domain-specific languages. xJsnark’s compilation back-
end encompasses several stages:
• First pass: the back-end collects useful information about the structure of the
circuit, e.g., how variables are being used (e.g. whether involved in arithmetic
or Boolean operations, and how many times used), how memory is being ac-
cessed, etc. This is done by creating a dummy circuit that does not realize
every low-level detail, but only what is needed to understand the characteris-
tics of the circuit.
• Second pass: making use of information collected during the first pass, the
back end decides an efficient circuit representation of the computation.
• Optional third pass: This pass uses a customized multivariate polynomial
minimization technique to introduce more savings in the circuit.
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Front end. The front end of xJsnark is developed as a Java language extension
using the Jetbrains MPS framework [13]. xJsnark’s front end supports numerous
features designed to help a non-specialist user. First, we provide parametrized types,
including bitwidth-parametrized integers, and Fp fields elements at the language
level, allowing the user to express short and long integers very conveniently. The
extension comes with an Interactive Development Environment (IDE) that is based
on projectional editing and real-time type checking that allows programmers to
detect programming errors early on. We provide code examples in Appendix C.1,
and discuss the trade-offs of using the underlying framework in Section 3.2.1.
Using previous compilers like Buffet [11] or Geppetto [12], programmers are
assumed to have some additional experience in order to develop efficient applica-
tions on top. For example, programmers may need to carefully add extra casting
statements, specify additional prover inputs or add extra constraints to the code
in order to develop secure and efficient programs. xJsnark attempts to solve these
problems through both the front end features, and the back end algorithms.
Performance. For four different cryptographic applications spanning SHA-256,
SWIFFT hash function, RSA, and AES, we illustrate how xJsnark can produce
more efficient circuits by factors ranging between 1.2× to more than 2×, while not
requiring the programmer to be experienced in the underlying SNARK implemen-
tation (Section 3.6.1). Additionally, we show how our framework produces efficient
random access circuits by a factor of 2-3× in the case of sorting, while also provid-
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ing more efficient ways to obtain more concise circuits that are order of magnitudes
better (See Section 3.6.2). Furthermore, we illustrate that the framework can pro-
duce efficient circuits as done by existing low-level implementations, as in the case
of ZeroCash [7] when developed in our framework (Section 3.6.3).
3.2 xJsnark’s Front End
In this section, we discuss the language extension features. Using our Java ex-
tension built on top of Java using Jetbrains MPS, a programmer will specify the code
for the computation to be verified. Code examples are provided in Appendix C.1.
First, we provide brief background and discussion of Jetbrains MPS in Section 3.2.1,
then we discuss the front end features.
3.2.1 Language Development using MPS
Our language extension for the front end is built using Jetbrains MPS [13], an
open source language workbench [47] based on projectional editing. In this section,
we provide some background on language workbenches and Jetbrains MPS.
Language workbenches have been developed to facilitate the development of
new general-purpose or domain-specific languages. They can be generally classi-
fied into parser/text-based development tools, such as Xtext [48], and projectional
editor-based workbenches such as Jetbrains MPS that we use here [49]. Projectional
editing is a technique that allows the programmers to manipulate the abstract syn-
tax tree of a program directly, without relying on parsers/grammars.
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Jetbrains MPS provides flexibility in defining new language extensions, and
in modular composition of languages. The MPS approach has been used already to
develop different domain-specific languages, including mbeddr [50] which provides
extensions on top of the C language for embedded system development. Other
examples include Youtrack [51], an issue tracking system that has a Java language
extension for working with persistent data and queries among others [52], and MetaR
which facilitates biological data analysis with the R language [53]. For the draw-
backs, the use of projectional editing is less common than text editing for general
programming, however the usage of a projectional editor enables the modular com-
position of language extensions in a more flexible way. Additionally, Jetbrains MPS
attempts to handle most of the usability issues that arise from projectional edit-
ing [54], while the mbeddr authors [55] argue that their pilot usability study suggest
a quick learning curve for the end language users to get familiar with the editor. In
the discussion section (Section 3.7), we discuss other future plans to investigate the
usage of other front ends for our optimizations and algorithms in the back end.
In the following, we give a brief idea about the necessary elements that a Java
language extension on top of MPS Jetbrains needs to have [56]. To define a language
extension, such as the one that we use in this work, the following modules need to
be defined. Some details are omitted/simplified for brevity.
Abstract syntax: The first step is to define the structure, by specifying the ad-
ditional abstract syntax tree nodes required for the extension. This is done through
the definition of new concepts. A concept definition typically includes the proper-
ties, children and references of each node. Then, the constraints on the structure
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are defined, to specify any restriction on the properties, children and references of
any concept.
Editor (Concrete Syntax): This specifies the projectional editor behavior for
the new concepts, e.g. the visualization of the newly added extensions, and the
automated actions by the editor.
Type system: This specifies the type system rules needed for any introduced new
types.
Code generation: This specifies how the extension constructs will be translated
to the base Java language, based on the definition of reduction rules.
After the language developer specifies the above, the user of the extended
language will be able to write programs in the new language with IDE support, e.g.
auto-completion, error highlighting, and others.
3.2.2 Extension Features
To support easier development of arithmetic circuits, while giving optimization
hints to the back end, xJsnark’s front end supports the following:
3.2.2.1 Parametrized Types
To give the programmer greater control, and in the same time enable our
back end implementation to translate the code efficiently, our framework introduces
parameterized types for integers and field elements, where the programmer can
specify the bitwidth of integers, and the modulus of the field elements. The following
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snippet shows examples of variables declared using those types.
uint 7 x1 = 12;
uint 1024 x2 = 8105278157615764165361523651316112323u;
F swifft y1 = 123;
F p256 y2 = F p256(810527815761576416536152365131u);
bit b1 = 1;
Note that the programmer easily specifies long integer and field element types,
without specifying how that will be implemented in the background. Also, the pro-
grammer can specify long integer literals without dividing them to chunks according
to the native underlying field. In order to enable the programmer to define finite
field types, the framework has a special file where field identifiers can be specified,
typically in the following syntax:
swifft : 257
p256: .. // NIST Curve P−256 prime
Then, the programmer can use these identifiers when defining field elements.
3.2.2.2 Operators
The framework allows the programmer to directly use typical arithmetic op-
erators with the types defined above (e.g. +,−, ∗, /,&, |, ) when applicable, instead
of using special methods. For example, the following snippet shows a piece of code
that verifies the ownership of an RSA secret key:









verifyEq((uint 2048)p∗q, modulus); // Equality Assertion
}
}
Due to the underlying Java implementation in MPS Jetbrains, we introduce
new operators for bit and equality operators such as (AND, OR, NOT) to be com-
patible with our types. We also introduce new operators like inv, which obtains the
multiplicative inverse of a field element (assuming a prime order).
3.2.2.3 External Code Blocks
In many cases, computing the value of a prover’s witness can be more expen-
sive than its verification, e.g. verifying a solution for a linear system of equations has
less complexity than computing the solution itself. In such cases, previous compilers
assume that the computation of such witnesses happens independently outside the
circuit, and only the verification is specified in the code. We believe this may be
inconvenient, due to writing code in two different frameworks. Instead, the program-
mer can specify in our framework within the same code how these computations will
take place in Java. To specify code to be executed outside the circuit, the xJsnark
programmer can use the external code blocks, and the val operator, which refers
to the value during runtime (See Appendix C.1.1).
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3.2.2.4 Smart Memory and Permutation Verifier
As we will discuss in detail in the back end, xJsnark provides a smart mem-
ory implementation that decides the best way to translate memory operations after
analyzing the workload of each array. Additionally, xJsnark provides a native func-
tion that can be used to verify that a group of elements is a permutation of another,
without exposing the programmer to the internal details of switching networks. This
feature can be used along with the external code block and constraints to compile
some applications more efficiently, e.g. sorting with respect to arbitrary criteria (See
Appendix C.1.1 for an example, and Section 3.6.2 for performance results).
3.2.2.5 Composite Types
xJsnark allows the programmer to define class types that are a collection of
xJsnark’s primitive types. It also supports a very basic notion of object-oriented
programming, such that these classes could also define methods that manipulate
the state of the object. These classes have a special implementation in the back
end, so that the programmer can easily manipulate them as circuit inputs/output-
s/witnesses. The programmer can use the keyword struct to define such classes.
3.2.2.6 Assertions
xJsnark provides supports for writing high-level constraints in the code. As
in the previous example, the keyword verifyEq forces two values to be exactly the
same. Additional assertion keywords include verify to verify general constraints
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and verifyZero.
Having a native support for constrains in the code enables translation to more
efficient programs, since checking conditions using if statements is generally less
efficient.
3.2.3 Type and Syntactic Constraint Checking
Introducing new types and features requires additional type rules and syntactic
constraints to be enforced/checked by the front end. For example, we need to
add type rules for checking bitwidth properties during assignments and operations.
Syntactic constraints enforce the structure of the input program. We define the type
system and syntactic constraint rules using a special language in the underlying
framework. Note that our framework checks such rules and constraints interactively
during development, which makes development easier.
3.2.4 Front-End Code Generation
In this section, we briefly discuss few technical points regarding the transforma-
tion from the xJsnark code to normal Java code. JetBrains MPS requires specifying
Java code to replace the extension feature in some special language. Therefore, for
every type or feature we have, there are Java classes in the back end that handle its
functionalities.
To translate conditional if statements and other data-dependent constructs,





































Figure 3.2: Bitwidth adjustment examples
a bit variable, multiply it by other bits from outer conditional statements (if any),
and then use this bit variable in all operations, such as assignment operations, to
ensure that all effects are applied only if this bit is true.
A more efficient approach would be to apply the single assignment algorithm,
as in the Fairplay [22] compiler. This will help reduce the number of gates in nested
if statements, and when multiple operations are inside a block. We adopt this
approach in our implementation.
3.3 Data Type Representation
In this section, we describe how xJsnark’s back end represents data types and
implements their operations. The discussion will be mainly focused on integers and
field elements (recall that integers are field elements, where the modulus is a power
of two). In the beginning, we make a distinction between short integer and large
integer arithmetic. Assuming the underlying SNARK prime is p, typically a 254-bit
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prime, then short integer arithmetic is applied when the modulus of the field p′ is
less than
√
p. For simplicity, when dlog2 p′e < 0.5dlog2 pe . The reason for that
decision is to make sure that the initial result of multiplying two elements will be
less than p, i.e. fits in one wire. Otherwise, dividing the element across multiple
words will be needed, as will be shown when the long arithmetic is described in
detail.
Representing the operations of a different field on top of the SNARK field
requires some care, as operations are done modulo p in the circuits. Therefore,
adding two 32-bit integers is expected to produce a 33-bit value, but we mainly
care about the least significant 32-bit. Converting the 33-bit value to the correct
32-bit is an expensive process that requires 34 multiplications. This conversion is
not always necessary. In other words, many operations can be done, e.g. additions
or multiplications, before it comes necessary to convert the element to a value within
its field, e.g. to avoid overflows (when the result of an operation exceeds p), or if
the element is involved in a comparison. The same holds for general field elements,
but the conversion is even more costly here due to a more expensive remainder
operation, as will be shown shortly.
In order to make our implementation safe against overflows, we keep track of
the maximum value that any element can have at any point. For an element or word
x, we denote the maximum value it can have as xmax.
In the following subsections, we discuss different design decisions for both short
and long integer arithmetic.
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3.3.1 Short Integer Arithmetic
Assume the field being represented is Fp′ , log2 p
′ < 0.5 ∗ log2 p. Each element
is represented as a single word.
3.3.1.1 Bitwidth Adjustment
Addition and multiplication are straightforward operations for short integer
arithmetic, however they typically increase the bitwidth of the resulting element
beyond dlog2 p′e. Deciding when to convert an element back to the range of its field
is a challenging problem. First, we have to make a distinction between three types
of elements.
• Elements within range, i.e. 0 ≤ emax < p′ : examples include input elements
(which are guaranteed to be in range), or elements resulting from bitwise oper-
ations, e.g. bitwise XOR. In that case, the output element is guaranteed to be
within range, as it is been computed based on packing individual bits.
• Elements that could be above the range, i.e. p′ ≤ emax < p and required to
be returned within range: This may include elements that are labeled as output,
elements that are involved in bitwise operations and comparisons, elements in-
volved in operations like division or remainder, and elements that are involved in
memory operations. In the context of integer elements, this also includes elements
that are involved in operations or assignments with higher bitwidth. For example,
adding a 32-bit element to a 64-bit element, requires that the 32-bit element is in
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range. Otherwise, this will lead to a wrong result.
• Elements that could be above the range, i.e. p′ ≤ emax < p but are not al-
ways required to be within range: This includes intermediate elements between
multiplication and addition operations, such that none of the above conditions
apply.
In order to be able to classify the elements into the above categories, we make an
initial pass constructing a dummy circuit to identify the class of each of the elements.
This is one main objective for the initial phase described in Figure 3.1. Based on
the classification of the elements above, the main question is when to adjust the
bitwidth of an element e falling in the third category, to achieve the following two
goals:
• Ensure no overflows can happen in later operations involving e.
• Minimize the total cost resulting from adjustments overall the circuit.
This can be modeled as a constrained optimization problem. To illustrate that
by example, Figure 3.2 provides sample circuits, assuming p′ = 232. For each element
ei that does not fall in the first category, we define the following two variables bi, vi:
bi is a binary variable denoting whether ei is going to be adjusted or not, while vi
represents the value of the bitwidth before applying adjustments if any. bi is 1 for
any elements falling in the second category. Note that adjusting the bitwidth of an
n-bit element will cost n + 1 constraints. Now, we can specify both the objective
function and the constraints, for circuit (a) in Figure 3.2.
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The objective function can be defined as the total number of constraints re-
sulting from all adjustments f =
∑
i bi(vi + 1)
Subject to the following constraints
v1 =v2 = 64
b5 =b6 = 1
v3 =v1 + b1(32− v1) + v2 + b2(32− v2)
v4 =v3 + b3(32− v3) + 1
v5 =v6 = v4 + b4(32− v4) + 32
vi ∈{32, .., blog2 pc}
bi ∈{0, 1}
It is possible to express the problem as a function of bi’s only, however, the
reason vi’s were introduced is that the size of the expressions will grow without the
equality constraints. Based on our experience trying multiple nonlinear optimization
algorithms, using the above approach for large circuits will not be efficient, but has
the advantage of producing optimal solutions.
Greedy Strategies. Due to the cost of the above solution, one alternative
could be to apply a simple greedy algorithm after the initial phase, where adjust-
ments are only introduced if the next operation is going to result in an overflow.
This approach can work well for most of the applications we consider. Note that
the initial phase itself can introduce some optimizations through the knowledge of
how elements are being used later. For example, in this sample example, it can be
noted that x1 is being used in a bitwise operation later, i.e. it falls under category
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2 defined earlier, and its bitwidth will be adjusted in all cases. However note that
the line x2 = x1 ∗ x1 occurs before the bitwise operation. This line could make use
of the fact that x1 will be adjusted back to its range. This is not possible unless we
make a complete pass over the program first as we do already in the first phase in
the back end.
// assume in1, in2 are uint 32 variable inputs, while out is uint 32 output.
uint 32 x1 = in1∗in2;
uint 32 x2 = x1∗x1;
uint 32 x3 = x1 ˆ in1;
..
out = x2+x3;
Another greedy approach will be to study how an element contributes to dif-
ferent paths leading to an adjustment in the end. Note that solving the above
optimization problem (Figure 3.2 [a]) will lead to b4 = 1, while b1 = b2 = b3 = 0.
This result can possibly be justified by noticing that wire #4 contributes eventually
to two distinct paths through two multiplication gates, each leading to an adjust-
ment in the end. However, in [b] it is expected that no adjustment will be needed in
any of the intermediate levels, although wire #4 still contributes to two paths, but
they are not leading to different adjustment outcomes. It’s possible during compila-
tion time to study which intermediate wires contribute to the end points, and select
wires that contribute with multiplications in more than one path. However, this
won’t ensure optimality in all cases as well. It is also still important to handle the
possibilities of overflows, as the strategy does not directly take that into account.
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For example, in Figure 3.2 [c], applying the strategy above directly might lead to
an overflow in the lower level, except if the corresponding wire is adjusted.
In summary, the greedy strategies will not always achieve the optimal solution,
but can compile applications faster.
Adjustment Implementation Adjustment for an element x is done by com-
puting the element r = x mod p′. Implementing the remainder operation is straight-
forward when p′ is a power of two. In that case, it is enough to split x, trim the
unnecessary bits, and pack the rest to a new element (if needed). The cost for the
adjustment in that case is nearly: log2 xmax + 1 constraints.
To get the remainder in the case of general field elements where p′ is not a
power of two, we use the power of SNARK verification where the prover can provide
two values r and q, and the circuit checks the following constraint: qp′+r = x, while
restricting the bitwidth of q such that no overflow will happen, and also asserting
that 0 ≤ r < p′. This last constraint is implemented by checking that the bitwidth
of r is less than or equal to the bitwidth of p′, and applying the comparison test
mentioned earlier to ensure that r < p′.
However, an additional optimization in the case of fields, where p′ is not a
power of two, is to implement bitwidth adjustment differently for the elements falling
in the third category described earlier. Such elements do not have to apply the
second part of the third constraint. It is enough for the prover to provide a value r
that satisfies the bitwidth constraint, but no need to check that r < p′, as adjusting
the elements of the third category is mainly done to avoid overflows.
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3.3.1.2 Subtraction
To subtract two short elements x and y, the result will depend on p if x < y.
To avoid that, we introduce an auxiliary constant a such that a = c.p′, where c is
the smallest integer such that c.p′ ≥ ymax. If c.p′ ≥ p, this means that the value of
y needs to be adjusted, i.e. we need to compute the value y mod p′ in the circuit
as above, and set c to 1 for the subtraction. The result of the subtraction will be:
a+ x− y.
3.3.1.3 Division and Remainder operations
Division and remainder operations supported only for integers have a similar
implementation to the implementation of bitwidth adjustment described earlier. A
similar approach can also apply for the multiplicative inverse for field elements, by
forcing the remainder of the product of the operand and the result to be equal to 1
(mod p′), while checking that the inverse result is in range.
3.3.2 Long Integer Arithmetic
Typically, the prime field used in zk-SNARK implementation is a 254-bit prime
field, however in many cryptographic applications, longer integer arithmetic is re-
quired for high security, such as in RSA or Elliptic Curves. Hence, a long integer is
represented using a group of wires rather than a single wire. An n-bit long integer x
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Figure 3.3: Equality assertion in a modular multiplication circuit. Auxiliary con-
stant values are carefully chosen in the last step to facilitate the verification.
A technical question here is how to set b properly to achieve high performance.
As we are going to show, setting the bitwidth b, to be the largest possible while
avoiding overflows does not necessarily result in the best performance or the cheapest
circuit.
Additionally, as in the short integer case, care is also needed when another
field is represented on top of the 254-bit field case. However, unlike the short integer
case, the algorithms for when to adjust long integers back will have to be adapted
a little bit as in the following. Most of the operations are similar to what have been
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discussed in the short integer case. We mainly highlight the major differences.
3.3.2.1 Multiplication
Given two long integers x and y each is m words. While addition is straight-
forward, i.e. can be implemented by adding corresponding chunks, multiple options
exist for multiplying x and y in the circuit. For example, we can either apply the
trivial O(m2) approach, where z[i] =
∑
j+k=i x[j]y[k], or Karatsuba’s method [45],
which costs O(m1.58) multiplications.
However, it’s possible to have an O(m) approach. The result of the mul-
tiplication z can be computed independently by the prover and provided as a
witness to the circuit. Then the circuit can verify the result using the follow-










i. In other words, the prover will be re-
quired to provide 2m−1 values that satisfy a linear system of 2m−1 equations, that
has a single solution. The total number of constraints to implement this verification
circuit is 2m − 1. Note that we mainly rely on the observation that multiplication
by hard-coded constants in the circuit is almost free. Figure 3.4 illustrates a com-
























Figure 3.4: Long integer multiplication methods
3.3.2.2 Subtraction
Subtraction in the case of long integer arithmetic is more challenging. Recall
that in the case of short integer arithmetic, an auxiliary constant value was added
in order to make sure the result stays in range. In the case of long integer represen-
tation, we also need to ensure that the result of subtracting corresponding chunks
stays in range. The way we do this is as follows: To subtract two long elements
x and y, we introduce an auxiliary constant a such that a = c.p′, where c is the
smallest integer such that c.p′ ≥ ymax. Additionally, it must be possible to represent
a = c.p′ as a group of words a[i], such that a[i] ≥ y[i]max for all i.
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3.3.2.3 Bitwidth Adjustment
Similar to the case we had before, bitwidth adjustment in the case of long
integers is needed if any of the operations involving its words may overflow, or if the
number is being used for comparison or equality checks.
The same greedy procedures described earlier can be applied in the case of long
integers, however an easy observation to make is that when a long integer is involved
in a multiplication, this means that each of its words contributes to multiple words in
the output number, which implies the involvement in multiple bitwidth adjustment
end points. This can make the decision of adjustment more straightforward. We
apply this simple heuristic: we adjust any long integer that is an output of a long
integer multiplication before being involved in another multiplication operation.
3.3.2.4 Equality Assertion
In many applications such as RSA or Elliptic Curves, many inverse and re-
mainder operations will be required to verify the correctness of the results. These
operations require applying equality constraints on long integers. This is the most
expensive part in the circuit, as in [12,16].
What makes the problem of equality assertion in long integers more challenging
is that the words of a long integer operand may not be bounded to their starting
range. For example, consider the main building block of modular exponentiation
illustrated in Figure 3.3. Both of the integers z1 = xy, and z2 = nq+r are supposed
to be equal, but their words do not have to be equal, as any z1[i] or z2[i] are not
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expected to be within the range [0, 2b−1]. Assuming x and y had properly bounded
words, then it’s expected that z1[0] falls in the range [0, 2
2b−1] for example. The way
to force equality efficiently would be by noting that the first b bits for z1[0] − z2[0]
must be zero, while the rest can be propagated to the check done at the second
word, in which the first b bits of the two words will be checked as well, and so on.
This is the approach applied adopted by [12,16]. This costs about b constraints per
each pair of words, resulting in a total of 2mb gates approximately (as xy requires
2m− 1 words).
Additional optimization over [12, 16] is to utilize that addition and multipli-
cation by constants are free operations. So, instead of forcing the first b bits of
z1[0] − z2[0] to be zero, we can instead apply a grouping stage (as far as b allows).
For example, if b = 64, it’s clear that we can apply this constraint instead: force the
first 2b bits of z1[0] + 2
64z1[1]− (z2[0] + 264z2[1]) to be zero, propagate the rest of the
bits to the next check (nearly b bits). This implies that the circuit will need to pay
about 64 gates per each 2 pairs of words. If b was chosen the highest possible (e.g.
120 in Cinderella’s implementation [9]), the number of words will be less by a factor
of 2, but the cost will be higher per every pair of words. As b decreases, the more
grouping that can be done, and the more savings. That said, decreasing b results
in a higher number of words, which means more cost for the multiplication module
in the earlier steps. Based on a parameter exploration for RSA 2048, choosing b at























Figure 3.5: Bitwidth Effect on Number of Gates in RSA modular exponentiation
circuit
3.4 RAM Implementation
One challenge in translating programs to circuits is that programs make dy-
namic memory accesses (whose addresses are not known at compilation time),
whereas circuits have static wiring. Before presenting our approach, we overview
existing techniques for verifying dynamic memory accesses [4, 11]:
Linear Scan. Each memory access is performed through a linear sweep of the
entire memory. Roughly speaking, this costs O(kn) for making k memory accesses
where n is the total memory size.
Merkle Tree. Memory accesses are verified through memory checking techniques
such as a Merkle hash tree. This approach requires roughly Θ(k log n) hash com-
putations inside the SNARK circuit for making a total of k accesses. Although the
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dependence on n is logarithmic, the hash evaluation is expensive, and therefore this
approach is in practice inefficient unless for very large choices of n.
Permutation Network. Memory accesses are verified using an AS-Waksman net-
work [57]: This approach costs O((k+n) log(k+n)) for k accesses where the starting
memory size is n. This approach was proposed in [24], and subsequently used in
TinyRAM [25], and Buffet [11].
In the remainder of this section,
• We start by revisiting the earlier random memory access methods, and discuss
some low level optimizations.
• We propose an additional random memory access algorithm that can do poten-
tial savings in many scenarios where the memory being accessed is hardcoded
and read-only, such as in cryptographic S-boxes.
• Finally, we put all together and discuss how the smart memory is implemented.
3.4.1 Improvements for earlier methods
3.4.1.1 Merkle tree approach
The main bottleneck in Merkle tree implementations is the cost of the hash
function applied at each level. Pantry reported about 4700 multiplication gates
per level. Instead, it is possible to use a SNARK-friendly collision resistant hash
function, as the one initially proposed in [21], and later analyzed in [16]. Using such
hash function, the cost per level can be 2032 gates to achieve more than 128 bit
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security level.
3.4.1.2 Permutation network approach
We describe a low level optimization for the permutation network used in
previous work to implement general random memory accesses.
A permutation network is typically implemented as an AS-Waksman net-
work [57] in order to fit the arbitrary number of accesses. Buffet reported the
cost per access nearly to be: c+ 10 log k+ 2 log n, where k is the number of memory
accesses, n is the memory size and c is a constant. The reason for the factor of 10 is
due to the observation that every memory access contributes a record of four wires
to the permutation network, since every memory access is implemented as a tuple
of four elements (Timestamp, Index, Data Element, LOAD/WRITE). Any switch
in the permutation network will receive two tuples as input, and a verifiably binary
input to set the direction of the switch. The first improvement will be to reduce
the factor of 10 by half, by observing the linear dependencies between the switch
outputs.
Furthermore, in some situations where the number of memory accesses is high
compared to the memory size, such as in small memories and short data elements,
it will be better to pack the four elements of a tuple together to a single wire, such
that every switch in the network will only have two wires as inputs. An interesting
observation here is that a switch in that case can be implemented without using an
input to handle the switching. In fact, it can be implemented using one constraint.
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Figure 3.6: O(n) methods for read-only memory access
For a switch receiving two wires w1 and w2, the prover provides the first output wire
as an external witness w′1, such that (w1−w′1)(w2−w′2) = 0, and the other wire can be
computed as a linear function of the three other wires, simply by w′2 = (w1+w2)−w′1.
Deciding whether to do the packing or not is a decision by the compiler that depends
on the memory workload, and the type/size of the data elements stored.
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Figure 3.7: New approach for static read-only memories
3.4.2 Algorithm for static read-only memory access
In this section, we discuss a new method for implementing dynamic memory
accesses in read-only arrays whose contents are prepopulated and never going to
change. This can fit many applications where the memory content is known in
advance, such as the cases for S-box evaluation in cryptographic primitives, as in
AES. It can also be extended to other cases where look-up tables are used instead
of expensive floating-point arithmetic computation, as in logarithmic functions.
Problem statement and known techniques. Formally, given a mapping M
from A = {0, 1}log2 n → B = {0, 1}log2 n. Assume there is no straightforward map-
ping from A to B, as in the case of random permutations. For simplicity, assume
that n is an even power of two. The mapping is fixed and known in advance, how-
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ever, an accessed index a in the circuit is unknown at compilation time. To resolve
the mapping and obtain b = M(a) in the circuit, we can employ any of the known
techniques, including linear scan, Merkle tree, or permutation networks.
Our algorithm. Now, we will show how to have a useful O(
√
n) algorithm for
resolving b = M(a) that can be better than all the above cases in practical cases.
Building block: polynomial function via a linear system solution. We first
describe a building block for accessing a read-only memory. Although this building
block alone requires O(n) cost per access, we will later explain how to combine this
technique with our näıve linear scan algorithm, to obtain a new O(
√
n) algorithm.
An n-degree polynomial function can be introduced to obtain a relation be-
tween the inputs and the outputs. In a preprocessing phase, the compiler constructs
an n × (n + 1) matrix P , where each row is the power vector [1, a, a2, .., an] for all
ai ∈ A, and a column vector b that has the corresponding n elements of B. Then, a
coefficient vector c with n+1 elements can be obtained by solving the linear system
Pc = b. Note that the last element of c is set to 1. A solution will always exist since
the finite field we operate on has a prime order. Then, in the circuit, the coefficients
c can be just hardcoded as constants in the circuits, and to resolve an index a, the
power vector a is constructed costing n − 1 gates, and the result is obtained by
the dot product b = a · c costing zero gates. We denote this method as the linear
system-based method in the next discussions. (Although there can be more efficient
methods to compute the coefficients, we keep the linear system naming as we rely
on linear systems eventually in our last optimization).
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Intuition. The proposed technique relies on non-determinism. The actual value of
b = M(a) does not have to be computed by the circuit, but instead, the prover can
provide b as a witness, and the circuit can just verify that the pair (a, b) is a valid
pair with respect to M .
The O(
√
n) method we propose for checking the validity of the pair is a hy-
brid of the two O(n) methods mentioned earlier (Both methods are illustrated in
Figure 3.6). The approach is mainly inspired by two observations in the second
method: 1) The cost of the dot product operation is zero, since the coefficient vec-
tor is computed in advance. 2) The cost of the technique is mainly due to computing
the powers of a, which costs O(n) multiplications.
Now, the goal is to reduce the length of the power vector, while introducing
multiple free dot product operations instead. In brief, this will be done by decom-
posing the problem of accessing one array that has n distinct elements to checking
membership in
√
n arrays, each has
√
n distinct elements. In particular, for each
array, a linear system is solved in the preprocessing phase, and a coefficient vector
is obtained. Then, in the constructed circuit, a shorter power vector is computed
(only up to
√
n elements), and then the free dot product operations are applied on
the
√
n hardcoded vectors. The output element will be verified using a more efficient




Approach. More formally, during the compilation time, since the memory is fixed,
the back end can compute the set S = {z0, z1, ..zn−1}, where zi = bi + n.ai. Note
that the elements zi are guaranteed to be distinct even if the values bi are not, as
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the indices ai are distinct, and 0 ≤ bi < n.
The back end then divides the set S into
√
n subsets, such that each subset
Sj = {zk : j
√
n ≤ k ≤ (j + 1)
√
n − 1} for all j ∈ 0, 1, ..,
√
n− 1. This implies that
the cardinality of each Sj is
√
n. For each Sj, the back end constructs the following





n = 0 for each z ∈ Sj, where cj is a
column vector associated with Sj. Since every set contains
√
n distinct elements,
it’s expected to have
√
n equations per each linear system, and a unique solution
always exists since we operate in finite field with a prime order.
In the circuit construction phase, the back end hardcodes the vectors {ci} in
the circuit. To resolve a random access to index a, the prover provides a witness b,
and the circuit checks that b = M(a). In other words, the circuit checks that the
value z = b+a.n belongs to S. First, the circuit checks the range of b, i.e. 0 ≤ b < n.





n−1 gates), and applied to each vector in the set {cj} via free
dot product operations. If the value b provided by the prover is correct, then the
value z should belong to only one of the sets Sj, and result in a zero value in the
corresponding dot product operation. To verify the correctness of b, it suffices to
check that any of the dot product outputs is zero. This can be done through a more
efficient linear scan path that just multiplies all the values and asserts the product
value to be zero. This costs only
√
n gates. An additional visual illustration of the
method can be found in Figure 3.7. The actual cost in the circuit will be equal to
2
√
n+ log2 n constraints per access. Further optimization is described shortly.
Security. Note that the preprocessing of the above scheme is equivalent to finding
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polynomials at specific roots (Although that would be more efficient, we keep the
linear system notation for further optimizations that are discussed shortly). To see
how the scheme above protects against the case where a prover claims that b′ is
the result of M(a), while b′ 6= M(a). Recall that only the permissible set of values
(roots) are of the form zi = bi + n.ai. For a false mapping, the following condition
will need to hold b′ + n.a = zj = bj + n.aj for some j, i.e. b
′ = bj + n.(aj − a).
There can be two cases here: if aj = a, then bj = b
′ (contradiction). If aj 6= a, then
b′ will either satisfy b′ ≥ n or b′ < 0, which contradicts the range check applied by
the circuit: 0 ≤ b < n, assuming n is much smaller than the prime order p as in
practical scenarios.
Further Optimization. Additional optimizations can be made to the earlier ap-
proach to reduce the number of gates per access by half, but still within the O(
√
n)
complexity. For example, in the above description, instead of completely relying on
the power vector in constructing the linear systems, if the bit decompositions of a
and b are available/needed for other purposes in the circuit (b’s bit decomposition is
already needed for the range check), then the bits can be used instead to partially
construct the linear systems. This has to be done carefully, such that the prover
cannot cheat. In our implementation, this may require shuffling the elements before
dividing them into
√
n groups, and including few elements from the power vector
while checking the rest of the restricted domain to verify that the prover cannot
cheat.
Such optimization helps in reducing the cost of small memory access, as in the


























> 3x speed up
> 10x speed up
Figure 3.8: Comparison between the proposed O(
√
n) method for read-only memory
access, and other optimized approaches when n = 256. k represents the number of
accesses.
for other parts in the circuit.
Comparison with earlier methods In case of small hardcoded memories, such as
in AES S-box (which is a 256-element array), the proposed method is clearly better
than the O(n) approaches. Additionally, it’s much better than the Merkle tree
approach due to the large cost of the hash function. When the number of accesses
is high, the main competitive to our approach in the case of small memories is the
permutation network approach, which has two main issues: 1) Since the memory
does not start empty, n write operations will need to be inserted in the permutation
network as input initially. 2) Additionally, the total cost of applying the permutation
network is O((n+k)(log(n+k))) as mentioned earlier, which means it also depends
on the number of accesses made, besides the memory size. Table 3.1 compares all
the techniques discussed so far.
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Table 3.1: Comparing read-only constant memory access techniques in terms of
the total number of constraints for all accesses (n denotes the memory size, and k
denotes the total number of reads.)
Total Cost (Complexity) Actual Total Cost
Linear Scan O(kn) 2kn
Linear System O(kn) kn
Merkle Tree O(k log n) 2000k log2 n
Buffet Perm. N/w O((n+ k)(log(n+ k))) (n+ k)(log2(n+ k))+






Case study when n = 256. Figure 3.8 compares the existing approaches
(after optimizations) to the proposed O(
√
n) method (in a logarithmic scale), iden-
tifying in which regions each algorithm performs better. As shown, the proposed
algorithm performs better than all the other alternatives, achieving speed-ups rang-
ing from more than 10× when the number of accesses is 2, to more than 3×, when
the number of memory accesses is more than 32 million.
3.4.3 Smart Memory
In our framework, a programmer will use a special syntax to instantiate a smart
memory, however the programmer will be able to use the typical array operators.
In the first preprocessing stage of the back end, each memory is studied separately,
and the compiler takes the following factors into account:
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• The number of read/write operations.
• The type/size of data being accessed.
• Whether the memory contents is read only and known in advance or not.
Based on these factors, the back end decides the most appropriate implemen-
tation, and its specifics. For example, in case of a general read-write memory (with
contents unknown during compilation time), it can decide that a linear scan method
is better than constructing a permutation network, when the operations done are
not many or when they involve few random accesses among many accesses to con-
stant locations. Also, in the case of read-only hardcoded memories, the framework
automatically chooses the best implementation, and performs any required prepro-
cessing.
3.5 Arithmetic Optimization Module
In the previous optimizations, we discussed how to reduce the number of con-
straints resulting from split gates, random memory accesses and other operations.
In this section, we describe a low-level optimization that can further reduce the
number of gates via multivariate polynomial minimization.
This module is motivated by the following: As mentioned earlier, the cost for
bit-level operations is high. Any inefficient implementation of Boolean operations
will have an effect on the size of the circuit that correlates with the bitwidth of
the variables. For example, in this SHA-256 code, the majority variable is being
computed as in the following equation, where all a, b and c are 32-bit words.
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for( int i = 0; i < 64; i++){
// ..




a = /∗ Code omitted f(maj) ∗/;
}
If this equation is translated into a circuit directly, given the bits of a, b and
c, computing each bit in maj will cost 5 multiplications per bit, however using
minimization techniques, this can be reduced to 2 multiplications, saving a total of
6144 multiplications across all bits in all rounds. To achieve that, each bit i of maj
can be expressed as:
ti = aibi; maji = ti + ci(ai + bi − 2ti)
This cannot be specified directly in high-level C or java, but instead, taking
Geppetto as an example, the compiler supports special instructions to have access
to bits, and to write constraints accordingly. An additional optimization that can
be done is to observe that the variable b is assigned to c, and a is assigned to b.
This implies that the maj computation across rounds will have shared variables on
the bit level. Making use of that observation, additional 1024 multiplications can
be saved.
To perform such optimization automatically, we implemented a customized
technique for multi-variate polynomial minimization based on [58] as a building
block. This block takes a set of multivariate polynomials as inputs, and tries to
minimize the expressions cost based on a greedy strategy. Due to the large circuit
61
sizes, we developed techniques for clustering the arithmetic expressions into smaller
subgroups that can be optimized independently in parallel.
In the following subsections, we describe the steps in detail.
3.5.1 Assignment of Input and Output Symbols
In many programs, it is not possible to express the circuit outputs as poly-
nomial functions of the inputs. This is mainly due to having special kinds of gates
where outputs cannot be written as polynomial functions of the inputs. This in-
cludes the split gate, the zero checking gate, and typically user-defined gadgets
that rely on verification properties, e.g. a gadget for verifying a linear system of
equations. Such gates appear in any programs that have bitwise operations, condi-
tionals, division and others. Therefore, we may need to split the circuit to multiple
sub-circuits depending on its shape. The way this is done is by labeling wires as
opt-input (denoting an input variable to an optimization problem) or opt-output
(denoting an output variable to an optimization problem) in an initial phase. The
notion of opt-input and opt-output variables used above should not be confused
with the input and output wires of the circuit. After labeling, the sub-problems are
chosen accordingly.
The criteria by which we initially label wires as opt-input or opt-output vari-
ables, are as follows.
• Program input and prover witness wires are labeled as opt-inputs, while out-
puts are labeled as opt-outputs.
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• For any gates in which the output cannot be expressed as a polynomial of the
input, the inputs to the gate are labeled as opt-outputs, while the outputs of
the gate are considered opt-inputs to be used in later expressions. This applies
to the split gate and conditional gates. Furthermore, although the pack gate
does not fall under the same category (as its output can be expressed as a
linear combination of its inputs), we apply the same rule here in order to
separate the Boolean operations from arithmetic ones.
• All inputs to assertions, which have no output wires, are labeled as opt-
outputs.
Additional criteria can also be employed for selecting opt-output wires. If an
expression gets large, we can split the circuit at that point, and introduce a new opt-
input. Another approach could be to rely on the usage count. When the usage count
of a certain intermediate wire is high, this may suggest that this is a good point
to split this part of the circuit. For example, assume a program that computes a
linear function of the inputs, and then use the result in a heavy computations later
that are independent from the previous part. To reduce the running time of the
optimizer, it may be beneficial to use such criteria.
For the rest of the discussion, we will denote opt-input and opt-output wires
assigned to the optimization problems as xi and yi. Figure 3.9 illustrates an example












Figure 3.9: An example for how opt-input and opt-output wires are selected for
multivariate minimization. Red wires indicate opt-inputs, and green wires indicate
opt-outputs.
3.5.2 Clustering Expressions
After opt-input and opt-output variables are chosen, the expressions are com-
puted by iterating over the gates of the circuit, and computing the output polynomial
of each gate given its input polynomials.
Optimizing single multivariate expressions alone may not lead to the optimal
solution. However, when we have a group of such expressions, we can eliminate
shared computation and allow one expression to benefit from intermediate variables
of another. For example, in the following case, the terms x1x2 and x1x3 can be
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computed once, and no additional multiplications will be needed to compute any of
yi.
y1 = x1x2 + x1x3; y2 = x1x2 + x4; y3 = x1x3 + x5
If each expression is optimized alone, the resulting expressions will be:
y1 = x1(x2 + x3); y2 = x1x2 + x4; y3 = x1x3 + x5
This will be more costly than the earlier case when we had a more global view
of other expressions. Therefore, in order to decide whether an optimization is useful
to apply or not, its effect on other parts of the circuit should be considered, by
studying multiple related expressions at the same time.
Our approach is to instead cluster the expressions together based on the vari-
ables they share. We define a cluster as a set of expressions in which any two
expressions must share at least two input variables in a term, or different power
terms for the same input variable.
It should be noted that before running the next step, the symbolic evaluation of
the circuit so far can help reduce the number of multiplication gates. For example, it
can detect the cases where some operations are unnecessary, e.g. when a programmer
writes code for a swapping operation using XOR instructions instead of using a
temporary variable. Using the XOR method is much more expensive for SNARKs,
compared to the free assignment instructions. The symbolic execution can detect
and partially optimize this case.
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3.5.3 Minimization
After clustering the equations based on the input variables, we implemented a
customized optimization technique for reducing the cost of multivariate polynomial
evaluations. Our implementation follows the greedy algorithm specified in [58],
which is already based on known techniques in Multi-level logic synthesis, such
as [59]. The implemented techniques can provide better results in comparison with
multi-variate Horner’s rule, and techniques for common sub-expression elimination.
The main difference between our implementation, and the algorithm in [58] is that
we distinguish between multiplication of variables, and multiplication by constants,
to suit the cost model described earlier in Section 2.1.1.
3.5.4 Limitation
Our approach is greedy and does not guarantee optimality — in general achiev-
ing optimality is intractable. However, it was observed that this approach performs
better than others for common cases [58]. Another limitation is its running time
and memory consumption for large problems, therefore, we restrict the size of the
problems tackled by this module, and we are working on optimizations.
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we illustrate how our framework provides savings for multiple
cryptographic building blocks, spanning hash functions, signatures, and encryption,
compared to other compilers, while achieving programmability. Additionally, we dis-
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cuss savings for random memory access. Furthermore, the evaluation also includes
the full large circuit used by ZeroCash [7] for anonymous transactions, which we
compare to existing manual optimized implementations, and show that our frame-
work provides competitive performance to manual implementation, while reducing
the programmer’s effort.
3.6.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In the following, we evaluate four cryptographic primitives using our proposed
framework and algorithms. The comparison is primarily done with respect to the
state-of-the-art compilers, [11, 12]. The savings are measured in the number of the
constraints (multiplication gates), while any additional programmer effort/experi-
ence required by the other compilers is mainly characterized by the following: 1)
Introducing additional prover inputs and constraints to the circuit. 2) Specifying
where bitwidth adjustment/remainder operations are needed. 3) Adding special
procedures, e.g. a linear search code to implement random access.
SHA-256. We start by evaluating the SHA-256 circuit generated by the three
compilers. SHA-256 has been used and optimized for zk-SNARKs in many earlier
systems before, e.g. ZeroCash [7] and Hawk [2], mostly in a manually optimized
way built using either libsnark [15] or jsnark [14], which provide a circuit that has
approximately 27100 and 26100 gates respectively. In the following, we show how
xJsnark reduces the gap between the automated solutions and the manual ones.
The code tested for SHA-256 is a typical SHA-256 code, except that Java
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integer type is replaced by xJsnark’s parametrized type uint_32. We assume a cor-
responding C code for both Buffet and Geppetto. We assume that the circuit hashes
one block only, and that all inputs are variables, i.e. no padding is applied. Our
experiments (Table 3.2) indicate that the SHA-256 circuit produced automatically
by xJsnark achieves (1.5× and 1.7×) savings over the alternatives. Two main rea-
sons behind the savings in our automatically produced SHA-256 circuit. The first is
the smart bitwidth adjustment, which saves about 3,200 constraints over Geppetto,
10,000 constraints over Buffet, and the multivariate polynomial minimization, which
saves 8,800 constraints over both compilers.
Note that it is possible to enhance the SHA-256 circuits in Geppetto and Buf-
fet, but with the cost of additional programming effort/experience (e.g. optimizing
the expressions by hand in Geppetto, or adding casting statements in Buffet). In
this example specifically, we assumed almost the same code in all of the three alter-
natives.
SWIFFT hash function. The SWIFFT function is a lattice-based hash function
[60], in which the computations run in a field with p′ = 257. As mentioned earlier,
xJsnark allows the programmer to define Field types for arbitrary p′. On the other
hand, Buffet and Geppetto do not have native data types that represent fields.
As indicated in Table 3.2, xJsnark achieves the most savings while being easy to
program. The savings are due to efficient remainder checking when the represented
p′ can be expressed as 2n + 1, while the programmability is mainly due to that
fact that the programmer in that case does not choose where to do the remainder
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operation. In comparison, Buffet supports mod operations (in a less efficient way),
and the programmer will have to select where to do the mod operations. The result
in Table 3.2 assumes the optimal positioning of remainder operations in Buffet.
To the best of our knowledge, Geppetto does not (yet) support mod operations
when the modulus is not a power of two, so it’s assumed that the programmer will
have to manually add the additional inputs and constraint checking of the remainder
operations, plus choosing where to perform the remainder operations.
RSA-2048 Modular Exponentiation. Due to the complexity of the RSA circuit,
we only compare with existing implementations/specifications, such as the state-of-
the-art implementation in Cinderella [9], which was developed on top of Geppetto.
It is true that Buffet as well provides a library for long integer operations, however
the remainder operation is not implemented, and to implement it efficiently, it would
require the programmer to specify prover witness inputs to the circuit.
To ensure a fair comparison, we implemented the specification provided in
the Cinderella paper (assuming a pre-known modulus), and compared it with our
back end technique described earlier (The cost of our Cinderella implementation
is less, which provides a good lower bound). Cinderella’s implementation divides
the big integers to 120-bit words, and hence cannot apply the group step described
in our equality assertion algorithm, while in xJsnark’s case, the back end sets the
bitwidth to 32, applies our O(n) multiplication algorithm, and the improved equality
assertion algorithm with the additional group step. The result is shown in Table 3.2,
showing more than 1.5× speed-up overall. Looking closer, the enhancement in the
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Table 3.2: Comparison between different compilers with respect to the number of
constraints and programmability. A filled circle indicates more effort/experience by
the programmer relatively. A † symbol indicates a conservative lower bound.
Buffet [11] Geppetto [12] xJsnark
SHA-256 44999 # 38556 # 26155 #
SWIFFT 3857 G# 3006†  3006 #
RSA-2048 -  144933 [9] G# 90804 #
AES-128 (300) 9.3×106† # 27.2×106† G# 4.2×106 #
equality assertion step exceeds 3×, as both implementations share about 70,000
constraints for verifying the range of prover witness values. Note that in our case,
the programmer does not deal with any additional witness inputs or constraints,
compared to Cinderella’s code in Geppetto. This all happens in the background.
AES-128. The major cost incurred by an AES block in naive implementations is
mainly due to the cost of randomly accessing its S-Box, therefore we focus in this
section only on this part while assuming that the rest of the AES function has been
implemented optimally for all the other compilers. This is in particular to show the
savings that our proposed memory technique introduces. Table 3.2 illustrates the
results, when the number of AES blocks is high, e.g. 300. (Note that our technique
always provides better results (Figure 3.8)). To the best of our knowledge, Geppetto
does not currently support random accesses of unknown indices, therefore the linear
scan method is the default method to implement S-Box there. For the Buffet case,
we computed an estimate using the equation provided in the original paper [11],
which uses an unoptimized permutation network. As shown in the table, our O(
√
n)
technique provides more than 2× speedup over Buffet for the whole AES circuit.
It should also be noted that our O(
√
n) approach used in this evaluation achieves
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Table 3.3: Comparison between an improved permutation network approach based
on Buffet [1] versus xJsnark’s static read only memory technique, on a circuit of 300
AES-128 blocks
Proof Time Proving Key Size Memory Usage
Buffet
347.32 s 1.8 GB 24 GBPermutation
Network (improved)
xJsnark 172.62 s 958.79 MB 16 GB
1.7× enhancement over the optimized permutation network approach we use. The
savings also apply to the key sizes and the memory usage.
Table 3.3 shows a comparison between the proposed memory approach, and
an improved permutation network approach (based on the approach of Buffet [1])
in terms of the evaluation key size and the memory usage. Results were obtained
by running key generation and a sample proof computation using libsnark [15]. The
table illustrates better numbers for xJsnark’s approach (2× better in both the proof
time and the proving key size). This confirms that the savings obtained by reducing
the number of multiplication gates is much more than the cost of adding constant
multiplications in the circuit (the proof time is measured on an Amazon r3.8x EC2
instance).
3.6.2 Random Memory Access Application
In this section, we discuss the savings introduced by our framework in sorting
applications. We start by comparing the result of compiling merge sorting code using
Buffet [11], and xJsnark. The first two columns of Table 3.4compare the circuit sizes
produced by a merge sort implementation of an array of 16-bit integers, that is
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Table 3.4: Number of constraints for sorting circuits (n: input size)
n
Buffet [11] xJsnark xJsnark
Merge Sort Merge Sort Verify Permut.
32 276×103 79×103 782
64 714×103 266×103 1646
512 7.9×106 [11] 3.8×106 14830
according to Buffet’s available repository [61]. The code written using xJsnark is
almost similar except for minor syntax differences. For the first case where n = 32,
our adaptive memory algorithm selects the linear scan method over the permutation
network after analyzing the memory workload in the first phase. In the other cases,
the linear scan performs worse, and the back end selects the permutation network
instead. In both cases, there is 2-3× improvement over earlier implementations.
Furthermore, note that it will be more efficient to write code for verifying
the sorting result directly, using the high-level permutation verification feature in-
troduced in Section 3.2. Although the merge sort code uses also a permutation
network in the background, the permutation verification method provides signifi-
cantly better results as it saves a logarithmic factor of comparisons, and eliminates
the cost of read/write memory operations. Table 3.4 shows the savings compared
to basic approaches (Appendix C.1.1 provides a code example).
3.6.3 ZeroCash’s ZK-SNARK Circuit
Using our framework, we developed one existing application that was manually
developed using the libsnark gadget library [15, 62], mainly the pour circuit in the
ZeroCash system [7], which is used to add privacy to transactions on top of the
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Table 3.5: Comparison between the manual implementation and different compilers
in the case of ZeroCash’s Pour Circuit. A filled circle indicates more effort/experi-
ence by the programmer. A † symbol indicates a conservative lower bound.
# Constraints Development Effort
Existing Manual 4× 106 [7, 62]  
Implementations
xJsnark 3.81×106 #
Buffet [11] 6×106† #
Geppetto [12] 5×106† #
blockchain.
Table 3.5 compares the alternatives for developing the ZeroCash Pour circuit.
The reason xJsnark provides slightly better results than the manual optimized im-
plementation is due to some further low-level arithmetic optimizations that can be
automatically detected such as those by the multi-variate polynomial minimizer, by
detecting similarities across loops (As described in Section 3.5). In terms of the
development effort, the implementation is more compact in comparison with the
existing available implementation online on Github [62], and the gadgets it uses
from libsnark [15]. The rest of the table shows the efficiency achieved by xJsnark
compared to other compilers.
3.7 Limitations and Future Work
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our current implementation, and
directions for future work.
1. Integration of other optimizations. Previous implementations like Buffet or
Geppetto have other orthogonal optimizations that we plan to integrate in our next
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implementation. For example, Buffet provides a technique for loop coalescing, which
helps to reduce the complexity of nested loops, when the total running time is O(n),
while the trivial compilation to SNARK circuits can lead to O(n2) size. This can be
helpful for some applications, beyond what we evaluated. An optimization imple-
mented by Geppetto is energy-saving circuits, which reduces the prover’s running
time by making all the wire values for not taken branches have a zero value. Other
optimizations include: dead code elimination, which ignores any parts of the circuit
that did not contribute to the output of the circuit. Most of such optimizations can
be integrated in our back end. Another direction would be to formally argue about
the correctness of the compiler as in the PinocchioQ compiler [63].
2. Front end alternatives. As illustrated earlier, we used Jetbrains MPS to
build our Java extension for the front end. One possible drawback of using MPS
Jetbrains is that in order for the programmers to develop the code, it has to be
done in the projectional editor provided by MPS. Although this framework is free
and can be used on top of Windows, Linux, OS X and others, we plan to make
our implementation more generic, and investigate other approaches for developing
the java extension in order for our framework to be more accessible. Note that the
optimizations described in our back end does not depend on the specific framework
of the front end, and can be integrated with any other front end providing a similar
interface.
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Chapter 4: HAWK: Privacy-preserving Smart Contracts 1
Emerging smart contract systems, such as Ethereum [19], enable user-defined
decentralized applications to run on top of a public blockchain system. However,
the most commonly used form of these technologies lacks transactional privacy. All
the inputs and outputs of a smart contract execution have to be publicly visible to
the network in order to achieve transparency. Even though parties can create new
pseudonymous public keys to increase their anonymity, the values of all transactions
and balances for each (pseudonymous) public key are publicly visible. Furthermore,
recent works have also demonstrated deanonymization attacks by analyzing the
transactional graph structures of cryptocurrencies [64, 65].
We believe that lack of privacy could be a major hindrance towards the broad
adoption of decentralized smart contracts, since financial transactions (e.g., insur-
ance contracts or stock trading) are considered by many individuals and organiza-
tions as being highly secret. Although there has been progress in designing privacy-
preserving cryptocurrencies such as Zerocash [66] and several others [6, 67], these
systems forgo programmability, and it is unclear a priori how to enable programma-
bility without exposing transactions and data in cleartext to miners.
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Andrew Miller, Elaine Shi, Zikai Wen and Char-
alampos Papamanthou, that appeared in the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016 [2].
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4.1 HAWK Overview
In the following, we consider the setting of a public blockchain system with
support for smart contracts, e.g. Ethereum [19].
We propose HAWK, a framework for building privacy-preserving smart con-
tracts. With HAWK, a non-specialist programmer can easily write a HAWK program
without having to implement any cryptography. Our HAWK compiler is in charge
of compiling the program to a cryptographic protocol between the blockchain and
the users. A HAWK program contains two parts:
1. A private portion denoted φpriv which takes in parties’ input data (e.g., choices
in a “rock, paper, scissors” game) as well as currency units (e.g., bids in an
auction). φpriv performs computation to determine the payout distribution
amongst the parties. For example, in an auction, winner’s bid goes to the
seller, and others’ bids are refunded. The private HAWK program φpriv is
meant to protect the participants’ data and the exchange of money.
2. A public portion denoted φpub that does not touch private data or money.
Our compiler will compile the HAWK program into the following pieces which
jointly define a cryptographic protocol between users, the manager, and the blockchain:
• the blockchain’s program which will be executed by all consensus nodes;
• a program to be executed by the users; and
• a program to be executed by a special facilitating party called the manager
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which will be explained shortly.
Security guarantees. HAWK’s security guarantees encompass two aspects:
• On-chain privacy. On-chain privacy stipulates that transactional privacy be
provided against the public (i.e., against any party not involved in the contract)
– unless the contractual parties themselves voluntarily disclose information.
Although in HAWK protocols, users exchange data with the blockchain, and
rely on it to ensure fairness against aborts, the flow of money and amount
transacted in the private HAWK program φpriv is cryptographically hidden
from the public’s view. Informally, this is achieved by sending “encrypted”
information to the blockchain, and relying on zero-knowledge proofs to enforce
the correctness of contract execution and money conservation.
• Contractual security. While on-chain privacy protects contractual parties’
privacy against the public (i.e., parties not involved in the financial contract),
contractual security protects parties in the same contractual agreement from
each other. HAWK assumes that contractual parties act selfishly to maximize
their own financial interest. In particular, they can arbitrarily deviate from the
prescribed protocol or even abort prematurely. Therefore, contractual security
is a multi-faceted notion that encompasses not only cryptographic notions
of confidentiality and authenticity, but also financial fairness in the presence
of cheating and aborting behavior. The best way to understand contractual
security is through a concrete example, and we refer the reader to Section 4.1.1
for a more detailed explanation.
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Minimally trusted manager. The execution of HAWK contracts are facilitated
by a special party called the manager. The manager can see the users’ inputs and is
trusted not to disclose users’ private data. However, the manager is not trusted for
the correctness of the computation. Even when the manager can deviate arbitrarily
from the protocol or collude with the parties, the manager cannot affect the correct
execution of the contract. In the event that a manager aborts the protocol, it can
be financially penalized, and users obtain compensation accordingly.
The manager also need not be trusted to maintain the security or privacy
of the underlying currency (e.g., it cannot double-spend, inflate the currency, or
deanonymize users). Furthermore, if multiple contract instances run concurrently,
each contract may specify a different manager and the effects of a corrupt man-
ager are confined to that instance. Finally, the manager role may be instantiated
with trusted computing hardware like Intel SGX, or replaced with a multiparty
computation among the users themselves, as we describe in Section 4.3.3.
4.1.1 Example: Sealed Auction
Example program. Figure 4.1 shows a HAWK program for implementing a sealed,
second-price auction where the highest bidder wins, but pays the second highest
price. Second-price auctions are known to incentivize truthful bidding under certain
assumptions, [68] and it is important that bidders submit bids without knowing the
bid of the other people. Our example auction program contains a private portion
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φpriv that determines the winning bidder and the price to be paid; and a public
portion φpub that relies on public deposits to protect bidders from an aborting
manager.
For the time being, we assume that the set of bidders are known a priori.
Contractual security requirements. HAWK will compile this auction program
to a cryptographic protocol. As mentioned earlier, as long as the bidders and the
manager do not voluntarily disclose information, transaction privacy is maintained
against the public. HAWK also guarantees the following contractual security require-
ments for parties in the contract:
• Input independent privacy. Each user does not see others’ bids before com-
mitting to their own (even when they collude with a potentially malicious
manager). This way, users bids are independent of others’ bids.
• Posterior privacy. As long as the manager does not disclose information,
users’ bids are kept private from each other (and from the public) even after
the auction.
• Financial fairness. Parties may attempt to prematurely abort from the proto-
col to avoid payment or affect the redistribution of wealth. If a party aborts or
the auction manager aborts, the aborting party will be financially penalized
while the remaining parties receive compensation. As is well-known in the
cryptography literature, such fairness guarantees are not attainable in general
by off-chain only protocols such as secure multi-party computation [29, 30].
As explained later, HAWK offers built-in mechanisms for enforcing refunds of
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private bids after certain timeouts.
• Security against a dishonest manager. We ensure authenticity against a dis-
honest manager: besides aborting, a dishonest manager cannot affect the out-
come of the auction and the redistribution of money, even when it colludes
with a subset of the users. To ensure the above, input independent privacy
against a faulty manager is a prerequisite. Moreover, if the manager aborts,
it can be financially penalized, and the participants obtain corresponding re-
muneration.
An auction with the above security and privacy requirements cannot be triv-
ially implemented atop existing cryptocurrency systems such as Ethereum [19] or
Zerocash [66]. The former allows for programmability but does not guarantee trans-
actional privacy, while the latter guarantees transactional privacy but at the price
of even reduced programmability than Bitcoin.
Aborting and timeouts. Aborting is dealt with using timeouts. A HAWK pro-
gram such as Figure 4.1 declares timeout parameters. Three timeouts are declared
where T1 < T2 < T3:
T1 : The HAWK contract stops collecting bids after T1.
T2 : All users should have opened their bids to the manager within T2; if a user
submitted a bid but fails to open by T2, its input bid is treated as 0 (and any
other potential input data treated as ⊥), such that the manager can continue.
T3 : If the manager aborts, users can reclaim their private bids after time T3.
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The public HAWK contract φpub can additionally implement incentive struc-
tures. Our sealed auction program redistributes the manager’s public deposit if
it aborts. Specifically, in our sealed auction program, φpub defines two functions,
namely check and managerTimeOut. The check function will be invoked when the
HAWK contract completes execution within T3, i.e., manager did not abort. Other-
wise, if the HAWK contract does not complete execution within T3, the managerTimeOut
function will be invoked. We remark that although not explicitly written in the code,
all HAWK contracts have an implicit default entry point for accepting parties’ de-
posits – these deposits are withheld by the contract till they are redistributed by the
contract. Bidders should check that the manager has made a public deposit before
submitting their bids.
Additional applications. Besides the sealed auction example, We illustrate that
HAWK can support various other applications. We give more sample programs in
Section 4.5.2.
4.1.2 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, HAWK was the first to simultaneously offer
transactional privacy and programmability in a decentralized cryptocurrency sys-
tem.
New cryptography suite. We implement a new cryptography suite that binds
private transactions with programmable logic. Our protocol suite contains three
essential primitives freeze, compute, and finalize. The freeze primitive allows
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parties to commit to not only normal data, but also coins. Committed coins are
frozen in the contract, and the payout distribution will later be determined by the
program φpriv. During compute, parties open their committed data and currency
to the manager, such that the manager can compute the function φpriv. Based on
the outcome of φpriv, the manager now constructs new private coins to be paid to
each recipient. The manager then submits to the blockchain both the new private
coins as well as zero-knowledge proofs of their well-formedness. At this moment,
the previously frozen coins are now redistributed among the users. Our protocol
suite strictly generalizes Zerocash since Zerocash implements only private money
transfers between users without programmability.
Implementation and evaluation. We built a HAWK prototype and evaluated its
performance by implementing several example applications, including a sealed-bid
auction, a “rock, paper, scissors” game, a crowdfunding application, and a swap fi-
nancial instrument. We propose interesting protocol optimizations that gained us a
factor of 10× in performance relative to a straightforward implementation. We show
that for at about 100 parties (e.g., auction and crowdfunding), the manager’s cryp-
tographic computation (the most expensive part of the protocol) is under 2.85min
using 4 cores, translating to under $0.14 of EC2 time. Further, all on-chain com-
putation (performed by all miners) is very cheap, and under 20ms for all cases. We
will open source our HAWK framework in the near future.
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1 HawkDeclareParties(Seller,/* N parties */);
2 HawkDeclareTimeouts(/* hardcoded timeouts */);
3 // Private portion φpriv
4 private contract auction(Inp &in, Outp &out) {
5 int winner = -1;
6 int bestprice = -1;
7 int secondprice = -1;
8 for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) {
9 if (in.party[i].$val > bestprice) {
10 secondprice = bestprice;
11 bestprice = in.party[i].$val;
12 winner = i;
13 } else if (in.party[i].$val > secondprice) {
14 secondprice = in.party[i].$val;
15 }
16 }
17 // Winner pays secondprice to seller
18 // Everyone else is refunded
19 out.Seller.$val = secondprice;
20 out.party[winner].$val = bestprice-secondprice;
21 out.winner = winner;
22 for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) {
23 if (i != winner)
24 out.party[i].$val = in.party[i].$val;
25 }
26 }
27 // Public portion φpub
28 public contract deposit {
29 // Manager deposited $N earlier
30 def check(): // invoked on contract completion
31 send $N to Manager // refund manager
32 def managerTimeOut():
33 for (i in range($N)):
34 send $1 to party[i]
35 }
Figure 4.1: HAWK program for a second-price sealed auction. The provided code
is an approximation of our real implementation.
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4.2 Notations and Threat Model
We begin by describing the trust model and assumptions.
In this work, the blockchain refers to a decentralized set of miners who run a
secure consensus protocol to agree upon the global state. We therefore will regard
the blockchain as a conceptual trusted party who is trusted for correctness and
availability, but not trusted for privacy. The blockchain not only maintains a
global ledger that stores the balance for every pseudonym, but also executes user-
defined programs. More specifically, we make the following assumptions:
• Time. The blockchain is aware of a discrete clock that increments in rounds.
• Public state. All parties can observe the state of the blockchain. This means
that all parties can observe the public ledger on the blockchain, as well as the
state of any user-defined blockchain program (part of a contract protocol).
• Message delivery. Messages sent to the blockchain will arrive at the beginning
of the next round. A network adversary may arbitrarily reorder messages that
are sent to the blockchain within the same round. This means that the ad-
versary may attempt a front-running attack (also referred to as the rushing
adversary by cryptographers), e.g., upon observing that an honest user is trad-
ing a stock, the adversary preempts by sending a race transaction trading the
same stock. Our protocols should be secure despite such adversarial message
delivery schedules.
We assume that all parties have a reliable channel to the blockchain, and the
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adversary cannot drop messages a party sends to the blockchain. In reality, this
means that the overlay network must have sufficient redundancy. However, an
adversary can drop messages delivered between parties off the blockchain.
• Pseudonyms. Users can make up an unbounded polynomial number of pseudonyms
when communicating with the blockchain.
• Correctness and availability. We assume that the blockchain will perform
any prescribed computation correctly. We also assume that the blockchain is
always available.
4.2.1 Notations
Pseudonymity. All party identifiers that appear in our protocols by default refer
to pseudonyms. When we write “upon receiving message from some P”, this accepts
a message from any pseudonym. Whenever we write “upon receiving message from
P”, without the keyword some, this accepts a message from a fixed pseudonym P ,
and typically which pseudonym we refer to is clear from the context.
Whenever we write “send m to G(Contract) as nym P” inside a user program,
we assume that authentication is happening in the background (This is formally de-
scribed in the Blockchain model in the full version of the work [2]) When the context
is clear, we avoid writing “as nym P”, and simply write “send m to G(Contract)”.
Ledger and money transfers. A public ledger is denoted ledger in our construc-
tions. When a party sends $amt to a blockchain program, this represents an ordinary
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message transmission. Money transfers only take place when the blockchain pro-
grams update the public ledger ledger. In other words, the symbol $ is only adopted
for readability (to distinguish variables associated with money and other variables),
and does not have special meaning or significance. One can simply think of this
variable as having the money type.
4.3 Cryptographic Protocols
In this section, we provide the cryptographic protocols we used for HAWK. Our
protocols are broken down into two parts: 1) the private cash part that implements
direct money transfers between users; and 2) the HAWK-specific part that binds
transactional privacy with programmable logic. The formal protocol descriptions
are given in Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7. The ideal functionalities and the
proofs are provided in the full version of the paper [2]. Below we explain the high-
level intuition.
4.3.1 Warmup: Private Cash and Money Transfers
Our construction adopts a Zerocash-like protocol for implementing private cash
and private currency transfers. For completeness, we give a brief explanation below,
and we mainly focus on the pour operation which is technically more interesting.
The blockchain program Blockchaincash maintains a set Coins of private coins. Each
private coin is of the format
(P , coin := Comms($val))
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where P denotes a party’s pseudonym, and coin commits to the coin’s value $val
under randomness s.
During a pour operation, the spender P chooses two coins in Coins to spend,
denoted (P , coin1) and (P , coin2) where coini := Commsi($vali) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The
pour operation pays val′1 and val
′
2 amount to two output pseudonyms denoted P1
and P2 respectively, such that val1 + val2 = val′1 + val′2. The spender chooses new
randomness s′i for i ∈ {1, 2}, and computes the output coins as(




The spender gives the values s′i and val
′
i to the recipient Pi for Pi to be able to spend
the coins later.
Now, the spender computes a zero-knowledge proof to show that the output
coins are constructed appropriately, where correctness compasses the following as-
pects:
• Existence of coins being spent. The coins being spent (P , coin1) and (P , coin2)
are indeed part of the private pool Coins. We remark that here the zero-
knowledge property allows the spender to hide which coins it is spending –
this is the key idea behind transactional privacy.
To prove this efficiently, Blockchaincash maintains a Merkle tree MT over the
private pool Coins. Membership in the set can be demonstrated by a Merkle
branch consistent with the root hash, and this is done in zero-knowledge.
• No double spending. Each coin (P , coin) has a cryptographically unique serial
number sn that can be computed as a pseudorandom function of P ’s secret
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key and coin. To pour a coin, its serial number sn must be disclosed, and a
zero-knowledge proof given to show the correctness of sn. Blockchaincash checks
that no sn is used twice.
• Money conservation. The zero-knowledge proof also attests to the fact that
the input coins and the output coins have equal total value.
We make some remarks about the security of the scheme. Intuitively, when an
honest party pours to an honest party, the adversary A does not learn the values
of the output coins assuming that the commitment scheme Comm is hiding, and
the NIZK scheme we employ is computational zero-knowledge. The adversary A
can observe the nyms that receive the two output coins. However, as we remarked
earlier, since these nyms can be one-time, leaking them to the adversary would
be okay. Essentially we only need to break linkability at spend time to ensure
transactional privacy.
When a corrupted party P∗ pours to an honest party P , even though the ad-
versary knows the opening of the coin, it cannot spend the coin (P , coin) once the
transaction takes effect by the Blockchaincash, since P∗ cannot demonstrate knowl-
edge of P ’s secret key. Since the contract binds the owner’s nym P to the coin, only
the owner can spend it even when the opening of coin is disclosed.
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Blockchaincash
Init: crs: a reference string for the underlying NIZK system
Coins: a set of coin commitments, initially ∅
SpentCoins: set of spent serial numbers, initially ∅
Mint: Upon receiving (mint, $val, s) from some party P,
coin := Comms($val)
assert (P, coin) /∈ Coins
assert ledger[P] ≥ $val
ledger[P] := ledger[P]− $val
add (P, coin) to Coins
Pour: Anonymous receive (pour, π, {sni,Pi, coini, cti}i∈{1,2}})
let MT be a merkle tree built over Coins
statement := (MT.root, {sni,Pi, coini}i∈{1,2})
assert NIZK.Verify(LPOUR, π, statement)
for i ∈ {1, 2},
assert sni /∈ SpentCoins
assert (Pi, coini) /∈ Coins
add sni to SpentCoins
add (Pi, coini) to Coins
send (pour, coini, cti) to Pi,
Relation (statement,witness) ∈ LPOUR is defined as:
parse statement as (MT.root, {sni,Pi, coin′i}i∈{1,2})
parse witness as (P, skprf, {branchi, si, $vali, s′i, ri, $val
′
i})
assert P.pkprf = PRFskprf(0)





for i ∈ {1, 2},
coini := Commsi($vali)
assert MerkleBranch(MT.root, branchi, (P‖coini))
assert sni = PRFskprf(P‖coini)
assert coin′i = Comms′i($val
′
i)
Figure 4.2: Blockchaincash construction. A trusted setup phase generates the NIZK’s
common reference string crs. For notational convenience, we omit writing the crs
explicitly in the construction. The Merkle tree MT is stored on the blockchain




Init: Wallet: stores P’s spendable coins, initially ∅
GenNym: sample a random seed skprf
pkprf := PRFskprf(0)
return pkprf
Mint: On input (mint, $val),
sample a commitment randomness s
coin := Comms($val)
store (s, $val, coin) in Wallet
send (mint, $val, s) to G(Blockchaincash)
Pour (as sender): On input (pour, $val1, $val2, P1, P2, $val′1, $val′2),





for i ∈ {1, 2}, assert (si, $vali, coini) ∈Wallet for some (si, coini)
let MT be a merkle tree over Blockchaincash.Coins
for i ∈ {1, 2}:
remove one (si, $vali, coini) from Wallet
sni := PRFskprf(P‖coini)
let branchi be the branch of (P, coini) in MT




cti := ENC(Pi.epk, ri, $val′i‖s′i)
statement := (MT.root, {sni,Pi, coin′i}i∈{1,2})
witness := (P, skprf, {branchi, si, $vali, s′i, ri, $val
′
i})
π := NIZK.Prove(LPOUR, statement,witness)
AnonSend(pour, π, {sni,Pi, coin′i, cti}i∈{1,2})
to G(Blockchaincash)
Pour (as recipient): On receive (pour, coin, ct) from G(Blockchaincash):
let ($val‖s) := DEC(esk, ct)
assert Comms($val) = coin
store (s, $val, coin) in Wallet
output (pour, $val)
Figure 4.3: UserPcash construction. Note that G(Blockchaincash) is a functional-
ity wrapper for Blockchaincash that captures the blockchain properties and threat
model [2].
90
4.3.2 Binding Privacy and Programmable Logic
So far, Blockchaincash, similar to Zerocash [66], only supports direct money
transfers between users. We allow transactional privacy and programmable logic
simutaneously.
Freeze. We support a new operation called freeze, that does not spend directly
to a user, but commits the money as well as an accompanying private input to a
smart contract. This is done using a pour-like protocol:
• The user P chooses a private coin (P , coin) ∈ Coins, where coin := Comms($val).
Using its secret key, P computes the serial number sn for coin – to be disclosed
with the freeze operation to prevent double-spending.
• The user P computes a commitment (val||in||k) to the contract where in de-
notes its input, and k is a symmetric encryption key that is introduced due to
a practical optimization explained later in Section 4.4.
• The user P now makes a zero-knowledge proof attesting to similar statements
as in a pour operation, i.e., that the spent coin exists in the pool Coins, the
sn is correctly constructed, and that the val committed to the contract equals
the value of the coin being spent. See LFREEZE in Figure 4.5 for details of the
NP statement being proven.
Compute. Next, computation takes place off-chain to compute the payout dis-
tribution {val′i}i∈[n] and a proof of correctness. In HAWK, we rely on a minimally
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trusted manager PM to perform computation. All parties would open their inputs
to the manager PM, and this is done by encrypting the opening to the manager’s
public key:
ct := ENC(PM.epk, r, ($val‖in‖k‖s′))
The ciphertext ct is submitted to the smart contract along with appropriate zero-
knowledge proofs of correctness. While the user can also directly send the opening
to the manager off-chain, passing the ciphertext ct through the smart contract would
make any aborts evident such that the contract can financially punish an aborting
user.
After obtaining the openings, the manager now computes the payout distri-
bution {val′i}i∈[n] and public output out by applying the private contract φpriv. The
manager also constructs a zero-knowledge proof attesting to the outcomes.
Finalize. When the manager submits the outcome of φpriv and a zero-knowledge
proof of correctness to Blockchainhawk, Blockchainhawk verifies the proof and redis-
tributes the frozen money accordingly. Here Blockchainhawk also passes the manager’s
public input inM and public output out to the public HAWK contract φpub. The pub-
lic contract φpub can be invoked to check the validity of the manager’s input, as well
as redistribute public collateral deposit.
Assuming that the hash function in the Merkle tree is collision resistant, the
commitment scheme Comm is perfectly binding and computationally hiding, the
NIZK scheme is computationally zero-knowledge and simulation sound extractable,
the encryption schemes ENC and SENC are perfectly correct and semantically se-
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cure, the PRF scheme PRF is secure, then it can be shown that our protocols in
Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.6 and 4.7 are secure (The theorem and proofs are available in
the full version of the paper [2]).
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Blockchainhawk(PM, {Pi}i∈[N ], T1, T2, φpriv, φpub)
Init: Call Blockchaincash.Init.
Freeze: Upon receiving (freeze, π, sni, cmi) from Pi:
assert current time T ≤ T1
assert this is the first freeze from Pi
let MT be a merkle tree built over Coins
assert sni /∈ SpentCoins
statement := (Pi,MT.root, sni, cmi)
assert NIZK.Verify(LFREEZE, π, statement)
add sni to SpentCoins and store cmi for later
Compute: Upon receiving (compute, π, ct) from Pi:
assert T1 ≤ T < T2 for current time T
assert NIZK.Verify(LCOMPUTE, π, (PM, cmi, ct))
send (compute,Pi, ct) to PM
Finalize: On receiving (finalize, π, inM, out, {coin′i, cti}i∈[N ]) from PM:
assert current time T ≥ T2
for every Pi that has not called compute, set cmi := ⊥
statement := (inM, out, {cmi, coin′i, cti}i∈[N ])
assert NIZK.Verify(LFINALIZE, π, statement)
for i ∈ [N ]:
assert coin′i /∈ Coins
add coin′i to Coins
send (finalize, coin′i, cti) to Pi
Call φpub.check(inM, out)
Blockchaincash: include Blockchaincash
φpub : include user-defined public contract φpub
Figure 4.4: Blockchainhawk construction.
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Relation (statement,witness) ∈ LFREEZE is defined as:
parse statement as (P ,MT.root, sn, cm)
parse witness as (coin, skprf, branch, s, $val, in, k, s
′)
coin := Comms($val)
assert MerkleBranch(MT.root, branch, (P‖coin))
assert P .pkprf = skprf(0)
assert sn = PRFskprf(P‖coin)
assert cm = Comms′($val‖in‖k)
Relation (statement,witness) ∈ LCOMPUTE is defined as:
parse statement as (PM, cm, ct)
parse witness as ($val, in, k, s′, r)
assert cm = Comms′($val‖in‖k)
assert ct = ENC(PM.epk, r, ($val‖in‖k‖s′))
Relation (statement,witness) ∈ LFINALIZE is defined as:
parse statement as (inM, out, {cmi, coin′i, cti}i∈[N ])
parse witness as {si, $vali, ini, s′i, ki}i∈[N ]
({$val′i}i∈[N ], out) := φpriv({$vali, ini}i∈[N ], inM)
assert
∑





for i ∈ [N ]:
assert cmi = Commsi($vali‖ini‖ki))
∨($vali, ini, ki, si, cmi) = (0,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)
assert cti = SENCki(s
′
i‖$val′i)
assert coin′i = Comms′i($val
′
i)
Figure 4.5: Relation definitions for the Blockchainhawk and UserPhawk constructions
in Figures 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7
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Protocol UserPhawk(PM, {Pi}i∈[N ], T1, T2, φpriv, φpub)
Init: Call UserPcash.Init.
Protocol for a party P ∈ {Pi}i∈[N ]:
Freeze: On input (freeze, $val, in) as party P:
assert current time T < T1
assert this is the first freeze input
let MT be a merkle tree over Blockchaincash.Coins
assert that some entry (s, $val, coin) ∈Wallet for some (s, coin)
remove one (s, $val, coin) from Wallet
sn := PRFskprf(P‖coin)
let branch be the branch of (P, coin) in MT
sample a symmetric encryption key k
sample a commitment randomness s′
cm := Comms′($val‖in‖k)
statement := (P,MT.root, sn, cm)
witness := (coin, skprf, branch, s, $val, in, k, s
′)
π := NIZK.Prove(LFREEZE, statement,witness)
send (freeze, π, sn, cm) to G(Blockchainhawk)
store in, cm, $val, s′, and k to use later (in compute)
Compute: On input (compute) as party P:
assert current time T1 ≤ T < T2
sample encryption randomness r
ct := ENC(PM.epk, r, ($val‖in‖k‖s′))
π := NIZK.Prove((PM, cm, ct), ($val, in, k, s′, r))
send (compute, π, ct) to G(Blockchainhawk)
Finalize: Receive (finalize, coin, ct) from G(Blockchainhawk):
decrypt (s‖$val) := SDECk(ct)
store (s, $val, coin) in Wallet
output (finalize, $val)
UserPcash: include UserPcash.
Figure 4.6: UserPhawk construction: The participant protocol. G(Blockchainhawk) is
a functionality wrapper for Blockchainhawk, that captures the blockchain properties
and threat model [2].
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Protocol UserPhawk(PM, {Pi}i∈[N ], T1, T2, φpriv, φpub)
Init: Call UserPcash.Init.
Protocol for manager PM:
Compute: On receive (compute,Pi, ct) from G(Blockchainhawk):
decrypt and store ($vali‖ini‖ki‖si) := DEC(esk, ct)
store cmi := Commsi($vali‖ini‖ki)
output (Pi, $vali, ini)
If this is the last compute received:
for i ∈ [N ] such that Pi has not called compute,
($vali, ini, ki, si, cmi) := (0,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)
({$val′i}i∈[N ], out) := φpriv({$vali, ini}i∈[N ], inM)
store and output ({$val′i}i∈[N ], out)
Finalize: On input (finalize, inM, out):
assert current time T ≥ T2
for i ∈ [N ]:







statement := (inM, out, {cmi, coin′i, cti}i∈[N ])
witness := {si, $vali, ini, s′i, ki}i∈[N ]
π := NIZK.Prove(statement,witness)
send (finalize, π, inM, out, {coin′i, cti})
to G(Blockchainhawk)
UserPcash: include UserPcash.
Figure 4.7: UserPhawk construction: The manager protocol.
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4.3.3 Extensions and Discussions
Refunding frozen coins to users. In our implementation, we extend our basic
scheme to allow the users to reclaim their frozen money after a timeout T3 > T2. To
achieve this, user P simply sends the contract a newly constructed coin (P , coin :=
Comms($val)) and proves in zero-knowledge that its value $val is equal to that of
the frozen coin. In this case, the user can identify the previously frozen coin in the
clear, i.e., there is no need to compute a zero-knowledge proof of membership within
the frozen pool as is needed in a pour transaction.
Instantiating the manager with trusted hardware. In some applications, it
may be a good idea to instantiate the manager using trusted hardware such as the
emerging Intel SGX. In this case, the off-chain computation can take place in a secret
SGX enclave that is not visible to any untrusted software or users. Alternatively,
in principle, the manager role can also be split into two or more parties that jointly
run a secure computation protocol – although this approach is likely to incur higher
overhead.
Note that our model is fundamentally different from placing full trust in any
centralized node. Trusted hardware cannot serve as a replacement of the blockchain.
Any off-chain only protocol that does not interact with the blockchain cannot offer
financial fairness in the presence of aborts – even when trusted hardware is employed.
Furthermore, even the use of SGX does not obviate the need for our crypto-
graphic protocol. If the SGX is trusted only by a subset of parties (e.g., just the
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parties to a particular private contact), rather than globally, then those users can
benefit from the efficiency of an SGX-managed private contract, while still utilizing
the more widely trusted underlying currency.
Pouring anonymously to long-lived pseudonyms.
In our protocols, the pour operation discloses the recipient’s pseudonyms.
This means that our protocols only retain full privacy if the recipient generates
a fresh, new pseudonym every time. In comparison, Zerocash [66] provides an option
of anonymously spending to a long-lived pseudonym (in other words, having pour
not disclose recipients’ pseudonyms to the public).
It would be straightforward to add this feature to HAWK as well (at the cost
of a constant factor blowup in performance); however, in most applications (e.g.,
a payment made after receiving an invoice), the transfer is subsequent to some
interaction between the recipient and sender.
Open enrollment of pseudonyms. In our current contracts, we assume that
parties’ pseudonyms are hardcoded and known a priori. We can easily relax this
to allow open enrollment of any pseudonym that joins the contract (e.g., in an
auction). Our implementation supports open enrollment. Due to SNARK’s pre-
processing, right now, each contract instance must declare an upper-bound on the
number of participants. An enrollment fee can potentially be adopted to prevent
a DoS attack where the attacker joins the contract with many pseudonyms thus
preventing legitimate users from joining. How to choose the correct fee amount to
achieve incentive compatibility is left as an open research challenge. The a priori
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upper bound on the number of participants can be avoided if we adopt recursively
composable SNARKs [12,69].
4.4 Adopting SNARKs in UC Protocols and Practical Optimizations
4.4.1 Using SNARKs in UC Protocols
Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge [4,25,70] provide succinct
proofs for general computation tasks, and have been implemented by several sys-
tems [1,4,25]. We would like to use SNARKs to instantiate the NIZK proofs in our
protocols — unfortunately, SNARK’s security is too weak to be directly employed
in Universal Composability protocols [18]. Specifically, SNARK’s knowledge extrac-
tor is non-blackbox and cannot be used by the UC simulator to extract witnesses
from statements sent by the adversary and environment — doing so would require
that the extractor be aware of the environment’s algorithm, which is inherently
incompatible with UC security.
UC protocols often require the NIZKs to have simulation extractability. Al-
though SNARKs do not satisfy simulation extractability, in [16] we show that it
is possible to apply efficient SNARK-lifting transformations to construct simula-




Efficient SNARK circuits. A SNARK prover’s performance is mainly deter-
mined by the number of multiplication gates in the algebraic circuit to be proven
(Section 2.1.1). To achieve efficiency, we designed optimized circuits through two
ways: 1) using cryptographic primitives that are SNARK-friendly, i.e. efficiently re-
alizable as arithmetic circuits under a specific SNARK parametrization. 2) Building
customized circuit generators to produce SNARK-friendly implementations instead
of relying on compilers to translate higher level implementation (See Appendices A
and B for a summary of our tools).
The main cryptographic building blocks in our system are: collision-resistant
hash function for the Merkle trees, pseudo-random function, commitment, and en-
cryption. Our implementation supports both 80-bit and 112-bit security levels. To
instantiate the CRH efficiently, we use an Ajtai-based SNARK-friendly collision-
resistant hash function that is similar to the one used by Ben-Sasson et al. [21].
In our implementation, the modulus q is set to be the underlying SNARK imple-
mentation 254-bit field prime, and the dimension d is set to 3 for the 80-bit security
level, and to 4 for the 112-bit security level based on the analysis in [71]. For PRFs
and commitments, we use a hand-optimized implementation of SHA-256. Further-
more, we adopt the SNARK-friendly primitives for encryption used proposed in
Appendix B [71], in which an efficient circuit for hybrid encryption in the case of
80-bit security level was proposed. The circuit performs the public key operations
in a prime-order subgroup of the Galois field extension Fpµ , where µ = 4, p is the
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underlying SNARK field prime (typically 254-bit prime, i.e. pµ is over 1000-bit ),
and the prime order of the subgroup used is 398-bit prime. This was originally
inspired by Pinocchio coin [6]. The circuit then applies a lightweight cipher like
Speck [72] or Chaskey-LTS [73] with a 128-bit key to perform symmetric encryption
in the CBC mode, as using the standard AES-128 instead will result in a higher
cost [71] 2. For the 112-bit security, using the same method for public key opera-
tions requires intensive factorization to find suitable parameters, therefore we use
a manually optimized RSA-OAEP encryption circuit with a 2048-bit key instead
(Note that this can be improved by our optimizations for RSA (Chapter 3) or using
our SNARK-friendly Elliptic curve (Appendix B), which both appeared after this
work).
In the next section, we will illustrate how using SNARK-friendly implementa-
tions can lead to 2.0-3.7× savings in the size of the circuits at the 80-bit security
level, compared to the case when naive straightforward implementation are used.
We will also illustrate that the performance is also practical in the higher security
level case.
Optimizations for finalize. In addition to the SNARK-friendly optimizations,
we focus on optimizing the O(N)-sized finalize circuit since this is our main
performance bottleneck. All other SNARK proofs in our scheme are for O(1)-sized
circuits. Two key observations allow us to greatly improve the performance of the
proof generation during finalize.
2This work was prior to developing our efficient AES circuit illustrated in Chapter 3
102
Optimization 1: Minimize Simulation Sound Extractable NIZKs. First, we observe
that in the security proof [2], the simulator need not extract any new witnesses
when a corrupted manager submits proofs during a finalize operation. All wit-
nesses necessary will have been learned or extracted by the simulator at this point.
Therefore, we can employ an ordinary SNARK instead of a stronger simulation
sound extractable NIZK during finalize. For freeze and compute, we still use
the stronger NIZK. This optimization reduces our SNARK circuit sizes by 1.5× as
can be inferred from Figure 4.10 of Section 4.5, after SNARK-friendly optimizations
are applied.
Optimization 2: Minimize public-key encryption in SNARKs. Second, during finalize,
the manager encrypts each party Pi’s output coins to Pi’s key, resulting in a cipher-
text cti. The ciphertexts {cti}i∈[N ] would then be submitted to the contract along
with appropriate SNARK proofs of correctness. Here, if a public-key encryption
is employed to generate the cti’s, it would result in relatively large SNARK cir-
cuit size. Instead, we rely on a symmetric-key encryption scheme denoted SENC in
Figures 4.5 and 4.7. This requires that the manager and each Pi perform a key
exchange to establish a symmetric key ki. During an compute, the user encrypts this
ki to the manager’s public key PM.epk, and prove that the k encrypted is consistent
with the k committed to earlier in cmi. The SNARK proof during finalize now
only needs to include commitments and symmetric encryptions instead of public key
encryptions in the circuit – the latter much more expensive.
This second optimization additionally gains us a factor of 1.9× as shown in
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Figure 4.10 of Section 4.5 after applying the previous optimizations. Overall, all
optimizations will lead to a gain of more than 10× in the finalize circuit.
Remarks about the common reference string. SNARK schemes require the
generation of a common reference string (CRS) during a pre-processing step. This
common reference string consists of an evaluation key for the prover, and a verifica-
tion key for the verifier. Unless we employ recursively composed SNARKs [12, 69]
whose costs are significantly higher, the evaluation key is circuit-dependent, and
its size is proportional to the circuit’s size. In comparison, the verification key is
O(|in| + |out|) in size, i.e., depends on the total length of inputs and outputs, but
independent of the circuit size. Note that only the verification key portion of the
CRS needs to be included in the public contract that lives on the blockchain.
We remark that the CRS for protocol UserPcash is shared globally, and can be
generated in a one-time setup. In comparison, the CRS for each HAWK contract
would depend on the HAWK contract, and therefore exists per instance of HAWK
contract. To minimize the trust necessary in the CRS generation, one can em-
ploy either trusted hardware or use secure multi-party computation techniques as
described by Ben-Sasson et al. [74].
Finally, in the future when new primitives become sufficiently fast, it is possible
to drop-in and replace our SNARKs with other primitives that do not require per-
circuit preprocessing.
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4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
4.5.1 Compiler Implementation
Our compiler consists of several steps, which we illustrate in Figure 4.8 and
describe below:
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Figure 4.8: Compiler overview. Circuit augmentation for finalize.
Preprocessing: First, the input HAWK program is split into its public contract
and private contract components. The public contract is Serpent code, and
can be executed directly atop an ordinary cryptocurrency platform such as
Ethereum. The private contract is written in a subset of the C language, and is
passed as input to the Pinocchio arithmetic circuit compiler [4]. Currently, our
private contract inherits the limitations of the Pinocchio compiler, e.g., cannot
support dynamic-length loops. In the future, we can relax these limitations
by employing recursively composition of SNARKs.
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Circuit Augmentation: After compiling the preprocessed private contract code
with Pinocchio, we have an arithmetic circuit representing the input/output
relation φpriv. This becomes a subcomponent of a larger arithmetic circuit,
which we assemble using a customized circuit assembly tool. This tool is pa-
rameterized by the number of parties and the input/output datatypes, and
attaches cryptographic constraints, such as computing commitments and en-
cryptions over each party’s output value, and asserting that the input and
output values satisfy the balance property.
Cryptographic Protocol: Finally, the augmented arithmetic circuit is used as
input to a state-of-the-art zkSNARK library, libsnark [5]. To avoid im-
plementing SNARK verification in Ethereum’s Serpent language, a SNARK
verification opcode must be added to Ethereum’s stack machine. We finally
compile an executable program for the parties to compute the libsnark proofs
according to our protocol.
4.5.2 Additional Examples
Besides our running example of a sealed-bid auction (Figure 4.1), we imple-
mented several other examples in HAWK, demonstrating various capabilities:
Crowdfunding: A Kickstarter-style crowdfunding campaign, (also known as
an assurance contract in economics literature [75]) overcomes the “free-rider
problem,” allowing a large number of parties to contribute funds towards some
social good. If the minimum donation target is reached before the deadline,
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then the donations are transferred to a designated party (the entrepreneur);
otherwise, the donations are refunded. HAWK preserves privacy in the fol-
lowing sense: a) the donations pledged are kept private until the deadline;
and b) if the contract fails, only the manager learns the amount by which the
donations were insufficient. These privacy properties may conceivably have
a positive effect on the willingness of entrepreneurs to launch a crowdfund
campaign and its likelihood of success.
Rock Paper Scissors: A two-player lottery game, and naturally generalized
to an N -player version. Our HAWK implementation provides the same notion
of financial fairness as in [29,30] and provides stronger security/privacy guar-
antees. If any party (including the manager), cheats or aborts, the remaining
honest parties receive the maximum amount they might have won otherwise.
Furthermore, we go beyond prior works [29, 30] by concealing the players’
moves and the pseudonym of the winner to everyone except the manager.
“Swap” Financial Instrument: An individual with a risky investment port-
folio (e.g, one who owns a large number of Bitcoins) may hedge his risks by
purchasing insurance (e.g., by effectively betting against the price of Bitcoin
with another individual). Our example implements a simple swap instrument
where the price of a stock at some future date (as reported by a trusted author-
ity specified in the public contract) determines which of two parties receives
a payout. The private contract ensures the privacy of both the details of the


































Figure 4.9: Gains of using SNARK-friendly implementation for the user-









































Figure 4.10: Gains after adding each optimization to the finalize auction
circuit, with 25, 50 and 100 Bidders. Opt 1 and Opt 2 are two practical
optimizations detailed in Section 4.4.
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Table 4.1: Performance of the zk-SNARK circuits for the user-side circuits:
pour, freeze and compute (same for all applications). MUL denotes multiple (4)
cores, and ONE denotes a single core. The mint operation does not involve any
SNARKs, and can be computed within tens of microseconds. The Proof includes
any additional cryptographic material used for the SNARK-lifting transformation.
80-bit security 112-bit security
pour freeze compute pour freeze compute
KeyGen(s)MUL 26.3 18.2 15.9 36.7 30.5 34.6
ONE 88.2 63.3 54.42 137.2 111.1 131.8
Prove(s) MUL 12.4 8.4 9.3 18.5 15.7 16.8
ONE 27.5 20.7 22.5 42.2 40.5 41.7
Verify(ms) 9.7 9.1 10.0 9.9 9.3 9.9
EvalKey(MB) 148 106 90 236 189 224
VerKey(KB) 7.3 4.4 7.8 8.7 5.3 8.4
Proof(KB) 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.71
Stmt(KB) 0.48 0.16 0.53 0.57 0.19 0.53
4.5.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluated the performance for various examples, using an Amazon EC2
r3.8xlarge virtual machine. We assume a maximum of 264 leaves for the Merkle
trees, and we present results for both 80-bit and 112-bit security levels. Our bench-
marks actually consume at most 27GB of memory and 4 cores in the most expensive
case. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the results – we focus on evaluating the zk-SNARK
performance since all other computation time is negligible in comparison. We high-
light some important observations:
• On-chain computation (dominated by zk-SNARK verification time) is very
small in all cases, ranging from 9 to 20 milliseconds The running time of
the verification algorithm is just linearly dependent on the size of the public
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Table 4.2: Performance of the zk-SNARK circuits for the manager circuit
finalize for different applications. The manager circuits are the same
for both security levels. MUL denotes multiple (4) cores, and ONE denotes a single
core.
swap rps auction crowdfund
#Parties 2 2 10 100 10 100
KeyGen(s)MUL 8.6 8.0 32.3 300.4 32.16 298.1
ONE 27.8 24.9 124 996.3 124.4 976.5
Prove(s) MUL 3.2 3.1 15.4 169.3 15.2 169.2
ONE 7.6 7.4 40.1 384.2 40.3 377.5
Verify(ms) 8.4 8.4 10 19.9 10 19.8
EvalKey(GB) 0.04 0.04 0.21 1.92 0.21 1.91
VerKey(KB) 3.3 2.9 12.9 113.8 12.9 113.8
Proof(KB) 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Stmt(KB) 0.23 0.2 1.11 10.26 1.11 10.26
statement, which is far smaller than the size of the computation, resulting into
small verification time.
• On-chain public parameters: As mentioned in Section 4.3.3, not the entire
SNARK common reference string (CRS) need to be on the blockchain, but only
the verification key part of the CRS needs to be on-chain. Our implementation
suggests the following: the private cash protocol requires a verification key of
23KB to be stored on-chain – this verification key is globally shared and there
is only a single instance. Besides the globally shared public parameters, each
HAWK contract will additionally require 13-114 KB of verification key to
be stored on-chain, for 10 to 100 users. This per-contract verification key is
circuit-dependent, i.e., depends on the contract program. We refer the readers
to Section 4.3.3 for more discussions on techniques for performing trusted
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setup.
• Manager computation: Running private auction or crowdfunding protocols
with 100 participants requires under 6.5min proof time for the manager on a
single core, and under 2.85min on 4 cores. This translates to under $0.14 of
EC2 time [76].
• User computation: Users’ proof times for pour, freeze and compute are
under one minute, and independent of the number of parties. Additionally, in
the worst case, the peak memory usage of the user is less than 4 GB.
Savings from protocol optimizations. Figure 4.9 illustrates the performance
gains attained by using a SNARK-friendly implementation for the user-side cir-
cuits, i.e. pour, freeze and compute w.r.t. the naive implementation at the 80-bit
security level. We calculate the naive implementation cost using conservative esti-
mates for the straightforward implementation of standard cryptographic primitives.
The figure shows a gain of 2.0-2.6× compared to the naive implementation. Fur-
thermore, Figure 4.10 illustrates the performance gains attained by our protocol
optimizations described in Section 4.4 The figure considers the sealed-bid auction
finalize circuit at different number of bidders. We show that the SNARK-friendly
implementation along with our two optimizations combined significantly reduce the
SNARK circuit sizes, and achieve a gain of 10× relative to a straightforward im-
plementation. The figure also illustrates that the manager’s cost is proportional to
the number of participants. (By contrast, the user-side costs are independent of the
number of participants).
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4.6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this chapter, we presented HAWK a system for privacy-preserving smart
contracts. HAWK relies on zk-SNARKs as a main tool for verifying computations
outside the blockchain in a privacy-preserving manner, and was built using our tools
for low-level circuit construction and composable zero-knowledge proofs presented
in Appendices A and B. The performance results presented in this chapter can
be further improved on the circuit level by the optimizations in Chapter 3, and
on the zero knowledge cryptographic back end level through the recent work by
Groth et al [77,78]. Furthermore, one limitation for our HAWK system is the trusted
preprocessing phase needed per contract. In Chapter 6, we discuss further directions
to look into based on new zero knowledge proof systems.
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Chapter 5: Investigating the future of Criminal Smart Contracts1
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin remove the need for trusted third parties from
basic monetary transactions and offer anonymous (more accurately, pseudonymous)
transactions between individuals. While attractive for many applications, these
features have a dark side. Bitcoin has stimulated the growth of ransomware [79],
money laundering [80], and illicit commerce, as exemplified by the notorious Silk
Road [81].
New cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum (as well as systems such as Counter-
party [82] and SmartContract [83]) offer even richer functionality than Bitcoin. In
a fully distributed system such as Ethereum, smart contracts enable general fair
exchange (atomic swaps) without a trusted third party, and thus can effectively
guarantee payment for successfully delivered data or services. Given the flexibility
of such smart contract systems, it is to be expected that they will stimulate not just
new beneficial services, but new forms of crime.
We refer to smart contracts that facilitate crimes in distributed smart contract
systems as criminal smart contracts (CSCs). An example of a CSC is a smart
contract for (private-)key theft. Such a CSC might pay a reward for (confidential)
1Based on a joint work with Ari Juels and Elaine Shi, that appeared in the ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2016 [8].
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delivery of a target key sk, such as a certificate authority’s private digital signature
key.
We explore the following key questions in this chapter. Could CSCs and new
verifible computation techniques enable a wider range of new crimes than earlier
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin)? How practical will such new crimes be? And What
key advantages do CSCs provide to criminals compared with conventional online
systems? Exploring these questions is essential to identifying threats and devising
countermeasures.
Would-be criminals face two basic challenges in the construction of CSCs.
First, it is not immediately obvious whether a CSC is at all feasible for a given crime,
such as key theft. This is because it is challenging to ensure that a CSC achieves a
key property in this work that we call commission-fair, meaning informally that its
execution guarantees both commission of a crime and commensurate payment for the
perpetrator of the crime or neither. Fair exchange is necessary to ensure commission-
fairness, but not sufficient: We show how CSC constructions implementing fair
exchange still allow a party to a CSC to cheat. Correct construction of CSCs can
thus be delicate.
Second, even if a CSC can in principle be constructed, given the limited op-
codes in existing smart contract systems (such as Ethereum), it is not immediately
clear that the CSC can be made practical. By this we mean that the CSC can be
executed without unduly burdensome computational effort, which in some smart
contract systems (e.g., Ethereum) would also mean unacceptably high execution
fees levied against the CSC.
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The following example illustrates these challenges.
Example 1a (Key compromise contract). Contractor C posts a request for theft
and delivery of the signing key skV of a victim certificate authority (CA) CertoMart.
C offers a reward $reward to a perpetrator P for (confidentially) delivering the Cer-
toMart private key skV to C.
To ensure fair exchange of the key and reward in Bitcoin, C and P would
need to use a trusted third party or communicate directly, raising the risks of be-
ing cheated or discovered by law enforcement. They could vet one another using a
reputation system, but such systems are often infiltrated by law enforcement author-
ities [38]. In contrast, a decentralized smart contract can achieve self-enforcing fair
exchange. For key theft, this is possible using the CSC Key-Theft in the following
example:
Example 1b (Key compromise CSC). C generates a private / public key pair
(skC, pkC) and initializes Key-Theft with public keys pkC and pkV (the CertoMart
public key). Key-Theft awaits input from a claimed perpetrator P of a pair (ct, π),
where π is a zero-knowledge proof that ct = encpkC [skV ] is well-formed. Key-Theft
then verifies π and upon success sends a reward of $reward to P. The contractor C
can then download and decrypt ct to obtain the compromised key skV .
Key-Theft implements a fair exchange between C and P , paying a reward to
P if and only if P delivers a valid key (as proven by π), eliminating the need for a
trusted third party. But it is not commission-fair, as it does not ensure that skvict
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actually has value. The CertoMart can neutralize the contract by preemptively
revoking its own certificate and then itself claiming C’s reward $reward!
As noted, a major thrust of this work is showing how, for CSCs such as
Key-Theft, criminals will be able to bypass such problems and still construct commission-
fair CSCs. (For key compromise, it is necessary to enable contract cancellation
should a key be revoked.) Additionally, we show that these CSCs can be efficiently
realized using existing cryptocurrency tools or features currently envisioned for cryp-
tocurrencies (e.g., zk-SNARKS [4,5]).
In this chapter, we show that it is or will be possible in smart contract systems
to construct CSCs for two types of crime:
1. Leakage / sale of secret documents;
2. Theft of private keys.
In the full version of the paper [8], we also study the applicability of “Calling-
card” crimes, a broad class of physical-world crimes (murder, arson, etc.) using
smart contracts, however, we do not cover them as they do not rely on verifiable
computation. Additionally, we study CSCs using trusted hardware for password
theft.
The fact that CSCs are possible in principle is not surprising. Previously, however,
it was not clear how practical or extensively applicable CSCs might be. As our
constructions for commission-fair CSCs show, constructing CSCs is not as straight-
forward as it might seem, but new cryptographic techniques and new approaches to
smart contract design can render them feasible and even practical.
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Our work therefore shows how imperative it is for the community to con-
sider the construction of defenses against CSCs. Criminal activity committed under
the guise of anonymity has posed a major impediment to adoption for Bitcoin.
Yet there has been little discussion of criminal contracts in public forums on cryp-
tocurrency [84] and the launch of Ethereum took place in July 2015. It is only
by recognizing CSCs early in their lifecycle that the community can develop timely
countermeasures to them, and see the promise of distributed smart contract systems
fully realized.
While our focus is on preventing evil, happily the techniques we propose
can also be used to create beneficial contracts. We explore both techniques for
structuring CSCs and the use of cutting-edge cryptographic tools, e.g., Succinct
Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (SNARKs), in CSCs. Like the design
of beneficial smart contracts, CSC construction requires a careful combination of
cryptography with commission-fair design [85].
In summary, our contributions are:
• Criminal smart contracts: We initiate the study of CSCs as enabled by Turing-
complete scripting languages in next-generation cryptocurrencies. We explore
CSCs for two different types of crimes: leakage of secrets in Section 5.2 (e.g.,
pre-release Hollywood films) and key compromise / theft (of, e.g., a CA sign-
ing key) in Section 5.3. We explore the challenges involved in crafting such
criminal contracts and demonstrate (anticipate) new techniques to resist neu-
tralization and achieve commission-fairness.
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• Proof of concept: To demonstrate that even sophisticated CSC are realistic,
we report (in their respective sections) on implementation of the CSCs we
explore. Our CSC for leakage of secrets is efficiently realizable today in existing
smart contract languages (e.g., that of Ethereum). The key theft CSC relies
respectively for efficiency and realizability on features currently envisioned by
the cryptocurrency community.
They too, however, are within practical reach as shown for example for our
key-theft CSC, which relies on zk-SNARKs. Our experiments show that
verification—the most important function, as it is performed by all full nodes—
requires as little as 9.9 msec on a 288-byte proof (with execution on an Amazon
EC2 r3.2xlarge instance with 2.5 GHz processors).
• Countermeasures: We briefly discuss in Section 5.4 how our work can help
prevent a proliferation of CSCs. Briefly, to be most effective, CSCs must
be advertised, making them detectible given community vigilance. Miners
have an economic incentive not to include CSC transactions in blocks, as
CSCs degrade the market value of a cryptocurrency. Consequently, awareness
and robust detection strategies may offer an effective general defense. A key
contribution of this work is to show the need for such countermeasures and
stimulate exploration of their implementation in smart contract systems such
as Ethereum.
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5.1 Notation and Threat Model
In this section, we describe the notations and the threat model we assume. It
is mostly similar to Section 4.2, but with additional notes related to our protocols in
the chapter. As in Chapter 4, we consider the setting of a public blockchain system
with support for smart contracts, like Ethereum [19].
Protocols in the smart contract model. Our model treats a contract as a
special party that is entrusted to enforce correctness but not privacy, as noted above.
(In reality, of course, a contract is enforced by the network.) All messages sent to
the contract and its internal state are publicly visible. A contract interacts with
users and other contracts by exchanging messages (also referred to as transactions).
Money, expressed in the form of account balances, is recorded in the global ledger.
Contracts can access and update the ledger to implement money transfers between
users, who are represented by pseudonymous public keys.
5.1.1 Threat Model
We adopt the following threat model in this work.
• Blockchain: Trusted for correctness but not privacy. We assume that the
blockchain always correctly stores data and performs computations and is
always available. The blockchain exposes all of its internal states to the public,
however, and retains no private data.
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• Arbitrarily malicious contractual parties. We assume that contractual parties
are mutually distrustful, and they act solely to maximize their own benefit.
Not only can they deviate arbitrarily from the prescribed protocol, they can
also abort from the protocol prematurely.
• Network influence of the adversary. We assume that messages between the
blockchain and players are delivered within a bounded delay, i.e., not per-
manently dropped. (A player can always resend a transaction dropped by a
malicious miner.) In our model, an adversary immediately receives and can ar-
bitrarily reorder messages, however. In real-life decentralized cryptocurrencies,
the winning miner sets the order of message processing. An adversary may
collude with certain miners or influence message-propagation among nodes.
As we show in Section 5.3, for key-theft contracts, message-reordering enables
a rushing attack that a commission-fair CSC must prevent.
5.1.2 Notational Conventions
We now explain some notational conventions for writing contracts.
• Currency and ledger. We use ledger[P ] to denote party P ’s balance in the
global ledger. For clarity, variables that begin with a $ sign denote money,
but otherwise behave like ordinary variables.
Unlike in Ethereum’s Serpent language, in our formal notation, when a con-
tract receives some $amount from a party P , this is only message transfer, and
no currency transfer has taken place at this point. Money transfers only take
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effect when the contract performs operations on the ledger, denoted ledger.
• Pseudonymity. Parties can use pseudonyms to obtain better anonymity. In
particular, a party can generate arbitrarily many public keys. In our notational
system, when we refer to a party P , P denotes the party’s pseudonym. The for-
mal blockchain model [2] we adopt provides a contract wrapper that manages
the pseudonym generation and the message signing necessary for establishing
an authenticated channel to the contract. These details are abstracted away
from the main contract program.
• Timer. Time progresses in rounds. At the beginning of each round, the
contract’s Timer function will be invoked. The variable T encodes the current
time.
• Entry points and variable scope. A contract can have various entry points,
each of which is invoked when receiving a corresponding message type. Thus
entry points behave like function calls invoked upon receipt of messages.
All variables are assumed to be globally scoped, with the following exception:
When an entry point says “Upon receiving a message from some party P ,”
this allows the registration of a new party P . In general, contracts are open
to any party who interacts with them. When a message is received from P
(without the keyword “some”), party P denotes a fixed party – and a well-
formed contract has already defined P .
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5.2 CSCs for Leakage of Secrets
As a first example of the power of smart contracts, we show how an exist-
ing type of criminal contract deployed over Bitcoin can be made more robust and
functionally enhanced as a smart contract and can be practically implemented in
Ethereum.
Among the illicit practices stimulated by Bitcoin is payment-incentivized leak-
age, i.e., public disclosure, of secrets. The recently created web site Darkleaks [86]
(a kind of subsidized Wikileaks) serves as a decentralized market for crowdfunded
public leakage of a wide variety of secrets, including, “Hollywood movies, trade se-
crets, government secrets, proprietary source code, industrial designs like medicine
or defence, [etc.].”
Intuitively, we define commission-fairness in this setting to mean that a con-
tractor C receives payment iff it leaks a secret in its entirety within a specified time
limit.
As we show, Darkleaks highlights the inability of Bitcoin to support commission-
fairness. We show how a CSC can in fact achieve commission-fairness with high
probability.
5.2.1 Darkleaks
In the Darkleaks system, a contractor C who wishes to sell a piece of content
M partitions it into a sequence of n segments {mi}ni=1. At a time (block height)
Topen pre-specified by C, a randomly selected subset Ω ⊂ [n] of k segments is publicly
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disclosed as a sample to entice donors / purchasers—those who will contribute to the
purchase of M for public leakage. When C determines that donors have collectively
paid a sufficient price, C decrypts the remaining segments for public release. The
parameter triple (n, k, Topen) is set by C (where n = 100 and k = 20 are recommended
defaults).
To ensure a fair exchange of M for payment without direct interaction between
parties, Darkleaks implements a (clever) protocol on top of the Bitcoin scripting
language. The main idea is that for a given segment mi of M that is not revealed
as a sample in Ω, donors make payment to a Bitcoin account ai with public key pki.
The segment mi is encrypted under a key κ = H(pki) (where H = SHA-256). To
spend its reward from account ai, C is forced by the Bitcoin transaction protocol to
disclose pki; thus the act of spending the reward automatically enables the community
to decrypt mi.
We present an overview of the existing, broken Darkleaks protocol, as we
are unaware of any unified technical presentation elsewhere. (Specific details, e.g.,
message formats, may be found in the Darkleaks source code [86], and cryptographic
primitives h1, h2, h2, and (enc, dec) are specified below.)
The protocol steps are as follows:
• Create: The contractor C partitions the secret M = m1 ‖ m2 ‖ . . . ‖ mn.
For each segment mi in M = {mi}ni=1, C computes:
– A Bitcoin (ECDSA) private key ski = h1(mi) and the corresponding
public key pki.
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– The Bitcoin address ai = h2(pki) associated with pki.
– A symmetric key κi = h3(pki), computed as a hash of public key pki.
– The ciphertext ei = encκi [mi].
C publishes: The parameter triple (n, k, Topen), ciphertexts E = {ei}ni=1, and
Bitcoin addresses A = {ai}ni=1.
• Challenge: At epoch (block height) Topen, the current Bitcoin block hash Bt
serves as a pseudorandom seed for a challenge S∗ = {si}ki=1.
• Response: In epoch Topen, C publishes the subset of public keys PK∗ =
{pks}s∈S∗ corresponding to addresses A∗ = {as}s∈S∗ . (The sample of segments
M∗ = {ms}s∈S∗ can then be decrypted by the Darkleaks community.)
• Payment: To pay for M , buyers send Bitcoin to the addresses A − A∗ corre-
sponding to unopened segments.
• Disclosure: The leaker C claims the payments made to addresses in A − A∗.
As spending the Bitcoin in address ai discloses pki., decryption of all unopened
segments M−M∗ is automatically made possible for the Darkleaks community.
Here, h1 = SHA-256, h2 = RIPEMD-160(SHA-256()), and h3 = SHA-256(SHA-256()).
The pair (enc, dec) in Darkleaks corresponds to AES-256-ECB.
As a byproduct of its release of PK∗ in response to challenge S∗, C proves
(weakly) that undecrypted ciphertexts are well-formed, i.e., that ei = encκi [mi] for
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κi = h3(pki). This cut-and-choose-type proof assures buyers that when C claims its
reward, M will be fully disclosed.
Shortcomings and vulnerabilities. The Darkleaks protocol has three major
shortcomings / vulnerabilities that appear to stem from fundamental functional
limitations of Bitcoin’s scripting language when constructing contracts without di-
rect communication between parties. The first two undermine commission-fairness,
while the third limits functionality.
1. Delayed release: C can refrain from spending purchasers’ / donors’ payments and
releasing unopened segments of M until after M loses value. E.g., C could withhold
segments of a film until after its release in theaters, of an industrial design until
after it is produced, etc.
2. Selective withholding: C can choose to forego payment for selected segments and
not disclose them. For example, C could leak and collect payment for all of a leaked
film but the last few minutes (which, with high probability, will not appear in the
sample Ω), significantly diminishing the value of leaked segments.
3. Public leakage only: Darkleaks can only serve to leak secrets publicly. It does not
enable fair exchange for private leakage, i.e., for payment in exchange for a secret
M encrypted under the public key of a purchaser P .
Additionally, Darkleaks has a basic protocol flaw:
4. Reward theft: In the Darkleaks protocol, the Bitcoin private key ski corresponding
to pki is derived from mi; specifically ski = SHA-256(mi). Thus, the source of M
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(e.g., the victimized owner of a leaked film) can derive ski and steal rewards received
by C. (Also, when C claims a reward, a malicious node that receives the transaction
can decrypt mi, compute ski = SHA-256(mi), and potentially steal the reward by
flooding the network with a competing transaction [87].)
This last problem is easily remedied by generating the set {κi}ni=1 of segment
encryption keys pseudorandomly or randomly, which we do in our CSC designs.
Remark: In any protocol in which goods are represented by a random sample, not
just Darkleaks, C can insert a small number of valueless or duplicate segments into
M . With non-negligible probability, these will not result in an invalid-looking sample
Ω, so Ω necessarily provides only a weak guarantee of the global validity of M . The
larger k and n, the smaller the risk of such attack. Formal analysis of human-verified
proofs of this kind and/or ways of automating them is an interesting problem beyond
the scope of this work, but important in assessing end-to-end security in a CSC of
this kind.
5.2.2 A generic public-leakage CSC
We now present a smart contract that realizes public leakage of secrets using
blackbox cryptographic primitives. (We later present efficient realizations.) This
contract overcomes limitation 1. of the Darkleaks protocol (delayed release) by en-
forcing disclosure of M at a pre-specified time Tend—or else immediately refunding
buyers’ money. It addresses limitation 2. (selective withholding) by ensuring that
M is revealed in an all-or-nothing manner. (We later explain how to achieve private
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leakage and overcome limitation 3.)
Again, we consider settings where C aims to sell M for public release after
revealing sample segments M∗.
Informal protocol description. Informally, the protocol involves the following
steps:
• Create contract. A seller C initializes a smart contract with the encryption of
a randomly generated master secret key msk. The master secret key is used to
generate (symmetric) encryption keys for the segments {mi}ni=1. C provides a
cryptographic commitment c0 := Enc(pk,msk, r0) of msk to the contract. (To
meet the narrow technical requirements of our security proofs, the commitment
is an encryption with randomness r0 under a public key pk created during a
trusted setup step.) The master secret key msk can be used to decrypt all
leaked segments of M .
• Upload encrypted data. For each i ∈ [n], C generates encryption key κi :=
PRF(msk, i), and encrypts the i-th segment as cti = encκi [mi]. C sends all en-
crypted segments {cti}i∈[n] to the contract (or, for efficiency, provides hashes of
copies stored with a storage provider, e.g., a peer-to-peer network). Interested
purchasers / donors can download the segments of M , but cannot decrypt
them yet.
• Challenge. The contract generates a random challenge set Ω ⊂ [n], in practice
today in Ethereum could be based on the hash of a recent block. Another
future possibility is some well known randomness source, e.g., the NIST ran-
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domness beacon [88], perhaps relayed through an authenticated data feed.
• Response. C reveals the set {κi}i∈Ω to the contract, and gives ZK proofs that
the revealed secret keys {κi}i∈Ω are generated correctly from the msk encrypted
as c0.
• Collect donations. During a donation period, potential purchasers / donors
can use the revealed secret keys {κi}i∈Ω to decrypt the corresponding segments.
If they like the decrypted segments, they can donate money to the contract as
contribution for the leakage.
• Accept. If enough money has been collected, C decommits msk for the contract
(sends the randomness for the ciphertext along with msk). If the contract
verifies the decommitment successfully, all donated money is paid to C. The
contract thus enforces a fair exchange of msk for money. (If the contract
expires at time Tend without release of msk, all donations are refunded.)
The contract. Our proposed CSC PublicLeaks for implementing this public leakage
protocol is given in Figure 5.1. The ideal functionaly and the proof are in the online
version of the paper [8].
5.2.3 Optimizations and Ethereum implementation
The formally specified contract PublicLeaks uses generic cryptographic primi-
tives in a black-box manner. We now give a practical, optimized version, relying on
the random oracle model (ROM), that eliminates trusted setup, and also achieves
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Contract PublicLeaks
Init: Set state := init, and donations := {}. Let crs := KeyGennizk(1λ),
pk := KeyGenenc(1
λ) denote hardcoded public parameters generated
through a trusted setup.
Create: Upon receiving (“create”, c0, {cti}ni=1, Tend) from some leaker C:
Set state := created.
Select a random subset Ω ⊂ [n] of size k, and send (“challenge”, Ω)
to C.
Confirm: Upon receiving (“confirm”, {(κi, πi)}i∈Ω) from C:
Assert state = created.
Assert that ∀i ∈ S: πi is a valid NIZK proof (under crs) for the
following statement:
∃(msk, r0), s.t. (c0 = Enc(pk,msk, r0))
∧ (κi = PRF(msk, i))
Set state := confirmed.
Donate: Upon receiving (“donate”, $amt) from some purchaser P :
Assert state = confirmed.
Assert ledger[P ] ≥ $amt.
Set ledger[P ] := ledger[P ]− $amt.
donations := donations ∪ {($amt,P)}.
Accept: Upon receiving (“accept”, msk, r0) from C:
Assert state = confirmed
Assert c0 = Enc(pk,msk, r0)
ledger[C] := ledger[C] + sum(donations)
Send (“leak”,msk) to all parties.
Set state := aborted.
Timer: If state = confirmed and T > Tend: ∀($amt,P) ∈ donations: let
ledger[P ] := ledger[P ] + $amt. Set state := aborted.
Figure 5.1: A contract PublicLeaks that leaks a secret M to the public in exchange
for donations.
better efficiency and easy integration with Ethereum [19].
A practical optimization. During contract creation, C chooses random κi
$←{0, 1}λ
for i ∈ [n], and computes
c0 := {H(κ1, 1), . . . , H(κn, n)}.
The master secret key is simply msk := {κ1, . . . , κn}, i.e., the set of hash pre-
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images. As in PublicLeaks, each segment mi will still be encrypted as cti := encκ[mi].
(For technical reasons—to achieve simulatability in the security proof [8] encκ[mi] =
mi ⊕ [H(κi, 1, “enc”) ||H(κi, 2, “enc”) . . . ,
||H(κi, z, “enc”)] for suitably large z.)
C submits c0 to the smart contract. When challenged with the set Ω, C reveals
{κi}i∈Ω to the contract, which then verifies its correctness by hashing and comparing
with c0. To accept donations, C reveals the entire msk.
This optimized scheme is asymptotically less efficient than our generic, black-
box construction PublicLeaks—as the master secret key scales linearly in the number
of segments n. But for typical, realistic document set sizes in practice (e.g., n = 100,
as recommended for Darkleaks), it is more efficient.
Ethereum-based implementation. To demonstrate the feasibility of implement-
ing leakage contracts using currently available technology, we implemented a ver-
sion of the contract PublicLeaks atop Ethereum [19], using the Serpent contract
language [89]. We specify the full implementation in detail in Appendix C.2.
The version we implemented relies on the practical optimizations described
above. As a technical matter, Ethereum does not appear at present to support
timer-activated functions, so we implemented Timer in such a way that purchasers
/ donors make explicit withdrawals, rather than receiving automatic refunds.
This public leakage Ethereum contract is highly efficient, as it does not require
expensive cryptographic operations. It mainly relies on hashing (SHA3-256) for
random number generation and for verifying hash commitments. The total number
130
of storage entries (needed for encryption keys) and hashing operations is O(n),
where, again, Darkleaks recommends n = 100. (A hash function call in practice
takes a few micro-seconds, e.g., 3.92 µsecs measured on a core i7 processor.)
5.2.4 Extension: private leakage
As noted above, shortcoming 3. of Darkleaks is its inability to support private
leakage, in which C sells a secret exclusively to a purchaser P .
However, using verifiable computation techniques as illustrated earlier in the
thesis, PublicLeaks can be modified for this purpose. The basic idea is for C not
to reveal msk directly, but to provide a ciphertext ct = encpkP [msk] on msk to the
contract for a purchaser P , along with a proof that ct is correctly formed, with
respect to earlier commitments.
5.3 A Key-Compromise CSC
Example 1b earlier described a CSC that rewards a perpetrator P for delivering
to C the stolen key skV of a victim V—in this case a certificate authority (CA) with
public key pkV . Recall that C generates a private / public key encryption pair
(skC, pkC). The contract accepts as a claim by P a pair (ct, π). It sends reward
$reward to P if π is a valid proof that ct = encpkC [skV ] and skV is the private key
corresponding to pkV .
Intuitively, a key-theft contract is commission-fair if it rewards a perpetrator
P for delivery of a private key that: (1) P was responsible for stealing and (2) Is
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valid for a substantial period of time.
This form of contract can be used to solicit theft of any type of private key,
e.g., the signing key of a CA, the private key for a SSL/TLS certificate, a PGP
private key, etc. (Similar contracts could solicit abuse, but not full compromise of
a private key, e.g., forged certificates.)
Figure 5.2 shows the contract of Example 1b in our notation for smart con-
tracts. We let crs here denote a common reference string for a NIZK scheme and
match(pkV , skV) denote an algorithm that verifies whether skV is the corresponding
private key for some public key pkV in a target public-key cryptosystem.
As noted above, this CSC is not commission-fair. Thus we refer to it as
KeyTheft-Naive.We use KeyTheft-Naive as a helpful starting point for motivating




Init: Set state := init. Let crs := KeyGennizk(1
λ) denote a hard-coded NIZK
common reference string generated during a trusted setup process.
Create: Upon receiving (“create”, $reward, pkV , Tend) from some contractor C :=
(pkC, . . .):
Assert state = init.
Assert ledger[C] ≥ $reward.
ledger[C] := ledger[C]− $reward.
Set state := created.
Claim: Upon receiving (“claim”, ct, π) from some purported perpetrator P :
Assert state = created.
Assert that π is a valid NIZK proof (under crs) for the following
statement: ∃r, skV s.t. ct = Enc(pkC, (skV ,P), r)
and match(pkV , skV) = true
ledger[P ] := ledger[P ] + $reward.
Set state := claimed.
Timer: If state = created and current time T > Tend:
ledger[C] := ledger[C] + $reward
state := aborted
Figure 5.2: A näıve, flawed key theft contract (lacking commission-fairness)
5.3.1 Flaws in KeyTheft-Naive
The contract KeyTheft-Naive fails to achieve commission-fairness due to two
shortcomings.
Revoke-and-claim attack. The CA V can revoke the key skV and then itself
submit the key for payment. The CA then not only negates the value of the con-
tract but actually profits from it! This revoke-and-claim attack demonstrates that
KeyTheft-Naive is not commission-fair in the sense of ensuring the delivery of a usable
private key skV .
Rushing attack. Another attack is a rushing attack. As noted in Section 5.1, an
adversary can arbitrarily reorder messages—a reflection of possible attacks against
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the network layer in a cryptocurrency. (See also the formal blockchain model [2].)
Thus, given a valid claim from perpetrator P , a corrupt C can decrypt and learn
skV , construct another valid-looking claim of its own, and make its own claim arrive
before the valid one.
5.3.2 Fixing flaws in KeyTheft-Naive
We now show how to modify KeyTheft-Naive to prevent the above two attacks
and achieve commission-fairness.
Thwarting revoke-and-claim attacks. In a revoke-and-claim attack against
KeyTheft-Naive, V preemptively revokes its public key pkV and replaces it with a
fresh one pk′V . As noted above, the victim can then play the role of perpetrator P ,
submit skV to the contract and claim the reward. The result is that C pays $reward
to V and obtains a stale key.
We address this problem by adding to the contract a feature called reward
truncation, whereby the contract accepts evidence of revocation Πrevoke.
This evidence Πrevoke can be an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
response indicating that pkV is no longer valid, a new certificate for V that was
unknown at the time of contract creation (and thus not stored in Contract), or a
certificate revocation list (CRL) containing the certificate with pkV .
C could submit Πrevoke, but to minimize interaction by C, KeyTheft could pro-
vide a reward $smallreward to a third-party submitter. The reward could be small,
as Πrevoke would be easy for ordinary users to obtain.
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The contract then provides a reward based on the interval of time over which
the key skV remains valid. Let Tclaim denote the time at which the key skV is provided
and Tend be an expiration time for the contract (which must not exceed the expiration
of the certificate containing the targeted key). Let Trevoke be the time at which Πrevoke
is presented (Trevoke =∞ if no revocation happens prior to Tend). Then the contract
assigns to P a reward of f(reward, t), where t = min(Tend, Trevoke)− Tclaim.
We do not explore choices of f here. We note, however, that given that a
CA key skV can be used to forge certificates for rapid use in, e.g., malware or
falsified software updates, much of its value can be realized in a short interval of
time which we denote by δ. (A slant toward up-front realization of the value of
exploits is common in general [90].) A suitable choice of reward function should be
front-loaded and rapidly decaying. A natural, simple choice with this property is
f($reward, t) =

0 : t < δ
$reward(1− ae−b(t−δ)) : t ≥ δ
for a < 1/2 and some positive real value b. Note that a majority of the reward is
paid provided that t ≥ δ.
Thwarting rushing attacks. To thwart rushing attacks, we separate the claim
into two phases. In the first phase, P expresses an intent to claim by submitting a
commitment of the real claim message. P then waits for the next round to open the
commitment and reveal the claim message. In real-life decentralized cryptocurren-
cies, P can potentially wait multiple block intervals before opening the commitment,
to have higher confidence that the blockchain will not fork. In our formalism, one
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round can correspond to one or more block intervals.
Figure 5.3 gives a key theft contract KeyTheft that thwarts revoke-and-claim
and the rushing attacks.
5.3.3 Target and state exposure
An undesirable property of KeyTheft-Naive is that its target / victim and state
are publicly visible. V can thus learn whether it is the target of KeyTheft-Naive. V
also observes successful claims—i.e., whether skV has been stolen—and can thus take
informed defensive action. For example, as key revocation is expensive and time-
consuming, V might wait until a successful claim occurs and only then perform a
revoke-and-claim attack.
To limit target and state exposure, we note two possible enhancements to
KeyTheft. The first is a multi-target contract, in which key theft is requested for
any one of a set of multiple victims. The second is what we call cover claims, false
claims that conceal any true claim. Our implementation of KeyTheft, as specified in
Figure 5.3, is a multi-target contract, as this technique provides both partial target
and partial state concealment.
Multi-target contract. A multi-target contract solicits the private key of any of
m potential victims V1,V2, . . . ,Vm. There are many settings in which the private
keys of different victims are of similar value. For example, a multi-target contract
KeyTheft could offer a reward for the private key skV of any CA able to issue SS-
L/TLS certificates trusted by, e.g., Internet Explorer (of which there are more than
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650 [91]).
A challenge here is that the contract state is public, thus the contract must be
able to verify the proof for a valid claim (private key) skVi without knowing which key
was furnished, i.e., without learning i. Our implementation shows that constructing
such proofs as zk-SNARKs is practical. (The contractor C itself can easily learn i
by decrypting skVi , generating pkVi , and identifying the corresponding victim.)
Cover claims. As the state of a contract is publicly visible, a victim V learns
whether or not a successful claim has been submitted to KeyTheft-Naive. This is
particularly problematic in the case of single-target contracts.
Rather than sending the NIZK proof π with ct, it is possible instead to delay
submission of π (and payment of the reward) until Tend. (That is, Claim takes as
input (“claim”, ct).) This approach conceals the validity of ct. Note that even
without π, C can still make use of ct.
A contract that supports such concealment can also support an idea that we
refer to as cover claims. A cover claim is an invalid claim of the form (“claim”, ct),
i.e., one in which ct is not a valid encryption of skV . Cover claims may be submitted
by C to conceal the true state of the contract. So that C need not interact with the
contract after creation, the contract could parcel out small rewards at time Tend to
third parties that submit cover claims. We do not implement cover claims in our
version of KeyTheft nor include them in Figure 5.3.
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Contract KeyTheft
Init: Set state := init. Let crs := KeyGennizk(1
λ) denote a hard-coded NIZK
common reference string generated during a trusted setup process.
Create: Same as in Contract KeyTheft-Naive (Figure 5.2), except that an addi-
tional parameter ∆T is additionally submitted by C.
Intent: Upon receiving (“intent”, cm) from some purported perpetrator P :
Assert state = created
Assert that P has not sent “intent” earlier
Store cm,P
Claim: Upon receiving (“claim”, ct, π, r) from P :
Assert state = created
Assert P submitted (“intent”, cm) earlier such that cm =
comm(ct||π, r).
Continue in the same manner as in contract KeyTheft-Naive, except that
the ledger update ledger[P ] := ledger[P ] + $reward does not take place
immediately.
Revoke: On receive (“revoke”, Πrevoke) from some R:
Assert Πrevoke is valid, and state 6= aborted.
ledger[R] := ledger[R] + $smallreward.
If state = claimed:
Let t := (time elapsed since successful Claim).
Let P := (successful claimer).
rewardP := f($reward, t).
ledger[P ] := ledger[P ] + rewardP .
Else, rewardP := 0
ledger[C] := ledger[C] + $reward
−$smallreward− rewardP
Set state := aborted.
Timer: If state = claimed and at least ∆T time elapsed since Claim:
ledger[P ] := ledger[P ] + $reward;
Set state := aborted.
Else if current time T > Tend and state 6= aborted:
ledger[C] := ledger[C] + $reward.
Set state := aborted.
// P should not submit claims after Tend −∆T .
Figure 5.3: Key compromise CSC that thwarts the revoke-and-claim attack and the
rushing attack.
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1-Target #threads RSA-2048 ECDSA P256
Key Gen.[C] 1 124.88 sec 242.30 sec
4 33.53 sec 73.38 sec
Eval. Key 215.93 MB 448.24 MB
Ver. Key 6.09 KB 5.15 KB
Prove[P ] 1 41.02 sec 83.63 sec
4 15.7 sec 32.19 sec
Proof 711 B 711 B
Verification [Contract] 0.0089 sec 0.0087 sec
500-Target #threads RSA-2048 ECDSA P256
Key Gen.[C] 1 161.56 sec 263.07 sec
4 43.35 sec 78.31 sec
Eval. Key 279.41 MB 490.85 MB
Ver. Key 4.99 KB 4.99 KB
Prove[P ] 1 54.15 sec 84.69 sec
4 23.54 sec 33.49 sec
Proof 711 B 711 B
Verification [Contract] 0.0087 sec 0.0087 sec
Table 5.1: Performance of the key-compromise zk-SNARK circuit for Claim in the case of
a 1-target and 500-target contracts. [.] refers to the entity performing the computational
work.
5.3.4 Implementation
We rely on zk-SNARKs for efficient realization of the protocols above. As
mentioned earlier, zk-SNARKs have weaker security than what is needed in UC-style
simulation proofs. We therefore use a generic transformation [16] to lift security such
that the zero-knowledge proof ensures simulation-extractable soundness. (Recall
that a one-time key generation phase is needed to generate two keys: a public
evaluation key, and a public verification key. To prove a certain NP statement, an
untrusted prover uses the evaluation key to compute a succinct proof; any verifier
can use the public verification key to verify the proof. The verifier in our case is
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the contract.) In our implementation, we assume the key generation is executed
confidentially by a trusted party; otherwise a prover can produce a valid proof for a
false statement. To minimize trust in the key generation phase, secure multi-party
computation techniques can be used as in [92].
zk-SNARK circuits for Claim. To estimate the proof computation and veri-
fication costs required for Claim, we implemented the above protocol for theft of
RSA-2048 and ECDSA P256 keys, which are widely used in SSL/TLS certificates
currently. The circuit has two main sub-circuits: a key-check circuit, and an en-
cryption circuit. The circuit also has other commitment and encryption sub-circuits
needed for simulation sound extractability [16]. The encryption circuit was realized
using RSAES-OAEP [93] with a 2048-bit key. Relying on compilers (prior to our
later work on xJsnark) for high-level implementation of these algorithms was going
to produce expensive circuits for the zk-SNARK proof computation. Instead, we
had to build customized circuit generators that produce more efficient circuits. We
then used the state-of-the-art zk-SNARK library [5] to obtain the evaluation results.
Table 5.1 shows the results of the evaluation of the circuits for both single-target
and multi-target contracts. The experiments were conducted on an Amazon EC2
r3.2xlarge instance with 61GB of memory and 2.5 GHz processors.
The results yield two interesting observations: i) Once a perpetrator obtains
the secret key of a TLS public key, computing the zk-SNARK proof would require
less than two minutes, costing less than 1 USD [76] for either single or multi-target
contracts; ii) The overhead introduced by using a multi-target contract with 500
140
keys on the prover’s side is only 13 seconds in the worst case. In the same time,
the verification overhead by the contract is still the same as in the single-target
case. This is achieved by the use of an efficient Merkle tree circuit that proves the
membership of the compromised public key in the target key set in zero knowledge,
while using the same components of the single-target circuit as is.
Validation of revoked certificates. The reward function in the contract above
relies on certificate revocation time, and therefore the contract needs modules that
can process certificate revocation proofs, such as CRLs and OCSP responses, and
verify the CA digital signatures on them. As an example, we measured the run-
ning time of openssl verify -crl_check command, testing the revoked certificate
at [94] and the CRL last updated at [95] on Feb 15th, 2016, that had a size of 143KB.
On average, the verification executed in about 0.016 seconds on a 2.3 GHz i7 proces-
sor. The signature algorithm was SHA-256 with RSA encryption, with a 2048-bit
key. Since OCSP responses can be smaller than CRLs, the verification time could
be even less for OCSP.
The case of multi-target contracts. Verifying the revocation proof for single-
target contracts is straightforward: The contract can determine whether a revoca-
tion proof corresponds to the targeted key. In multi-target contracts, though, the
contract does not know which target key corresponds to the proof of key theft P
submitted. Thus, a proof is needed that the revocation corresponds to the stolen
key, and it must be submitted by C.
We built a zk-SNARK circuit through which C can prove the connection be-
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tween the ciphertext submitted by the perpetrator and the compromised target key.
For efficiency, we eliminated the need for the key-check sub-circuit in Revoke by
forcing P to append the secret index of the compromised public key to the secret
key before applying encryption in Claim. The evaluation in Table 5.2 illustrates
the efficiency of the verification done by the contract receiving the proof, and the
practicality for C of constructing the proof. In contrast to the case for Claim, the
one-time key generation for this circuit must be done independently from C, so that
C cannot cheat the contract. We note that the Revoke circuit we built is invariant
to the cryptosystem of the target keys.
Table 5.2: Performance of the key-compromise zk-SNARK circuit for Revoke
needed in the case of multi-target contract. [.] refers to the entity performing
the computational work.
#threads RSA-2048 ECDSA P256
Key Gen. 1 124.64 sec 124.35 sec
4 33.52 sec 33.38 sec
Eval. Key 215.41 MB 214.81 MB
Ver. Key 5.51 KB 4.88 KB
Prove[C] 1 41.08 sec 40.96 sec
4 15.94 sec 15.59 sec
Proof 711 B 711 B
Verification [Contract] 0.0087 sec 0.0086 sec
5.4 Countermeasures
The main aim of our work is to emphasize the importance of developing coun-
termeasures against CSCs for emerging smart contract systems such as Ethereum.
We briefly discuss this challenge here.
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Ideas such as blacklisting “tainted” coins / transactions—those with known
criminal use—have been brought forward for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. A
proactive alternative is an identity-escrow idea in early (centralized) e-cash systems
sometimes referred as “trustee-based tracing” [96,97]. Trustee-tracing schemes per-
mitted a trusted party (“trustee”) or a quorum of such parties to trace monetary
transactions that would otherwise remain anonymous. In decentralized cryptocur-
rencies, however, users do not register identities with authorities—and many would
object to doing so. It would be possible for users to register voluntarily and to choose
only to accept only currency they deem suitably registered. The idea of tainting
coins, though, has been poorly received by the cryptocurrency community because
it undermines the basic cash-like property of fungibility [98, 99], and trustee-based
tracing would have a similar drawback. It is also unclear what entities should be
granted the authority to perform blacklisting or register users.
We observe, however, that it is economically advantageous for most users of a
cryptocurrency to monitor and/or restrain criminal activity, which can degrade ac-
ceptance and therefore market value. This observation has stimulated the creation,
for instance, of the Blockchain Alliance [100], whose mission is to combat crimi-
nal activity on blockchains. Similarly, core developers of cryptocurrencies such as
Ethereum have indicated the desirability of filtering blockchain content, by analogy
with censorship of hate speech [101].
Identifying Bitcoin transactions as criminal is challenging, as transactions
themselves carry no information about payment context. In contrast, CSCs, if
identified as such (e.g., an assassination contract), are self-incriminating objects.
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Reversing CSC binaries could be challenging, but we note that for CSCs to be
effective—as in our examples above—their deployers must advertise, drawing atten-
tion to the nature of their contracts. (For example, a contractor looking to have an
assassination performed must find an assassin.) Our hypothesis, therefore, is that
a sufficiently vigilant cryptocurrency community can detect the presence of many
CSCs and will be incentivized to filter or purge associated transactions. One simple
potential mechanism is for miners to omit transactions from blocks when they are
flagged by reputable communities as CSCs.
A more aggressive approach is possible as well, a notion that we call trustee-
neutralizable smart contracts. A smart contract system might be designed such that
an authority, quorum of authorities, or suitable set of general system participants
is empowered to remove a contract from the blockchain. Such an approach would
have a big advantage over traditional trustee-based protections, in that it would not
require users to register identities. Whether the idea would be palatable to cryp-
tocurrency communities and whether a broadly acceptable set of authorities could
be identified are, of course, open questions, as are the right supporting technical
mechanisms.
In general, our work here is therefore important in sensitizing the cryptocur-
rency community to the threat of CSCs, enabling structures for monitoring and
appropriate countermeasures to be set in place. We believe it is important to cre-
ate awareness in the early stages of development of decentralized smart contract
ecosystems such as Ethereum.
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5.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that a range of commission-fair criminal smart con-
tracts (CSCs) are practical in decentralized currencies with smart contracts. In
this chapter, we presented two crimes—leakage of secrets, and key theft crimes—
and showed that they are efficiently implementable with existing cryptographic
techniques, given suitable support in smart contract systems such as Ethereum.
KeyTheft would require only modest, already envisioned opcode support for zk-
SNARKs for efficient deployment.
We emphasize that smart contracts in distributed cryptocurrencies have nu-
merous promising, legitimate applications and that banning smart contracts would
be neither sensible nor, in all likelihood, possible. The urgent open question raised
by our work is thus how to create safeguards against the most dangerous abuses of
such smart contracts while supporting their many beneficial applications.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we presented tools and protocols for verifiable computations.
We presented a high-level framework xJsnark which makes it easier for programmers
to develop secure and efficient circuits, while enabling various new optimizations for
arithmetic circuits for zk-SNARKs. To the best of our knowledge, our work yields
the most optimized circuits for cryptographic primitives like AES and RSA, in ad-
dition to being able to perform the optimizations automatically while compiling
high-level code. We illustrated the ability of xJsnark for compiling multiple crypto-
graphic and random memory access applications to efficient circuits, including the
ZeroCash circuit [7].
We also presented practical protocols that utilize verifiable computation in
cryptocurrency applications. We investigated both the good side, by designing
HAWK a system for privacy-preserving smart contracts, and the dark side by in-
vestigating misuses using smart contracts and verifiable computation.
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6.2 Future Directions and Ongoing work
6.2.1 Beyond Cryptocurrencies
The protocols presented in this thesis focused on cryptocurrency applications.
Extending VC techniques to support other application domains such as medical or
machine learning application will be beneficial. Below, we summarize one direction
that we have made some progress towards, and in Section 6.2.2 we summarize related
open problems.
6.2.1.1 Verifiable Research
Recently, many cases of research misconduct were discovered and several pa-
pers have been retracted [102], including cases where some scientists fabricate data,
falsify results, or use questionable research methods. In one survey in 2009, 2% of
scientists admitted to falsifying studies at least once and 14% admitted to personally
witnessing a fabrication [103]. According to the results, misconducts were reported
more in medical research. Another form of misconduct is questionable research
practices (QRPs) [104], which involves practices in which researchers intentionally
make their results look better by omitting data, or handling outliers in certain ways
for example. These were found to be more prevalent among researchers [103, 104].
Furthermore, looking to the cases that were discovered in data fraud and falsifica-
tions, the reason for the discovery of such cases was how anomalous the faked results
were, which means that some cases may be more difficult to discover if the results
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look within the normal and acceptable possible range, which one blog post called
it the perfect scientific crime [105]. This motivates the need for a process that can
ease the process of verification, while making it harder for researchers to fake or
falsify data. Using new technologies like verifiable computation, trusted hardware
and smart contracts, we make an attempt at making the research publication pro-
cess more trustworthy and reliable to reduce cases like data fraud and questionable
research methods (whenever possible).
These practices make the scientific publication process less reliable, and may
even put patients at risk in some clinical scenarios. In this project, we aim to use
efficient zero-knowledge proofs to develop a practical service that enables reviewers
to verify research publications even when the data involved is private.
Our work aims to consider three domains: clinical studies where patients’
samples are analyzed by a lab, surveys via an online survey service and surveys
done via in-person interviews with the subjects. One of the main challenges is how
to reduce or minimize trust in any intermediaries. In some cases like in-person
interviews, there are usually no intermediaries, which makes the problem even more
challenging.
6.2.2 Open Problems
6.2.2.1 Efficiency versus Trust Assumptions
Recently many zero-knowledge constructions have been proposed [106–110] in
order to solve the drawbacks of the zk-SNARK construction that was used in this
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thesis, namely the need for a trusted setup for every different computation.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the verification of the proofs produced
by these schemes is not as efficient as the zk-SNARK constructions we use, and
the proofs are not as succinct, which makes it hard for such new techniques to be
adopted by blockchain-based applications directly.
A research question here will be how to solve the tension between efficiency and
trusted setup, by finding ways to maintain both succinctness and trustless setup, or
minimized trusted setup.
6.2.2.2 Large-scale Problems
Although the zk-SNARK constructions used in this thesis provide a good level
of succinctness that primarily benefits the verifier, such constructions require high
computation resources for very large arithmetic circuits in order to compute the
proof. This could limit their applicability in domains like machine learning and
image processing applications, where circuits can easily reach billions of gates. En-
abling verifiable computation techniques to scale to such circuit sizes while main-
taining succinctness is an open question.
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Appendix A: Low-level Circuit Development Tools
In this appendix, we summarize other development tools that we developed
for building efficient and secure zk-SNARK applications.
A.1 Jsnark
jsnark is a low-level circuit construction library written in Java [14]. Its main
goal is to provide an easier and more friendly front end to libsnark [15]. jsnark aims
at making low-level development easier by providing high-level APIs and few back
end optimizations to enable programmers to write optimized programs conveniently.
The library also allows developers to augment circuits produced by the Pinocchio
compiler in a straightforward way. jsnark has been used in developing and inves-
tigating applications like HAWK [2] (Chapter 4) and Gyges [8] (Chapter 5), and
was used as a starting library for both C∅C∅ [16] and xJsnark. It was also used for
benchmarking for several other works.
A.2 C∅C∅
C∅C∅ is a library for developing composable zero-knowledge proofs [16]. It also
provides a library for SNARK-friendly cryptographic primitives which enables imple-
150
menting composable zero-knowledge proofs efficiently. More details about SNARK-
friendly cryptographic primitives are provided in Appendix B.
As we mention in Section 4.4.1, known instantiations of zk-SNARKs [11,20,25]
are not known to satisfy composability and therefore often cannot be adopted
straight out of the box in the design of larger protocols, as UC-secure protocols
would often require simulation sound extractable zero-knowledge proofs. For this
purpose, we built C∅C∅ (short for Composable 0-knowledge, Compact 0-knowledge),
which enables practical, UC-secure, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for gen-
eral, user-defined statements.
C∅C∅ relies on UC-secure NIZKs that are circuit succinct, but not witness
succinct. In other words, the size of the proofs and verification time are linear
in the witness size, but independent of the size of the circuit that encodes the
language. Note that in comparison, standard, non-UC-secure SNARKs achieve a
stronger notion of succinctness, i.e., they are both circuit- and witness succinct. Note
that recent progress in the area shows that it is possible to get succinct composable
NIZK proofs [78].
In order to implement such proofs efficiently, this work also explores selected
known cryptographic primitives such as encryption and key exchange, and expresses
them as efficient arithmetic circuits. Earlier and concurrent works have considered
the optimization of such primitives for specific purposes, such as [6, 7, 9, 69]. In
this work, we studied possible optimizations/alternatives, including the trade-offs
of existing constructions such as RSA and field extension for key exchange, and
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Figure A.1: C∅C∅’s architecture. The SNARK lifting module transforms a zk-
SNARK to a simulation sound extractable NIZK (a UC-secure NIZK).
Similarly, SNARK-friendly block ciphers for symmetric encryption are explored.
More details are in Appendix B. Our implementation for such schemes is available
in the jsnark repository [14].
From the front end perspective, using C∅C∅, the developer only will need to
implement the high-level application (i.e., user-defined statement), and the C∅C∅
framework handles the remaining automatically and results in highly optimized
implementations. Figure A.1 presents the high-level architecture of xJsnark and
highlights our contributions. C∅C∅ has been adopted in subsequent works [2, 8] to
build privacy-preserving protocols. Releasing C∅C∅ to the public is in progress.
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Appendix B: SNARK-friendly Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we explore alternatives for different cryptographic primitives.
As discussed earlier, known SNARK constructions model computation as arithmetic
circuits modulo a large prime p. Standard implementations and parameter choices
for cryptographic primitives are targeted at modern hardware platforms with dif-
ferent constraints than SNARKs. For example, some operations, like addition and
constant-scalar multiplication of field elements Fp, which are expensive in hardware,
are essentially free in a SNARK; however, while XORing two 32-bit numbers takes
a single cycle on an ordinary CPU, this is far more costly in an arithmetic circuit.
Guided by the cost model we described in Section 2.1.1, we explore other al-
ternatives that could be more circuit-friendly when represented as SNARK circuits.
This was primarily motivated by the need to transform zk-SNARKs to simulation
sound extractable NIZKs, a property need for UC-based proofs. We call this trans-
formation: SNARK lifting.
B.1 Encryption
As the costs of all SNARK-lifting constructions that we use are dominated
by the public-key encryption of the witness [16], we focus most of our efforts on
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this task. We start by implementing an optimized circuit for RSA PKCS1 v1.5
and RSA-OAEP ( PKCS1 v2.2) encryption with SHA-256 as the hash and mask
generation function [93], as our baselines. We apply our xJsnark optimizations here,
although they were not available at the time of the initial version of this work [16].
We consider the use of hybrid encryption, where we use a public-key scheme to
exchange/encrypt a symmetric key, and then use the symmetric key to encrypt the
plaintext. To explore this alternative, we explored various options for key exchange
and symmetric-key encryption as we describe below.
Key exchange. Although it is possible to use the optimized RSA circuit above
to encrypt and exchange a symmetric key, we explored the following schemes for
a SNARK-friendly key exchange in order to find a more efficient alternative than
RSA.
• Diffie-Hellman key exchange via a SNARK-friendly field extension. Instead of
relying on RSA for key exchange, we investigate another scheme based on the
Discrete-Logarithm (DL) problem in Extension Fields, and use it for symmet-
ric key exchange. Since p is only 254-bit prime in existing implementations,
the DL problem in Fp will not be hard, therefore an extension Fpµ will be
used instead. This idea is mainly inspired by the construction in Pinocchio-
Coin [6]. The key exchange circuit has two generators in that case g, h ∈ Fpµ ,
where 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 is a large multiplicative subgroup of order q|pµ − 1. We fol-
low Lentra’s guidelines for selecting q to be a factor of the µ-th cyclotomic
polynomial Φµ(x) when evaluated at x = p [111].
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The hardness of discrete-log in extension fields has been studied for quite some
time; recently quasi-polynomial time algorithms [112,113] have been designed
for the special case of fixed-sized, i.e., small, characteristic fields. The key ideas
behind these recent algorithms, however, do not extend to larger characteristic
fields. To estimate the security level in our case, we observe that the finite
field in our context is related to pairing-based curves due to the underlying
implementation of SNARKs using BN curves [114]. In fact, the prime p
has a special form in our case (p can be computed based on a polynomial
36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x + 1). This property can be utilized to solve the
Discrete-Logarithm problem faster using the the Special Number Field Sieve
algorithm proposed by Joux et al [115]. This is the best attack (see [116]) we
are aware of; using µ = 4 in our scenario yields about 86-bit security.
The extension field construction requires us to search for large primes that
divide Φµ(p). In our implementation using libsnark [5], in order to get about
80-bit level of security, we set µ to be 4 as mentioned above, and choose q to
be the 398-bit prime factor of the Φ4(p), where p is the SNARK field order
of libsnark. For higher security when µ = 6, we found a 313-bit prime order
subgroup for the extension field. However, to get higher security levels (i.e.,
µ > 6), this may require expensive factorization.
• Diffie-Hellman key exchange via a SNARK-friendly Elliptic Curve. The field
extension approach above has two drawbacks: 1) The size of public keys and
keying material is large. For 80-bit security, the size of the exchanged key
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is nearly 128 bytes. A hash-based key derivation function (KDF) will have
a high cost for SNARKs, especially if we raise the security level of the field
extension to above 100. 2) It requires expensive factorization to find suitable
parameters to achieve higher bit security. Therefore, we investigated whether
we can construct a SNARK-friendly elliptic curve mainly for key exchange.
Note that in earlier works that proposed elliptic curves for SNARKs [12, 69],
one goal was to implement the pairing operation efficiently within the circuits.
On the other hand, our goal here to implement the operation required in key
exchange, i.e. gx, in a more efficient way.
Following the guidelines described in constructing Curve25519 [117], we pro-
pose a SNARK-friendly Montgomery elliptic curve over the SNARK field Fp,
that is specified by the equation: y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x, where A = 126932.
Choosing A = 126932 implies that the order of the curve is 8× 251-bit prime,
and the order of its twist is 4× 252-bit prime. Note that the size of the prime
order subgroup is above 2250, achieving about 125-bit security. The secret key
in our construction has the same properties as in Curve25519, i.e. chosen to
be a multiple of 8, in order to avoid small subgroup attacks. Note that we
don’t follow the other efficiency guidelines described for Curve25519, due to
the different setting and cost model. Finally, the safety of the parameters of
the new curve was verified according to the script available online on the Safe
Curves website [118].
The implementation of point addition and multiplication using the above curve
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is very efficient. Assuming affine coordinates, both point doubling and addition
can both be encoded using the same number of constraints in our case. In
fact, each step only requires 4 multiplication gates. This is because verifying
multiplicative inverses in SNARKs is very cheap, costing one multiplication
gate per operation. Furthermore, to implement the operation gx efficiently, one
possible optimization is to pre-compute all powers for a base g, and hardcode
them in the circuit, i.e. {g2, g3, .., g251}, then use them to compute gx. In
our implementation, the operation gx costs 6 multiplications per each bit in x
(compared to 60 multiplications in Geppetto’s curve [12]).
Symmetric-key encryption. After exchanging a secret key using a public key
scheme, symmetric encryption is performed in CBC mode using a block cipher.
Note that in the case of using the extension field-based scheme or the elliptic curve
scheme, we use a hash-based key derivation function to derive a secret key and a
secret initialization vector for the symmetric encryption. This process is not required
in the RSA case, as the sender can encrypt the random key and initialization vector
directly.
To achieve better performance, we looked for lightweight ciphers according to
the criteria in Section 2.1.1, and found two promising ciphers, Speck and Chaskey
block ciphers. Speck was proposed in 2013 [72] by NSA. The Chaskey block cipher
is an Even-Mansour block cipher that was used in the Chaskey MAC algorithm [73].
In terms of security, this block cipher relies on a weaker security model, in which
the time complexity of an attack is about 2k/D if the attacker obtains D chosen
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plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and the key size is k bits. For increased security, we use a
more secure version of the Chaskey block cipher called Chaskey-LTS, which applies
16 rounds instead of 8 to achieve long-term security. Both Speck and Chaskey-
LTS ciphers have more SNARK-friendly implementations compared to AES, but
the disadvantage of using these ciphers is that they are new compared to AES, and
not as trusted. This has motivated us to later research the optimization for AES
presented in xJsnark (Chapter 3).
Micro-benchmarks. Table B.1 provides the micro-benchmarks for the public key
and symmetric key schemes discussed above. It should be noted that for public
key schemes, we assumed that the public key is hardcoded in the circuit, which is
suitable for our purposes in the SNARK lifting transformations. If the public keys
are not hardcoded, the cost for the field extension circuit will increase with about
20k gates, and the cost for the elliptic curve scheme will be about 5K gates, but
it will result into minor difference in the RSA case. As noted in the table, the
cost of SNARK-friendly elliptic curve is more than 3-10x better than the RSA-2048
case. However, the cost of Field Extension is worse than the RSA-1024 v1.5 case,
but better than the OAEP case. Note that it costs more gates compared to the
elliptic curve setting due to the cost of hash-based key derivation using SHA-256
(Exploring SNARK-friendly key derivation functions can be a direction for future
work). For the block ciphers, the table shows about 2x better cost for Speck and
Chaskey compared to an optimized version of AES.
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Table B.1: Number of constraints of public-key and symmetric-key encryption. The
field extension uses (µ = 4). The block cipher schemes all use a 128-bit key. The
block cipher cost does not include any one-time key expansion cost.
PKE Scheme Key Exchange + Derivation Block Cipher Cost / Block
RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 (1024) 46k + 0 AES 12.3k
RSA-OAEP (1024) 165k + 0 Speck 6.5k
Field Extension 3.5k + 52k Chaskey 5k
RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 (2048) 94k + 0
RSA-OAEP (2048) 348k + 0
Elliptic Curve 3k + 26k
B.2 Other Cryptographic Primitives
PRFs and commitments. In our implementation, we instantiate PRFs and
Commitments using an efficient SHA-256 circuit. An efficient SHA-256 circuit costs
about 26k gates for one block (512-bit input), while its näıve implementation using
SNARK compilers costs more than 40k gates. The optimizations are mainly achieved
by representing Boolean operations efficiently, and careful circuit design. A previous
similar implementation and a detailed discussion of SHA-256 optimizations can be
found in [7].
Collision resistant hashes. Lattice-based cryptography, including Ajtai’s col-
lision resistant hash, are promising for use in SNARKs [69]. However, existing
estimates of concrete security for such schemes only extend to lattices over small
finite fields, but do not a priori apply to lattices constructed over a SNARK’s (much
larger) native field. In [16], parameterization of such lattice-based schemes is pro-
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vided, which we use for collision resistant hashing schemes in our circuits.
Signatures. For digital signatures, one possible approach is to use an optimized
RSA-PSS signature verification circuit using the PKCS-1 standard v2.1 [93]. As
stated earlier, SNARK circuits do not necessarily have to compute, and since the
signature verification in RSA is cheaper (due to the small public exponent), in
our implementations involving digital signatures, we adopt a signature verification
circuit instead, and apply the same optimizations we applied for the RSA Encryption
circuit. We currently use SHA-256 to hash the message to be signed. Another
optimization that can be done is to use the same approach we used for optimized
DH key exchange, by relying on a SNARK-friendly elliptic curve-based scheme for
signatures. Such scheme can actually be derived based on the curve used earlier
in key exchange, like the relation between the curve used in Ed25519 [119] and
Curve25519 [117]. Since the protocols we implemented in this thesis do not rely
mainly on signatures within the circuits, we leave investigating this direction to
future work.
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Appendix C: Additional Illustrative Examples
C.1 xJsnark
C.1.1 Sorting via Permutation Verifier
This example illustrates the usage of both the permutation verifier feature
along with the external code blocks. The omitted code is simple Java sorting calls.
Writing code using this approach leads to performance that is order of magnitudes
better than just writing merge sort code, as benchmarked in earlier work.
Program Sort {
int SIZE = 1024;
uint 32 [] array = new uint 32[SIZE];
uint 32 [] sortedArray = new uint 32[SIZE];
inputs { array };
witnesses { sortedArray };





BigInteger [] values = new BigInteger[SIZE];
for ( int i = 0; i < SIZE; i++)
values [ i ] = array[i ]. val ;
/∗∗ code omitted ..
Apply sorting outside the circuit to obtain sortedValues
and sortedIdx(the index of elements after sorting) . ∗∗/
// provide solution
for ( int i = 0; i < SIZE; i++)
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sortedArray[i ]. val = sortedValues[i ];
// Give hint to the evaluator during run time
resolve permutation (sortedIdx , ”id1”);
}
// Inside circuit
verify permutation <uint 32>( array , sortedArray , ”id1” ) ;
for ( int i = 0; i < SIZE − 1; i++)




As a case study, we illustrate how the framework can be used to program the
pour circuit of ZeroCash [7], and compare the resulting number of gates, and the
implementation effort with the manual implementation.
The Pour circuit is the main circuit used in ZeroCash to hide the flow of money,
relying on the power of zk-SNARKs. The circuit relies mainly on SHA-256 as a
building block, and uses it to instantiate commitments, Merkle trees and PRFs. In
the original ZeroCash paper [7], the benchmarks assumed 264 total number of coins,
which lead to a large circuit consisting of millions of gates. This made the manual
implementation more attractive in comparison with the existing high-level compilers
at the time. The ZeroCash paper reported the number of multiplication gates to
be 4109330, after manual optimization. (A slightly better implementation is
available here [62], achieving about 4017157 gates).
In comparison with the above low-level implementation, our framework achieves
a very close and actually better number due to some low-level arithmetic optimiza-
tions that can be automatically detected by the multi-variate polynomial minimizer.
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Our framework provides a total of 3814264 gates, saving more than 2× 105 gates.
This is while the programmer provided the code in a high-level manner, without
specifying any of the low-level optimizations.
In the following subsections, we list the code written for the Pour circuit
using xJsnark. Note that this is all the code the programmer writes in our case.
There are no specific manual optimizations done by the programmer in any of the
code snippets. The code tries to follow the namings used in the original ZeroCash
paper [7] for better readability (The reader may consult Figure 2 in the ZeroCash
Paper for the detailed specifications).
C.1.2.1 ZeroCash Data Structures
1. Coin Information. Every coin structure includes a secret value, randomness
secrets, and a public address.
struct Coin {
uint 64 value;
uint 32 [] rho = new uint 32[8];
uint 32 [] rand = new uint 32[12];
PubKey pubKey = new PubKey();
}
The following data structures store the key information. Note that the keys
in ZeroCash also include encryption keys but they are not part of the circuit.
struct PrivKey {
uint 32 [] a sk = new uint 32[8];
}
struct PubKey {
Digest a pk = new Digest();
}
2. Hash Digests. For readability, this is a simple data structure to represent a
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SHA-256 output. It also includes a method for equality assertion.
struct Digest {
uint 32 [] array = new uint 32[8]; // Typically SHA−256 output
void assertEqual(Digest other) {
for ( int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) {




3. Merkle Tree Authentication Path. This data structure represents the Merkle
tree authentication path. It includes an integer to specify to which direction, the
witness digests are added (left or right). This structure also defines a method to
compute the merkle tree root. As will be shown later, the programmer instantiates
one or more MerkleAuthPath objects, labels them as witnesses, and verifies the root
computed through the Merkle tree.
struct MerkleAuthPath {
Digest [] digests = new Digest[PourCircuit.HEIGHT];
uint 64 directionSelector ; // Path specification
public MerkleAuthPath() {
for ( int i = 0; i < digests.length; i++) {
digests [ i ] = new Digest();
}
}
Digest computeMerkleRoot(Digest leaf) {
bit [] directionBits = directionSelector . bits ;
Digest currentDigest = leaf ;
uint 32 [] inputToNextHash = new uint 32[16];
for ( int i = 0; i < PourCircuit.HEIGHT; i++) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if ( directionBits [ i ]) {
inputToNextHash[j] = j >= 8 ? currentDigest.array[j − 8] : digests [ i ]. array[ j ];
} else {










This mainly includes the code for the SHA-256 hash function. Its code is pretty
standard without any SNARK hints that could benefit the framework’s backend.
public class Util {
public static Digest SHA256(uint 32[] input) {
uint 32 [] K = {/∗∗ SHA−256 Hardcoded Constants ∗∗/}
uint 32 [] H = {/∗∗ SHA−256 Hardcoded Constants ∗∗/};
uint 32 [] words = new uint 32[64];
uint 32 a = H[0];
uint 32 b = H[1];
uint 32 c = H[2];
uint 32 d = H[3];
uint 32 e = H[4];
uint 32 f = H[5];
uint 32 g = H[6];
uint 32 h = H[7];
for ( int j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
words[j ] = input[j ];
}
for ( int j = 16; j < 64; j++) {
uint 32 s0 = rotateRight(words[j − 15], 7) ˆ rotateRight(words[j − 15], 18) ˆ (words[j
− 15] >> 3);
uint 32 s1 = rotateRight(words[j − 2], 17) ˆ rotateRight(words[j − 2], 19) ˆ (words[j −
2] >> 10);
words[j ] = words[j − 16] + s0 + words[j − 7] + s1;
}
for ( int j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
uint 32 s0 = rotateRight(a, 2) ˆ rotateRight(a, 13) ˆ rotateRight(a, 22);
uint 32 maj = (a & b) ˆ (a & c) ˆ (b & c);
uint 32 t2 = s0 + maj;
uint 32 s1 = rotateRight(e, 6) ˆ rotateRight(e, 11) ˆ rotateRight(e, 25);
uint 32 ch = (e & f) ˆ (˜(e) & g);









a = t1 + t2;
}
H[0] = H[0] + a;
H[1] = H[1] + b;
H[2] = H[2] + c;
H[3] = H[3] + d;
H[4] = H[4] + e;
H[5] = H[5] + f;
H[6] = H[6] + g;
H[7] = H[7] + h;




public static uint 32 rotateRight(uint 32 in , int r) {
return (in >> r) | (in << (32 − r));
}
public static uint 32 [] concat(uint 32 [] a1, int idx1, int l1 , uint 32 [] a2, int idx2, int
l2) {
uint 32 [] res = new uint 32[l1 + l2 ];
for ( int i = 0; i < l1; i++) {
res [ i ] = a1[i + idx1];
}
for ( int i = 0; i < l2; i++) {





C.1.2.3 The ZeroCash Pour Circuit




/∗∗ Merkle tree height ∗∗/
public static final int HEIGHT = 64;
/∗∗ Merkle tree root ∗∗/
Digest root = new Digest();
/∗∗ Merkle tree authentication paths ∗∗/
MerkleAuthPath authPath1 = new MerkleAuthPath();
MerkleAuthPath authPath2 = new MerkleAuthPath();
/∗∗ Coin Data ∗∗/
Coin c1 old = new Coin();
Coin c2 old = new Coin();
Coin c1 new = new Coin();
Coin c2 new = new Coin();
/∗∗ Serial numbers used to prevent double spending ∗∗/
Digest sn1 old = new Digest();
Digest sn2 old = new Digest();
/∗∗ Coin Commitments ∗∗/
Digest c1 old comm = new Digest();
Digest c2 old comm = new Digest();
Digest c1 new comm = new Digest();
Digest c2 new comm = new Digest();
/∗∗ Secret keys of old coins ∗∗/
PrivKey sk1 old = new PrivKey();
PrivKey sk2 old = new PrivKey();
/∗∗ Hash of a PK used for One−time Sig ∗∗/
Digest h sig = new Digest();
/∗∗ MACs to prevent malleability ∗∗/
Digest h1 = new Digest();
Digest h2 = new Digest();
/∗∗ public transaction amount (e.g. transaction fees ) ∗∗/
uint 64 pubVal;
inputs {
root, pubVal, h sig
}
/∗∗ Data Kept Secret ∗∗/
witnesses {




sn1 old, sn2 old, c1 new comm, c2 new comm, h1, h2
}
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public void Main() {
// verifying that the commitments have appeared before on the ledger
authPath1.computeMerkleRoot(c1 old comm).assertEqual(root);
authPath2.computeMerkleRoot(c2 old comm).assertEqual(root);
// verify the knowledge of the secret keys
c1 old .pubKey.a pk.assertEqual(PRF(”addr”, sk1 old.a sk, new uint 32[]{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0}));
c2 old .pubKey.a pk.assertEqual(PRF(”addr”, sk2 old.a sk, new uint 32[]{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0}));
// Compute old coins serial numbers (this avoids double spending)
sn1 old = PRF(”sn”, sk1 old.a sk, c1 old.rho);
sn2 old = PRF(”sn”, sk2 old.a sk, c2 old.rho);
// Verify old commitments and compute the new ones
c1 old comm.assertEqual(COMM s(COMM r(c1 old.rand, c1 old.pubKey.a pk.array,
c1 old.rho).array, c1 old.value));
c2 old comm.assertEqual(COMM s(COMM r(c2 old.rand, c2 old.pubKey.a pk.array,
c2 old.rho).array, c2 old.value));
c1 new comm = COMM s(COMM r(c1 new.rand, c1 new.pubKey.a pk.array,
c1 new.rho).array, c1 new.value);
c2 new comm = COMM s(COMM r(c2 new.rand, c2 new.pubKey.a pk.array,
c2 new.rho).array, c2 new.value);
// verifying the correct flow of money
verifyEq ( c1 old .value + c2 old.value , c1 new.value + c2 new.value + pubVal );
// verifying there are no overflows (the positivity of the values is guaranteed by the
backend)
uint 65 sum = uint 65(c1 old.value) + c2 old.value;
uint 65 mask = 0x10000000000000000u;
verifyEq ( sum & mask , 0 );
// Compute MACs needed for non−malleability
// 3 bits from h sig are truncated (SEE page 23 in
// http://zerocash−project.org/media/pdf/zerocash−extended−20140518.pdf )
// 1 bit is truncated here, and 2 bits are already truncated later in PRF call
uint 32 [] h sigTruncated = truncate(h sig.array, 1);
h1 = PRF(”pk”, sk1 old.a sk, h sigTruncated);
h sigTruncated[0] = h sigTruncated[0] | 0x80000000u;
h2 = PRF(”pk”, sk2 old.a sk, h sigTruncated);
}
/∗∗ Parametrized PRF Function ∗∗/
private Digest PRF(String type, uint 32[] x, uint 32 [] z) {
// truncate 2 least significant bits
// See page 22 in
http://zerocash−project.org/media/pdf/zerocash−extended−20140518.pdf
z = truncate(z, 2);




} else if (type.equals(”sn”)) {
mask = 0x40000000u;
} else if (type.equals(”pk”)) {
mask = 0x80000000u;
}
uint 32 [] input = new uint 32[16];
for ( int i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if ( i < 8) {
input[ i ] = x[i ];
} else if ( i == 8) {
input[ i ] = z[i − 8] | mask;
} else {





/∗∗ Commitment r Function ∗∗/
private Digest COMM r(uint 32[] r, uint 32[] a pk, uint 32 [] rho) {
uint 32 [] input1 = Util.concat(a pk, 0, a pk.length, rho, 0, rho.length);
uint 32 [] out1 = Util.SHA256(input1).array;
uint 32 [] input2 = Util.concat(r, 0, r .length, out1, 0, out1.length / 2);
return Util .SHA256(input2);
}
/∗∗ Commitment s Function ∗∗/
private Digest COMM s(uint 32[] k, uint 64 val) {
uint 32 [] paddedVal = new uint 32[]{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, uint 32((val >> 32)), uint 32(val)};
uint 32 [] input = Util.concat(k, 0, k.length, paddedVal, 0, paddedVal.length);
return Util .SHA256(input);
}
// truncates n least signicant bits . n is assumed to be <= 32
// This is to follow the implementation decision in (page 22):
http://zerocash−project.org/media/pdf/zerocash−extended−20140518.pdf
private uint 32 [] truncate(uint 32 [] words, int n) {
if (n > 32 || n < 0) { throw new IllegalArgumentException(”Invalid truncation
argument”); }
uint 32 [] t = new uint 32[words.length];
for ( int i = 0; i < words.length; i++) {
t [ i ] = words[i ];
}
t [words.length − 1] = t[words.length − 1] >> n;
for ( int i = words.length − 2; i >= 0; i−−) {
t [ i + 1] = t[i + 1] | (t [ i ] << (32 − n));






In comparison with the existing low-level implementation for ZeroCash that is
available in [62] and its gadget dependencies in [15], it can be observed how xJsnark
saves a lot of the programming effort, while producing efficient output as illustrated
in Section 3.6.3.
C.2 Criminal Smart Contracts
The section illustrates an actual smart contract for public leakage. This con-
tract fixes two main drawbacks with the existing Darkleaks protocol (Shortcomings
1 and 2 discussed in 5.2.1). The contract mainly enables better guarantees through
deposits and timeout procedures, while preventing selective withholding. The fol-
lowing code illustrates the contract code. The main goal of providing this code is
to illustrate how fast it could be to write such contracts.
data leaker address
data num chunks
data revealed set size
data T end
data deposit
data reveal block number






def init () :
self . leaker address = msg.sender
# A leaker commits to the hashes of the encryption keys, and sets the announcement details
def commit( key hashes:arr, revealed set size , reveal block number, T end,
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distribution address) :
# Assuming a deposit of a high value from the leaker to discourage aborting
if ( msg.value >= 1000000 and msg.sender == self.leaker address and self.deposit == 0 and
revealed set size < len(key hashes)):
self .deposit = msg.value
self .num chunks = len(key hashes)
self . revealed set size = revealed set size
self .T end = T end
self .reveal block number = reveal block number
i = 0
while( i < len(key hashes)):
self .key hashes[i ] = key hashes[i]





# The contract computes and stores the random indices based on the previous block hash.
The PRG is implemented using SHA3 here for simplicity.
# The contract does not have to check for the correctness of the sampled keys. This can be
done offline by the users .
if ( msg.sender == self.leaker address and len(sampled keys) == self. revealed set size and
block.number == self.reveal block number ):
seed = block.prevhash
c = 0
while(c < self . revealed set size ) :
if (seed < 0):
seed = 0 − seed
idx = seed % self.num chunks
# make sure idx was not selected before
while( self .selected sample[idx] == 1):
seed = sha3(seed)
if (seed < 0):
seed = 0 − seed
idx = seed % self.num chunks
self .selected sample[idx] = 1
seed = sha3(seed)





# Users verify the shown sample offline, and interested users donate money.
prev donation = self .donations[msg.sender]
if ( msg.value > 0 and block.timestamp <= self.T end and prev donation == 0):
self .donations[msg.sender] = msg.value
self .num donors = self.num donors + 1






# For the leaker to get the reward, the remaining keys have to be all revealed at once.
# The contract will check for the consistency of the hashes and the remaining keys this
time.
if ( msg.sender == self.leaker address and block.timestamp <= self.T end and




while(valid == 1 and idx1 < len(remaining keys)):
while( self .selected sample[idx2] == 1):
idx2 = idx2+1
key = remaining keys[idx1]
key hash = self .key hashes[idx2]




if (valid == 1):
send( self . leaker address , self .sum donations + self.deposit)







## This is a useful module that enables users to get their donations back if the leaker
aborted
v = self .donations[msg.sender]
if (block.timestamp > self.T end and self. finalized == 0 and v > 0):




The contract above considers a leaker who announces the ownership of the
leaked material (e-mails, photos, secret documents, .. etc), and reveals a random
subset of the encryption keys at some point to convince users of the ownership.
Interested users can then deposit donations. In order for the leaker to get the
reward from the contract, all the rest of the keys must be provided at the same
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time, before a deadline.
To ensure incentive compatability, the leaker is required by the contract in
the beginning to deposit an amount of money, that is only retrievable if complied
with the protocol. Also, for users to feel safe to deposit money, a timeout mechanism
is used, such that if the leaker does not provide a response in time, the users will
be able to withdraw the donations.
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